Poverty, inequality and the non-farm economy : the case of rural Vietnam by Mausch, Kai
Poverty, Inequality
and the Non-farm Economy:
The Case of Rural Vietnam
Von der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t
der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- Doctor rerum politicarum -
genehmigte Disseration
von
Dipl.-O¨k. Kai Mausch
geboren am 07.10.1980, in Glandorf
2010
.Kommisionsvorsitz: Prof. Dr. Ulrike Grote
Institut fu¨r Umwelto¨konomik und Welthandel
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Hermann Waibel
Institut fu¨r Entwicklungs- und Agraro¨konomik
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Javier Revilla Diez
Institut fu¨r Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeographie
Naturwissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover
Tag der Promotion: 04.01.2010
Abstract
i
ABSTRACT
Most Asian economies have made huge progress in poverty reduction in recent
years and Vietnam especially is one of the showpieces in income poverty reduction.
Furthermore, the transition from a centrally planned economy towards an open
market economy has resulted in successes in many fields. Despite these overall
achievements, regional and provincial disparities remained and in some cases even
increased. Poverty in remote regions is still at high levels, and privatization has
been successful mainly in the boom regions of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
With agricultural production being constantly faced with environmental haz-
ards like droughts, flooding and crop/livestock pests, the rural non-farm economy
becomes a key component in poverty reduction strategies, especially in rural ar-
eas. By providing additional income sources to the rural population, the non-farm
economy will serve as one means of increasing the resilience of these households to
setbacks. Besides providing the opportunity to diversify income, wage employment
in the non-farm economy will increase incomes, as wages are generally higher than
in the agricultural sector.
Three data sources are utilized to investigate the influence of non- and off-farm
income sources on poverty and inequality in rural areas. These are (i) a dataset
of about 2,200 rural households in three remote provinces of Middle Vietnam, (ii)
about 130 medium- and large-scale companies and (iii) a panel dataset of about
3,200 rural households from all provinces of Vietnam.
The analysis leads to the finding that besides generally known influential house-
hold characteristics, increased off-farm income shares, even in remote regions, in-
creases household incomes and consumption asset holdings. Furthermore, inequal-
ity among households with higher shares of income apart from farming activities is
less pronounced. Using the broader panel data for the whole of rural Vietnam, the
intertemporal dimension with regard to income structure has been added. Based
on the same household types used in the focused analysis of the three provinces,
the changes in income portfolios were analyzed for the 2002–2004 period. The
results showed that households’ income structure is extremely volatile, with house-
holds changing from pure agricultural production to pure non-farm employment
as their means of generating income. Based on these results, households were
grouped according to their 2002 and 2004 portfolios, and the concept of pro-poor
growth was used to investigate their performance. The results showed that house-
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holds changing their income sources were worse off in terms of poverty and income
when compared to non-switching households, for the first period. The positive
assessment is based on their intertemporal performance of poverty and inequality
reduction due to their higher growth rates.
Considering the lower poverty rates for households that generate higher shares
of income from sources other than farming, and the better performance of house-
holds that adjust their income portfolio, the provision of alternative sources of
income in the non-farm sector was found to be central to poverty reduction in
rural areas. Therefore, company data were analyzed, aiming at the identification
of the bottlenecks in their growth. Based on the special characteristics of Vietnam
as a transition economy, the focus was set on institutional factors. In terms of em-
ployment and profit, these factors were shown to have an influence on companies’
performance. Furthermore, the conditions in the research provinces, although all of
them are in Middle Vietnam and among the poorest of the Vietnamese provinces,
are considerably different. Based on their different history and location and current
conditions, the needs of companies are very different. Besides their common need
for skilled workers, some require better infrastructure to connect to the markets,
some lack reliable regulation by the provincial governments and some others need
a more open minded pro-private business attitude by the local authorities.
All in all, improvement of the local conditions of doing business are of central
importance for the reduction of rural poverty and the reduction of inequality within
the country. Furthermore, a ”one strategy fits all” solution on how to achieve
increased investments and growth in remote provinces cannot be given due to the
different needs and conditions.
Keywords: Rural Vietnam, Poverty, Household income composition
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die meisten asiatischen Staaten haben in den letzten Jahren enorme Fortschritte
im Bereich der Armutsreduzierung gemacht. Vietnam stellt in diesem Prozess ei-
nes der Musterbeispiele dar und hat die Milleniumsziele der Vereinten Nationen
zum Teil schon heute erreicht. Auch die Bemu¨hungen im Rahmen des Trans-
formationsprozesses, von einer zentral organisierten Planwirtschaft hin zu einer
offenen Marktwirtschaft, zeigen bereits Erfolge. Trotz dieser beeindruckenden Bi-
lanz gibt es auch hier noch viele Regionen die noch nicht von diesen Erfolgen
profitieren konnten. Immer noch gibt es Gebiete in denen Armut weit verbreitet
ist und die Privatisierung von Staatsunternehmen aufgrund von geringeren Markt-
chancen wenig erfolgreich verlief. Die Erfolgsregionen sind hauptsa¨chlich in den
o¨konomischen Zentren um Hanoi und Ho Chi Minh zu finden.
Des Weiteren ist die landwirtschaftliche Produktion speziell in den Ku¨sten- und
Bergregionen permanent der Gefahr von Umwelteinflu¨ssen wie Du¨rren, U¨berflut-
ungen, Pflanzenscha¨dlingen oder Tierseuchen ausgesetzt. Daher werden Bescha¨fti-
gungsmo¨glichkeiten im außerlandwirtschaftlichen Bereich als Schlu¨ssel zur Armuts-
reduzierung gerade in la¨ndlichen Ra¨umen angesehen. Neben den in der Regel ho¨-
heren Lo¨hnen, die in diesem Bereich erzielt werden, wu¨rden diese der la¨ndlichen
Bevo¨lkerung weitere Einkommensquellen o¨ffnen und somit ihre Anfa¨lligkeit gegen-
u¨ber Ru¨ckschla¨gen in anderen Bereichen reduzieren.
Um die Einflu¨sse von Bescha¨ftigungen außerhalb der selbststa¨ndigen landwirt-
schaftlichen Produktion zu analysieren, werden hier drei Datenquellen herange-
zogen. Diese sind: (i) ein Datensatz von circa 2.200 la¨ndlichen Haushalten aus
drei der a¨rmsten Provinzen Vietnams, (ii) Daten von ungefa¨hr 130 großen und
mittleren Unternehmen in denselben Provinzen und (iii) ein Paneldatensatz von
nahezu 3.200 Haushalten aus la¨ndlichen Gebieten ganz Vietnams.
Basierend auf Datensatz (i) wurde verdeutlicht, dass neben oftmals fokussierten
Haushaltseigenschaften gerade ho¨here Anteile an Einkommen aus Angestelltenver-
ha¨ltnissen oder selbststa¨ndiger außerlandwirtschaftlicher Ta¨tigkeit das Einkom-
men und die Konsumgu¨terausstattung von la¨ndlichen Haushalten zu einem großen
Teil beeinflussen. Außerdem ist die Ungleichverteilung von Einkommen im Ver-
gleich zu landwirtschaftlichen Haushalten weniger stark ausgepra¨gt. Aufbauend
auf diesen Ergebnissen werden die Paneldaten (ii) genutzt, um die Vera¨nderungen
der Einkommensstruktur im Zeitverlauf zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse fu¨r die
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Periode 2002–2004 zeigten, dass die Einkommensstruktur sich in vielen Fa¨llen er-
heblich vera¨nderte. Diese Vera¨nderungen sind teils extrem und Haushalte wech-
seln ihr Portfolio vollsta¨ndig von reiner landwirtschaftlicher Produktion hin zu
einer komplett von der selbststa¨ndigen Produktion abgewendeten Zusammenstel-
lung. Im Folgenden wurden die Einkommenszuwa¨chse und ihre Verteilung u¨ber die
Einkommensperzentile betrachtet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen deutlich, dass Haushalte
die ihr Portfolio angepasst haben, wesentlich besser abschneiden. Sie realisieren
ho¨here Wachstumsraten sowie ho¨here Armutsreduzierung. Allerdings waren diese
Haushalte in der ersten Periode mit zum Teil wesentlich niedrigeren Einkommen
und somit ho¨heren Armutsraten konfrontiert. Insgesamt zeigte sich jedoch deutlich
der positive Einfluss von Bescha¨ftigungen außerhalb der selbststa¨ndigen landwirt-
schaftlichen Produktion selbst fu¨r Haushalte in entlegenen Gebieten, in denen sich
Bescha¨ftigungsmo¨glichkeiten in der Regel auf benachbarte Farmen reduzieren.
Daher wurde im Folgenden die Entwicklung nicht landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe
betrachtet. Diese stellen die Basis fu¨r Wachstum und Bescha¨ftigungsmo¨glichkeiten
der Bevo¨lkerung dar und sind somit zentraler Bestandteil einer Armutsreduzierungs-
strategie. Bei der Analyse der Engpassfaktoren dieser Unternehmen wurde auf-
grund der Situation Vietnams als Transformationsland speziell auf Institutionen
eingegangen, da diese einen zentralen Bestandteil des Vera¨nderungsprozesses bilden.
Diese Faktoren zeigten einen deutlichen Einfluss sowohl auf die Bescha¨ftigtenanzahl
als auch auf den Gewinn der Betriebe. Es zeigte sich, dass sich trotz der großen
Gemeinsamkeiten der drei Provinzen das Umfeld und besonders die Qualita¨ten
der Provinzregierungen deutlich unterscheiden. Mit Ausnahme eines Mangels an
qualifiziertem Personal, das in allen Provinzen eine große Rolle spielt, sind auch
die Bedu¨rfnisse sehr unterschiedlich. Die anderen Faktoren, die nur fu¨r jeweils einen
der Standorte ein Rolle spielen, sind Ma¨ngel an der Infrastruktur, der Verla¨sslichkeit
lokaler gesetzlicher Regelungen sowie an der Anerkennung privater Unternehmer-
tums.
Zusammenfassend ist die Verbesserung der lokalen Strukturen und Bedingun-
gen fu¨r Unternehmen und ein nachhaltiges Wachstum der Wirtschaft von enormer
Bedeutung im Abbau von regionalen Disparita¨ten und Armut in la¨ndlichen Ge-
bieten. Allerdings zeigte sich auch, dass eine ”one strategy fits all”-Lo¨sung nicht
existiert und immer die regionalen Bedingungen und Strukturen beru¨cksichtigt
vi
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werden mu¨ssen, um Investitionen auch in weniger entwickelten Regionen attraktiv
zu machen.
Schlagworte: La¨ndliches Vietnam, Armut, Zusammensetzung von Haushalt-
seinkommen
vii
Table of Contents
Abstract i
Zusammenfassung iv
Table of Contents viii
List of Symbols and Abbreviations xi
List of Figures xiv
List of Tables xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Objectives of this study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Composition of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Background of the study and data used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Poverty and the Rural Non-farm Economy 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Poverty in Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Household survey design and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Poverty in the research provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.1 General characteristics of the households . . . . . . . . . . . 23
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2.5.2 Determinants of being income poor in the research area . . . 30
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Rural-Rural Differences in Pro-poor Growth 40
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1.1 The concepts of measuring pro-poor growth . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1.2 Previous empirical work on pro-poor growth . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Objectives and data used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Pro-poor growth in Vietnam 1993–2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Pro-poor growth in rural Vietnam 2002–2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4.1 Short term poverty dynamics and household income portfolio 51
3.4.2 Short term pro-poor growth performance across household
types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 Governmental Quality and Company Performance 68
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Vietnam’s economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Institutional economics and transition economies . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.1 Political economy approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3.2 Transaction cost based considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.3 The special case of institutions in a transition economy . . . 77
4.3.4 Empirical applications of the institutional economics concepts 80
4.4 Objectives and data used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.1 Objectives of this chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.2 Survey design and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 The effect of the institutional factors on the performance of the rural
non-farm economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.1 Description of the surveyed companies . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.2 The provincial business environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5.3 The perception of the business environment and the perfor-
mance of the companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.5.4 Effects of the business environment perceptions . . . . . . . 96
4.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
5 Conclusions and Recommendations 108
5.1 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Further research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Bibliography 122
A Appendices 135
A.1 World market coffee price monthly averages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.2 Regression variable description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.3 Regression variable correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A.4 Household typology changes and poverty rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A.5 T-test poverty differences by switchtypes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.6 Further growth incidence curves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.7 The questionnaire used for the company survey . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A.8 Variables used in the regressions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
A.9 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regressions. . . . . . . 152
A.10 Regression variable correlations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A.11 PCI scores of Vietnam’s provinces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
x
List of Symbols and Abbreviations
Symbol/Abbreviation Description / Definition
$ United States Dollar
% per cent
# Number (count)
ADB Asian Development Bank
AFD Agence Francaise de Developement
Coef. Coefficient
def. Definition
DFG Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Re-
search Foundation)
DFG FOR DFG Forschergruppe (DFG research Unit)
DFID United Kingdom Department for International
Development
eds. Editors
ed. Editor
e.g. For example
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIC Growth incidence Curve
...continues on next page
xi
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Symbol/Abbreviation Description / Definition
GPP Gross Provincial Product
GSO General Statistics Office of Vietnam
ha Hectare
HDI Human development index
HH Household
ICO International Coffee Organization
ICP International Comparison Program
i.e. That is
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IZA Institute for the Study of Labor
MDG Millennium development goals
MSE Mean squared Error
min Minutes
N Number of observations
n.a. Not available
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
OECD Organization For Economic Cooperation And
Development
pc Per capita
PCI Provincial Competitiveness Index
PDE Private domestic enterprises
PPG Pro-poor growth
PPP Purchasing power parity
Prob. Probability
RNFE Rural non-farm economy
RSE Robust standard error
Sign. Significance
SE Standard error
SEA South-East Asia
SOE State-owned enterprises
...continues on next page
xii
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Symbol/Abbreviation Description / Definition
thsd. Thousand
TT Hue Thua Thien Hue
UNDP United Nations Development Program
VHLSS Vietnam household living standard survey
VIF Variance inflation factor
VNCI Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative
VCCI Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry
xiii
List of Figures
1.1 DFG FOR 756 research area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Poverty rates rural Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Headcount rates by district 2002 and 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Sample stratification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 The sustainable livelihood framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Income distribution of households by household type. . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Consumption asset holdings by income group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Vietnam’s Growth Incidence Curve, 1993–2002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Household type shares by province 2002 and poverty rates by household
type and province 2002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Income composition changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Growth incidence curve for rural Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Growth incidence curves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6 PPG (2002–2004) for definitions I and II across provinces. . . . . . . . 66
4.1 GDP and employment structure by ownership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 Structure of GDP as share of total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 A framework of institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Research area - company survey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 Major expansion barriers of companies by province. . . . . . . . . . . . 93
xiv
List of Tables
2.1 Poverty indicators Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Output by sector and province. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Household characteristics by province. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Household income composition by province. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Household types by province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Income differences by sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 Income composition of households along income classes. . . . . . . . . . 27
2.8 Determinants of household income and consumption asset holdings. . . 33
3.1 Rates of pro-poor growth 1993–2002 by subregions. . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Poverty by household types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Household type (2002) Poverty Decomposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 Growth redistribution decomposition by household type. . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 Household typology changes and pro-poor growth rates. . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1 Transaction costs classification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Ease of doing business ranks of selected South Asian economies. . . . . 82
4.3 Representativeness of the sampled companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Sectoral distribution of companies by province. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 Surveyed companies description by province. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.6 Rating and importance of general business factors. . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.7 Rating and importance of infrastructure factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.8 Rating and importance of governmental quality indicators. . . . . . . . 92
xv
List of Tables
4.9 Provincial differences in the Index scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.10 Regression results for profit of companies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.11 Regression results for number of employees in 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.1 Drivers of household welfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2 Poverty and pro-poorness - summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Company performance - summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
xvi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
With growing public attention paid to the problems of increasing inequality and
slow progress toward reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), espe-
cially in Africa, [United Nations, 2006] but also in Asia, the question emerges: will
the poor ever be able to catch up in the process of global growth? Although the
South-East Asian (SEA) region has already more than accomplished the goal of
reducing the proportion of people living on less than $11 per day, the same suc-
cess concerning the proportion of people suffering from hunger has not yet been
achieved [United Nations, 2006]. More generally, the Asia-Pacific region is still
home to about two thirds of the world’s poor, emphasizing the task that still
remains [United Nations, 2007].
Economic theory predicts convergence, and actually the inequality across coun-
tries did decline in the 1970–2000 period. Yet, worldwide within country inequality
rose [Sala-i-Martin, 2006] especially in developing countries [Scha¨tzl, 2003; Shankar
and Shah, 2001; Venables, 2003; World Bank, 2003]. The extreme rural/urban dif-
ferences are one influential cause for this problem as the majority of poor people
life in rural areas of developing countries. This emphasizes the importance of de-
signing successful strategies for the development and strengthening of these regions
[United Nations, 2005a]. The share of poor people living and/or working in rural
areas is estimated at 75% [United Nations, 2005a]. The situation in the Asia and
Pacific region is slightly more equal between rural and urban areas with only 70%
of the poor population living in rural areas. However, taking the case of Vietnam,
where this share was estimated to be 92.3% for 2002 [United Nations, 2007], the
picture changes, and for Vietnam the importance of the urban/rural divide be-
comes even clearer. Therefore, effective strategies to overcome extreme poverty
all over the world need to consider the particular characteristics of rural areas to
adequately meet the needs of the rural poor.
Besides the already higher poverty incidences and severity in rural areas, envi-
ronmental shocks will affect mono structured regions, like the mostly agricultural
1$1 was about 16.500 Dong during the time of the survey [Association of German Banks,
2008, 11.01.2008]. $1 PPP converts to 4713 Dong [ICP, 2008]. (These conversion rates are
applied throughout the thesis.)
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
dominated rural areas in Vietnam, even more and will therefore further increase
the disparities [Duncan and Pollard, 2002].
One prominent and widely discussed path out of poverty is income diversifi-
cation of rural farmers into the rural non-farm economy (RNFE) via wage- or
self-employment. The connection between the poverty status of households and
their participation in the RNFE has been the subject of multiple theoretical and
empirical studies over the last decade, and these mainly concluded that partic-
ipation in the non-farm economy contributes to poverty reduction in developing
countries. Furthermore, the promotion of wage-employment in remote and low
income areas is a successful strategy in overcoming income inequalities within a
country [Collier, 2007; Schupp, 2002]. In developing countries in particular, agri-
cultural production is constantly endangered by adverse environmental conditions
such as droughts, crop pests and animal illnesses. Additionally, high reliance on
subsistence as well as few (often only one) marketed products makes these house-
holds especially vulnerable as they are therefore heavily dependent on a price that
fluctuates widely and often on short notice [Dercon, 1996; Dercon and Krishnan,
1996; Reardon, 1997].
That is why the rural non-farm economy and its spatial dimension has been
identified as a priority for future research aiming at reducing thevulnerability of
those households [Haggblade et al., 2007b] especially there are relatively few stud-
ies disaggregating rural non-farm activities using household data [Reardon et al.,
2007]. Generally, off- and non-farm employments are considered to result in higher
and especially more stable income as compared to farming, due to less exposure to
environmental conditions [Dercon, 2002].
Nevertheless, in order to overcome the extensive differences within developing
countries, the agricultural sector is often focused on as it is the main basis for rural
income generation. However, as elaborated above, the rural non-farm economy
plays a key role in rural development. As smallholder farms dominate agricultural
production, the demographic pressure will soon reduce farm sizes to an extent that
will further undermine the possibility of survival from smallholder farming. Here,
the non-farm economy has to enrich the rural economy and provide additional
income sources for the population. Promoting the already dynamic rural non-farm
economy, especially outside the major cities, and linking those to the markets will
3
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not only benefit the non-farm sector but will also improve the competitiveness of
agricultural markets and additionally support the poor [World Bank, 2007b].
Even though the jobs created by a newly developing rural industrialization will
not be ”wonderful” at first, they will improve the living conditions of the rural
poor. Once enough jobs are available, the benefits will spill over to the families
of the workers and their communities, and the rural economy will start to grow
[Collier, 2007]. Not only researchers, but also the poor, know that self- and wage
employment opportunities are the most promising path out of poverty [Narayan
et al., 2000]. However, one should not lose sight of agricultural development as it is
still constitutes the basic livelihood of many poor people and furthermore ensures
the food supply of most developing countries [World Bank, 2007b].
In Vietnam the RNFE slowly gained ground [Minot et al., 2006] and poverty
reduction was mostly successful, giving Vietnam an ”enviable position among the
developing countries” [Minot et al., 2006, p.1]. During the period 1992–1998 Viet-
nam reduced poverty rates by 4% a year which is about double than the average 2%
Asian average, leading to Vietnam already achieving the Millennium Development
Goal of halving income poverty.
Nevertheless, there remain several issues to be resolved [van de Walle and
Cratty, 2004]. The main problem in Vietnam is still the increasing disparities
between the successful and growing Delta regions (Mekong Delta and Red River
Delta) and rural areas - in particular the Upland regions. These regions are char-
acterized by poor infrastructure, high reliance on the agricultural sector and a
large share of ethnic minorities [Minot et al., 2006]. Especially in Middle Vietnam
and along the 3,444 km coast line [CIA, 2009], households are very vulnerable to
environmental risks that mainly affect agricultural production. These regions are
prone to typhoons, storm surges, flash floods, drought and saline water intrusion
for the coastal areas, and flash floods and landslides for the mountainous areas in
central Vietnam [Chaudhry and Ruysschaert, 2007].
1.2 Objectives of this study
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the influence of non- and off-farm
employment participation of the rural population in some of the least developed
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regions in Vietnam on poverty, growth and inequality. Furthermore, the possibil-
ities of growth for the rural companies that offer such wage employments will be
explored. The specific objectives are:
1. Quantify the extent of non- and off-farm reliance in rural areas in one of the
least developed regions in Vietnam, i.e. Middle Vietnam.
2. Identify the characteristics that determine the welfare status of rural house-
holds in Vietnam with special focus on their income portfolios.
3. Identify the extent of short-term fluctuations in the income portfolios of
households in rural areas of Vietnam.
4. Investigate the differences in the pro-poor growth performance, not only
across provinces, but extend previous research by taking the income port-
folios of households into account as a further parameter.
5. Thereby shed light on the difference in the extent to which farming, off-farm
employment and a mixture of these two income sources benefits the poor.
6. Examine the extent of differences in the institutional settings, i.e. infras-
tructure, governmental quality and transaction costs, among three remote
provinces in Vietnam.
7. Explore the effects of these possible differences on the economic performance
and employment generation of the companies operating in those provinces.
1.3 Composition of the thesis
The thesis is organized into five chapters. This first chapter gave an overview of
the research problem and the scope of the thesis, as well as the objectives that
will be pursued. Furthermore, the remaining part of this chapter will give a brief
overview of the data used for the different topics and introduce the research unit
in which the thesis was embedded.
The second chapter will analyze the importance of the rural non-farm economy
in three rural provinces of Vietnam and thereby target objectives one and two.
The chapter will give an overview of the literature in this field of research and a
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detailed presentation of the poverty trends and the current situation. Furthermore,
the data used and the underlying conceptual framework will be introduced in detail
before the analysis and findings are presented.
Chapter three will start with the concept of pro-poor growth. Using this concept
and several decomposition of poverty and inequality techniques, the chapter will
focus on objectives three to five. The data used for this chapter will also introduced
and previous work will be described in depth. Building on chapter one, the chapter
will be supplemented here by using panel data to gain more insight of the short
term intertemporal dynamics of poverty and inequality dynamics, again focusing
on the households’ income composition. The chapter will end by summarizing the
findings.
Chapter four will then switch the focus from a direct household perspective to-
wards the rural companies. Their performance and their prospects and limitations
for growth are analyzed, focusing on institutional issues. As in previous chapters,
the literature in the field is described, the objectives are given and the data used
are presented. Additionally, the trends in the Vietnamese economy and its current
issues are provided, together with a detailed presentation of the concept of institu-
tional economics, with a special focus on transition economies before the analysis
of the situation in the research area. The analysis will then focus on objectives six
and seven prior to a short summary.
The fifth and final chapter then presents a summary and conclusions from the
study, lays out the overall policy implications and ends with recommendations for
further research needs identified in this study.
1.4 Background of the study and data used
This study has been part of the DFG Research Unit FOR 756 ”Impact of shocks on
the vulnerability to poverty: consequences for development of emerging Southeast
Asian economies”. The research group comprises two base projects and three
special projects. The research unit aims at theoretically and empirically advancing
the concept as well as the methodology for measuring vulnerability to poverty.
Base project one is working towards the development of conceptually sound and
empirically tractable measures of vulnerability, taking into account the endogeneity
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of household structures as well as intra-household dynamics. Base project two
worked on the organization of the household survey presented in the preceding
section and will generate panel data from about 5,000 households in Vietnam and
Thailand, and facilitates the integration of the three special projects. The whole
research area can be seen in figure 1.1.
The three special projects focus on agriculture, financial institutions and eco-
nomic geography. The agricultural project is mainly working on the intra-sectoral
issues of farm production and marketing of agricultural production. The second
project investigates vulnerability-related issues of saving, credit and investment
from intertemporal and interpersonal perspectives. The third project, in which
this study was carried out, focuses on inter regional and inter sectoral issues such
as migration and off-farm employment. The special projects work in close collab-
oration with each other and with the two base projects.
Although detailed information on the data used will be presented in the respec-
tive chapters, a brief overview is given here for easier orientation. Based on the
different nature and requirements of the three chapters of this study, the data used
in each chapter are different, although there are several common characteristics.
First, the Vietnam data from the DFG FOR 756 household survey of about
5,000 rural households in Middle Vietnam and North Eastern Thailand is used.
This survey includes about 2,500 households in Vietnam, whose data is used in
the second chapter. Second, data from the Vietnam household living standards
survey 2002 and 2004 are used for several background analysis on Vietnam as well
as for the panel analysis that is required for chapter three on pro-poor growth.
Third, data from an own survey, conducted in the research provinces of the DFG
FOR 756 household survey, is used. This covers about 130 large and medium-large
companies.
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Figure 1.1: DFG FOR 756 research area.
Source: Hardeweg, B. Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover; Updated version of http://
www.vulnerability-asia.uni-hannover.de/projects.html.
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Chapter 2
Poverty and the Rural Non-farm
Economy in Vietnam1
1An adapted version of this chapter is submitted to the Review of Income and Wealth as:
Mausch, K. and Revilla Diez, J. (2009), Does diversification into off-farm activities elevate the
welfare status of rural households in Vietnam?
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2.1 Introduction
Although it is not explicitly mentioned in the United Nations Millennium Develop-
ment goals, off-farm wage and self-employment is increasingly recognized as a core
component of poverty and inequality reduction, especially for the rural population.
The connection between the poverty status of households and their participation
in the RNFE has been the subject of multiple theoretical and empirical studies
over the last decade [Barrett et al., 2001; Collier, 2007; Davis et al., 2007; Gaiha
and Imai, 2007; Gaiha et al., 2007; Gallup, 2004; Haggblade et al., 2007a; Lanjouw
and Lanjouw, 2001; Otsuka and Yamano, 2006; Schupp, 2002; Stampini and Davis,
2008; van de Walle and Cratty, 2004; World Bank, 2007b]. The underlying ques-
tions were either 1) whether income diversification into non-farm activities leads
to poverty reduction or, if that was already the underlying assumption, 2) which
factors affect the households’ decision or potential to participate in the RNFE.
With income diversification being the norm for most households [Barrett et al.,
2001] and the RNFE already accounting for 35–50% of rural incomes, it can be
nothing other than a central topic in rural poverty analysis [Haggblade et al.,
2007a]. Although agriculture still plays a major role in rural income generation ac-
tivities, the question is how the RNFE, as a complementary engine of rural growth,
can best be facilitated [Davis et al., 2007]. ”The fastest and surest way of reducing
income inequality is to promote employment in low income regions.”[Schupp, 2002,
p.1713] This is especially relevant in a densely populated country like Vietnam,
where land parcels are small, fragmented small-scale farm productivity is limited
and non-farm incomes are of crucial importance [Otsuka and Yamano, 2006; van
de Walle and Cratty, 2004].
Agricultural labor, although providing easily accessible jobs and some degree
of risk diversification to the rural population, has four major disadvantages com-
pared to the RNFE. Firstly, agricultural employment is often seasonal and thus
leaves the workers unemployed for long periods. This unemployment could be ab-
sorbed by the RNFE, which encompasses less seasonality [Gaiha and Imai, 2007].
Secondly, agricultural work is, according to the International Labour Organization
(ILO), one of the most dangerous of all occupations. Workers face safety and en-
vironmental hazards and are rarely covered by general labor regulations. Thirdly,
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the returns on education are lower than those on jobs in the non-farm economy
[World Bank, 2007b]. This implies that the increased educational achievements in
developing countries can better be converted into poverty reduction via non-farm
employment. Finally, non-farm employment relaxes farmers’ credit constraints
that often constitute entry barriers to new technologies and markets for poor rural
farmers [Stampini and Davis, 2008].
Another important role of the RNFE is the reduction of rural-urban differ-
ences. The non-farm economy has grown considerably faster in urban areas and
has thus fostered migration towards the overcrowded urban centers of countries or
regions. This could be balanced by a stronger rural non-farm economy [Gallup,
2004; Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2001; van de Walle and Cratty, 2004].
Besides the importance of the RNFE, pro-poor policy design depends on the
knowledge of the factors that influence households’ poverty status. Recent research
found several common factors that directly affect the income levels of households.
The first and most commonly found factor was that higher education is generally
associated with a lower likelihood of being poor [Gaiha et al., 2007; Otsuka and
Yamano, 2006; van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; World Bank, 2007b]. More
highly educated workers are able to find lucrative non-farm jobs while poorly or
uneducated workers depend on agricultural wage employment, which is typically
lower paid [Otsuka and Yamano, 2006]. This finding is qualified, as the returns on
education also depend on locational factors, such as the fact that non-farm jobs
are not available in some areas [van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001]. Further-
more, bearing the costs of education obviously poses a bigger challenge to poor
households. In addition to the direct costs, such as school fees and travel expenses,
which are high for poor households anyway, the opportunity costs of labor time
not devoted to the family farms also have to be taken into account [World Bank,
2007b].
Another observation, especially in Vietnam, is that ethnic minorities are eco-
nomically disadvantaged [Gaiha et al., 2007; van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001].
This is partly based on the fact that these groups live in remote mountainous ar-
eas that offer fewer income generation possibilities, but even comparing minority
households to majority households in the same region results in the same findings.
This is despite governmental programs specifically tackling poverty in ”ethnic mi-
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nority areas”. These programs, which are supposed to address the special needs of
minorities, often result in the support being given to majority households living in
predominantly minority regions, thus not reaching the target group [van de Walle
and Gunewardena, 2001].
Several other factors are discussed but are not generally tested due to different
focuses and different data sets being used. One further factor is the amount of land
owned by the household, which directly affects the production possibilities and thus
their income. The dependency burden is found to have a negative impact, as people
who do not earn their own income lower the per capita income of the household
[Gaiha and Imai, 2007; Gaiha et al., 2007]. Finally, households that derive their
income only from farming, which are most common in rural areas, are generally
the poorest households [Barrett et al., 2001; van de Walle and Cratty, 2004].
Despite the fact that non-farm employment and income diversification seem
to increase mean incomes, there are concerns that these factors may actually in-
crease inequality, as it is mainly the relatively well-off households that are able to
participate [Bonschab and Klump, 2007; Canagarajah et al., 2001; Lanjouw and
Lanjouw, 2001; Otsuka and Yamano, 2006; van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001].
While Otsuka and Yamano [2006] found that increased non-farm income genera-
tion possibilities do lower the gap between the favored and unfavored groups (i.e.
ethnic minorities or people from remote areas), Lanjouw and Lanjouw [2001] found
that despite the unfavored group being increasingly able to participate in non-farm
activities, they generally find lower paid employment, which in fact increases in-
come inequality. This is why inequality has to be investigated in its many national
settings, as the effects can vary [Canagarajah et al., 2001]. In the case of Vietnam,
inequality was extended even after the land reform, as authorities tended to give
privileges to the richer households. These households were then supposed to be
able to invest to a larger extent and create jobs, but the practice merely left the
poorer households landless as before [van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001]. Fur-
thermore, the Gini coefficient rose by 20% for urban areas and 33% for rural areas
from 1998 to 2002 [Bonschab and Klump, 2007].
In this study the non-farm sector is defined more widely, as wage employment,
even in agriculture, will most likely reduce risks for the household. Also agricultural
shocks like crop pests will, most of the time, not affect all households to the same
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extent and thus the off-farm income source will still be available. Therefore, the
following analysis will focus on off-farm employment and the term diversification
refers to either diversification of income sources or diversification of sectors, and
the term rural non-farm economy will be used more widely in a rural off-farm econ-
omy sense. Therefore, off-farm employment includes all activities that are outside
self-employed farming and livestock keeping. Furthermore, the term farming will
always refer to self-employed farming and excludes wage labor in the agricultural
sector.
As elaborated earlier, the objective of this chapter is to identify the character-
istics that determine the welfare status of rural households in Vietnam. Special
attention is given to the influence of off-farm incomes. In contrast to previous
research, this study focuses only on remote rural areas in order to address the real
characteristics of the target population, and does not include urban or boom areas.
In most research on RNFE, the samples are based on observations for entire coun-
tries, and try to establish general patterns and do not address the special group
that lags behind in development. All in all, the connection between poverty and
the participation in non-farm and off-farm activities is tried to establish based on
a broad sample in a specific region, especially addressing those who lag behind, i.e.
the rural poor.
2.2 Poverty in Vietnam
Vietnam, like most Asian economies, made impressive progress in achieving the
MDG [United Nations, 2005b]. Furthermore, the Human Development Index2
(HDI) outlines Vietnam’s successes in development. With a HDI value of 0.733,
Vietnam is currently ranked 105th of the 177 countries included in the report and
is categorized in the group showing medium human development. Nevertheless,
comparing this value to those for the rest of South-East Asia, Vietnam remains,
alongside Laos (0.601) and Cambodia (0.589), one of the lowest performing coun-
tries in this region [Watkins, 2007].
2The index is a measure that combines several indicators on human development to an index
ranging between zero and one, where one is the best score.
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Table 2.1: Poverty indicators Vietnam.
Indicator Unit 1993 1998 2002 2004 2005
Povertya % 58.1 37.4 28.9 24.1 12.9
Urban % 25.1 9.2 6.6 10.8 n.a.
Rural % 66.4 45.5 35.6 27.5 n.a.
Ethnic minorities % 86.4 75.2 69.3 n.a. n.a.
Food poverty % 24.9 15.0 9.9 7.8 10.9
Living with less than
$1/day
% 39.9 16.4 13.6 10.6 2.2
Gini coefficient 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.37 n.a.
Notes: a: Here the national poverty line is referred to.
Source: Own presentation based on United Nations [2005b, p.3].
Table 2.1 shows that the fight against extreme poverty was very successful in the
past decade with the incidence of poverty3 reduced to 12.9%, food poverty reduced
to less than 50% of the level in 1993 and the share of people living with less than
$1 PPP per day reduced to 2%. Nonetheless, recent research has produced some
doubts as to whether this trend will continue, with fears that it might slow down
or even reverse [Gaiha et al., 2007]. This is also reflected in the declining pro-poor
growth figures, which fell from 5.7% for the 1993-1998 period to only 2.2% for the
1998-2002 period [Bonschab and Klump, 2007].
Furthermore, some groups were not able to benefit from the recent boom. Di-
viding out the poverty rate and the poverty gap4 into the rural and urban popu-
lations and the ethnic minorities, one can see that the rural population is lagging
behind with the latest poverty rate (headcount ratio5) figure of 27.5%, while eth-
nic minorities had as much as 69.3% of the population living in poverty in 2002.
Additionally, after a decade of constant decline, the food poverty rate rose again
from 2004 to 2005 and the Gini coefficient rose continuously from 0.34 in 1993 to
3The national poverty line was set at 200,000 Dong ($1.29 PPP per day / $0.40 [ICP, 2008])
for rural areas. Due to recent inflation, these thresholds were adjusted to 300,000 Dong ($2.09
PPP per day) for rural areas.[Vietnam News, 2008]
4”Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having
zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of
poverty as well as its incidence.”[World Bank, 2007b, p.348]
5The absolute number of poor divided by the total population size. Here, the terms headcount
ratio and poverty rate are used analog.
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(a) 2002 (N=3132). (b) 2004 (N=3132).
Figure 2.1: Poverty rates rural Vietnam.
Source: Own calculations based on: GSO [2002; 2004]. Map using ADePT Maps 2.0
[2009].
0.37 in 2005 suggesting a ”pro-rich” / ”anti-poor” growth rather than pro-poor
growth.
Vietnam does also not constitute an exception when it comes to regional dis-
parities. As shown in table 2.1 as well as in figure 2.1, the regional distribution
of income in Vietnam is mainly concentrated in the boom regions of Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh City, which is also reflected in the rural-urban disparity. Therefore,
poverty headcount ratios are also very different across the provinces, with the low-
est ratios generally found in just those boom regions and the highest rates are in
the Northern and Central highlands. The large poverty reduction can also be seen
from figure 2.1 where poverty rates are far lower for figure 2.1b compared to fig-
ure 2.1a. Generally, despite impressive poverty reduction achievements, the ethnic
and spatial poverty trends persist, leaving ethnic minorities and remote households
behind the overall positive trend [Gaiha et al., 2007].
As one example, figure 2.2 shows disaggregated district level poverty differences
for the research provinces of DFG FOR 756. Besides the poverty reduction that
also took place in these provinces, the huge differences even within these smaller
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(a) 2002 (N=3132). (b) 2004 (N=3132).
Figure 2.2: Headcount rates by district 2002 and 2004.
Source: Own calculations based on: GSO [2002; 2004];
Map generated using ADePT Maps 2.0 [2009].
regional units is visible. All provinces have poverty rates ranging from below 15%
for some districts to more than 60% for other districts. This is not only based
on the already elaborated disparities between mountainous and coastal areas but
apparently also on other factors that go beyond the basic geographical facts. These
might have to do with, for example, off-farm wage employment opportunities, which
will be analyzed in the following.
2.3 Household survey design and data
Our research group’s (DFG FOR 756) research area are three provinces in North-
Eastern Thailand, i.e. Nakhon Phanom, Ubon Ratchathani and Buri Ram, as well
as three provinces in Middle Vietnam, i.e. Ha Tinh, Thua Thien Hue (TT Hue)
and Dak Lak. This study refers to the Vietnamese provinces only. The provinces
were selected as representing some of the poorest within each country.
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Besides their common characteristic of having only one major city (the provin-
cial capital) and no other medium or large cities, as well as only a small industrial
sector, the three provinces in Vietnam have quite considerable differences concern-
ing their basic geographic and economic characteristics.
First, Ha Tinh Province is located in the North-Central region of Vietnam.
Ha Tinh’s economy is dominated by agricultural production. In 2006, agricul-
ture/fishery and forestry accounted for 43% of the provincial gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). With only 39 thousand inhabitants, the provincial capital of Ha Tinh
(Ha Tinh City) is a rather small center in the province [The Ha Tinh Statistical Of-
fice, 2007]. The per capita industrial and agricultural outputs are far less than the
country’s average production [GSO, 2008c]. The provincial poverty headcounts are
estimated at 44.5% for the whole province and at 47.4% for rural Ha Tinh [Minot
et al., 2003]. Ha Tinh province has been faced with major outflows of migrants
for decades. Between 1994 and 1999 Ha Tinh faced a population loss of 4.1%. As
most of the migrants are highly educated young people, this brain drain6 acts to
reduce the welfare of the province and reduce economic growth in the long run
[Bahrenkamp, 2005].
Second, TT Hue is located in central Vietnam, bordering the third biggest city
of Vietnam, Da Nang. Its economy is more diversified compared to Ha Tinh. Agri-
culture/fishery and forestry accounts for only 20% of the provincial GDP (GPP)
while industry/construction and service account for 36% and 44% respectively. Of
the three provinces, TT Hue is the only one with a considerably higher output per
capita from industrial production compared to agricultural production (table 2.2).
With 331 thousand inhabitants, or 30% of the total population, the provincial cap-
ital of Hue province (Hue City) is the economic center and the main destination
for tourists visiting Hue. More than 400 thousand international and more than
one million Vietnamese tourists stayed at least one night in Hue city in 2006 [The
Thua Thien Hue Statistical Office, 2007]. The industrial output is more than twice
as high as in the other two provinces but still lags far behind Vietnam’s average
production [GSO, 2008c]. The poverty headcount is estimated at 47.2% for the
6Brain drain refers to the situation in which the highly educated people from a country/region
migrate to another and the home country/region only bares the cost of their education but can
not profit from them due to migration [Wong and Yip, 1999].
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whole province, with the rural poverty headcount being as high as 57.9% [Minot
et al., 2003].
Table 2.2: Output by sector and province.
Output per capita in 1994 prices ($)
Agriculture Industry
Ha Tinh 76 80
TT Hue 42 253
Dak Lak 199 90
Vietnam 106 868
Sources: Based on GSO [2008c].
Third, Dak Lak province is located in the central highlands of Vietnam. The
provincial capital Boun Ma Thout with 321 thousand inhabitants is the only eco-
nomic center in the province. The province derives most of its income from coffee
plantations and processing, and is Vietnam’s major coffee producer. Vietnam ac-
counts for about 15% of the world’s coffee production and 50% of the worldwide
robusta exports [ICO, 2008a]. This is also reflected in the dominance (>50%) of
agriculture in the GPP composition [The Dak Lak Statistical Office, 2007] and the
above average agricultural production [GSO, 2008c]. Based on its coffee produc-
tion, Dak Lak province, although landlocked (which is often seen as a disadvantage
for economic development) achieved major poverty reduction. The poverty head-
count was reduced to 39.5% [Minot et al., 2003]. As the coffee prices have increased
greatly over the last few years, the poverty headcount is most likely even lower by
now. After almost a decade of low coffee prices, recent years have been charac-
terized by a constant and strong increase in coffee prices, even for the low price
variety robusta that is mainly planted in Vietnam. Since 2004 coffee prices have
almost tripled [ICO, 2008b]. Nonetheless, as this drastic price fluctuation shows,
the coffee industry and thus the households linked to this industry are prone to
changes in the world market that can be huge in relatively short time periods (see
Appendix A.1, page 136).
Within the locations presented above, a three stage sampling procedure was
carried out. Due to the high heterogeneity in terms of population density and
agro-ecological conditions, provinces were subdivided into three zones: coastal area
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(blue), mountain area (green) and rice plain area (yellow) (see Figure 2.3). Dak
Lak was divided into mountain and rice plain area only as it has no coast. In
Figure 2.3: Sample stratification.
Source: Own presentation based on Hardeweg et al. [2007].
the first step, sub-districts were sampled randomly with a probability derived from
the size differentials with respect to the predefined zones. In the second stage, sur-
veyed villages were chosen randomly again based on the sizes of two villages within
the sub-district. Finally, the households were sampled from an equal probability
sampling procedure with implicit stratification by household size. Based on this
sampling procedure, an oversampling of small strata with low population density
(i.e. mountainous area) could not be avoided [Hardeweg et al., 2007]. Therefore,
in the analysis later, this fact is accounted for by incorporating a weighting based
on the sampling probabilities of each household.7 All in all, our sample covers the
7For details on the weights see [Hardeweg et al., 2007].
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people in need living in the least favorable areas and is designed especially for the
analysis of poverty-related topics.8
2.4 Conceptual framework
The underlying concept for this chapter is the sustainable livelihood framework
developed by Ellis [1998]. His approach combines several earlier approaches to
poverty analysis. The framework is based on the consideration of livelihood di-
versification as a possible instrument to reduce vulnerability to poverty of rural
households. He defines livelihood diversification as:
”[...] the process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio
of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival
and in order to improve their standards of living.”
He concludes that: ”Diverse rural livelihoods are less vulnerable than undiversi-
fied ones” [Ellis, 2000] as the negative implications are outweighed by the positive
impacts. Figure 2.4 indicates the different livelihoods of households and their inter-
actions. The central parts of the households’ livelihoods are their assets. Besides
financial assets, these include cash earnings from farm production (crop, livestock
and aquaculture sales), non-farm self-employment, wages, rent, remittances and
other kinds of cash income. They also include in-kind payments, such as home-
consumed farm produce or in-kind transfers from other households, as well as social
capital like kin, family or village. Finally, natural resources such as air and water
form the most basic part of the asset portfolio.
Besides its assets, a household’s livelihood consists of the social and public
services, such as education, health facilities or infrastructure that the household
can access or profit from. The institutional setting greatly influences the livelihoods
of rural households. Institutions determine not only property rights but also the
enforcement mechanisms of contracts and the ease of doing business or the security
of employment. Additionally, institutions also cover social norms, culture and other
intangible assets that determine the behavior of people/households [Ellis, 1998].
8The questionnaire used can be downloaded from http://www.vulnerability-asia.
uni-hannover.de/downloadspublic.html.
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Figure 2.4: The sustainable livelihood framework
Source: Adapted from [Mo¨llers and Buchenrieder, 2005, p.22]; according to [Ellis,
1998, p.4].
All these livelihoods are prone to external shocks and stresses that may lead
to decreases or increases in the levels of these livelihoods. On the one hand, the
main interest of research into vulnerability to poverty is the ability of households
to absorb negative shocks so that, even faced with adverse conditions, their liveli-
hoods are still guaranteed. On the other hand, positive shocks are of interest as
well. Faced with the question of how to get people out of poverty, positive shocks
caused by political decisions (for example redistribution policies, infrastructure in-
vestments, ...) may assist in shifting the livelihoods of the rural poor above the
poverty line and providing them with the opportunities to stay out of poverty.
Thus, the dynamic measure of vulnerability to poverty is closely linked to the
livelihood framework and to the static measures of poverty research. Estimates of
vulnerability try to evaluate the change in welfare over time by taking into account
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the fluctuations over time, the likelihood of these fluctuations to occur, as well as
the resilience of households [Gaiha et al., 2007]. A vulnerability measure, in con-
trast to the multiple ex post measures of poverty (for example income poverty, food
poverty, ...), evaluates the ex ante risk of staying poor or becoming poor [Chaudhuri
et al., 2001]. The concept of vulnerability is not explicitly included in this study as
vulnerability is dynamic and thus usually requires a panel data set. Nevertheless,
vulnerability considerations underlie most parts of the analysis. Using theoretical
models of intertemporal household behavior would allow for vulnerability analysis
from cross-sectional data, but it includes multiple theoretical assumptions, mean-
ing that a panel data set should be the ideal basis for the analysis of vulnerability
as it draws upon the real behavior of households [Chaudhuri et al., 2001]. Because
the panel data is not yet available at this point and the panel data of the VHLSS
do not provide enough detail to be suitable for the analysis, this chapter focuses
on poverty-related questions.
The concept of vulnerability implies that diversified livelihoods should serve
as vulnerability-reducing factors, as most shocks will not affect different types of
income or different sectors to the same extent, enabling households to maintain a
certain level of income and consumption. One way to diversify livelihoods consti-
tutes taking up employment in the RNFE in addition to working on the family
farm. A well functioning RNFE thus provides households with the preconditions
necessary to secure their livelihoods [Stampini and Davis, 2008]. Nevertheless,
farming is usually not completely abandoned as it also serves as a safety net in
case another income source, such as non-farm employment, fails. Furthermore,
subsistence agriculture is a traditional occupation and will still be pursued by the
household members who do not work.
The diversification into different farming activities is not taken into account for
this study as most farming activities are prone to similar shocks in environmental
conditions (such as floods or droughts). Although the influence of the world market
might differ based on the type of crop or livestock, the main shocks still result from
environmental conditions and thus affect most farm activities to the same extent.
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2.5 Poverty in the research provinces
2.5.1 General characteristics of the households
In order to gain some insight into the household structure as a basis for the analysis
of the poverty implications, the household characteristics are shown in table 2.3.
As the sampled households represent those that lag behind in the development
process (i.e. rural households in the least developed provinces), the shares of poor
households are higher for our sample compared to Vietnam in general.9 With 26%,
Dak Lak has the lowest share of poor households of the three provinces, which is still
considerably higher than the figure for the whole country (12.9%). The share for
the other provinces is even higher with 36% and 45% being considered poor in case
of TT Hue and Ha Tinh respectively. The education of the household heads varies,
Table 2.3: Household characteristics by province.a
Unit Ha Tinh TT Hue Dak Lak
Poor householdsb % 45 36 26
Education HH head years 8.4 6.8 7.2
HH Head age years 51 48 44
Ethnic minority HH’s % 0 24 38
House m2 pc 18 16 17
Land size hectare pc 0.14 0.20 0.27
Kids (<16) and elderly (>70) % 40 43 41
Distance to provincial capital min 99 69 80
Households with access to
electricity
% 97 94 90
Note: a: All values are means (N=2195).
Note: b: Here the national poverty line of 300,000 Dong for rural areas is applied.
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
with the most educated household heads living in Ha Tinh and the least educated
in TT Hue. Considering the provincial characteristics, this is a surprising result, as
one would expect that the more off-farm opportunities households have, the more
9The income calculation follows the concept of Johnson et al.. Incomes were derived from the
different sections of the household questionnaire. All income figures mentioned are net incomes
with the expenditure for each respective income source already deducted. Income can therefore
be negative in some cases. Furthermore, non-monetary benefits are taken at their market value
and included in the income aggregate.
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people would invest in education in order to meet the requirements for getting those
more highly paid jobs. Here, the opposite theoretical effect of opportunity costs of
education (referring to the fact that people miss the opportunity of earning money
whilst attending school) seems to be dominant. One possible explanation for this
observation is that formal education is not the major determinant for getting an
off-farm job in these provinces, which is common in agriculture, but especially so
in Vietnam where people also rely more on other factors such as kinship or similar
relationships.
As mentioned above, Dak Lak province’s main income source is agriculture.
Therefore, the land area per capita is considerably greater for this province. Besides
some cashew nut and corn production, the absolutely dominant cash crop in Dak
Lak is coffee. In Ha Tinh, the dominant cash crop is rice, although sweet potato and
peanuts also have a significant share. The picture in TT Hue is slightly different.
Although rice is also the major cash crop there, glue tree and fruit production, the
second and third most common crops, are almost as common as rice.
Table 2.4 shows that households in the three provinces are fundamentally dif-
ferent. Looking at the total income figures, as well as the composition of these in-
comes, it turns out that there are basic differences even among these least developed
provinces in Vietnam. The most obvious are the mean incomes per capita of the
Table 2.4: Household income composition by province.a
Indicator Unit Ha Tinh TT Hue Dak Lak
Income per month $per capita 27 30 41
Farm income % 16 12 21
Off-farm income (agrar
sector)
% 21 33 46
Off-farm income (other
sector)
% 13 19 9
Number of non-farm busi-
nesses per HH
0.2 0.6 0.2
Notes: a: All values are means (N=2195).
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
household members. Households in the Ha Tinh and TT Hue provinces earn only
66% and 73% respectively of the total income of households in Dak Lak. In addition
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to farm income, many households have already diversified their income to include
sources other than farming. The share of the total household income generated by
farming activities ranges from 12% for Hue province to 21% for Dak Lak province.
This means that about 80% of the total household income comes from other sources,
including off-farm employment, non-farm self-employment, land renting or several
types of transfers, such as remittances or public transfers. In Dak Lak, most of the
off-farm income is generated by wage employment on other farms, while in Hue
it is mostly non-agriculture income via self-employment or wage employment in
other sectors.
The same trends in terms of income sources are visible from the household
typology given in table 2.5. The household types refer to farm income only, on the
one hand, and off-farm wage employment as well as non-farm self-employment on
the other hand. A ’farm’ household thus does not participate in any of the latter
activities, while a ’non-farm’ household refers to one that does not have any crop,
livestock or aquaculture production. The two types of ’mixture’ households refer to
those that derive income from both farm and off-/non-farm activities. This group
is divided into one group for which the farm income exceeds the non-farm income
(mixture-farm) and vice versa for the mix-non-farm households. The households
referred to as ’others’ are those that have none of those income sources and rely on
transfer payments or renting activities. According to these types, the households in
Table 2.5: Household types by province (N=2136).
Province
Household income source categories
Farm Mixture Non-farm Others
farm non-farm
Ha Tinh 53% 30% 13% 2% 2%
TT Hue 30% 44% 13% 11% 2%
Dak Lak 27% 42% 26% 5% 0%
Whole sample 36% 39% 17% 6% 2%
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
Ha Tinh rely to a much higher extent on pure farming as compared to the other two
provinces. The highest share of diversified households (i.e. mixture households)
is surprisingly found in Dak Lak, the province that also has the highest share of
farm income. This is due to the fact that coffee production in Dak Lak is not only
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organized via smallholder farming, but also takes places on numerous large estate
farms, which offer the possibilities of off-farm employment for the households.
This is also indicated by the fact that the biggest share of off-farm employment in
Dak Lak is in the agricultural sector. The diversification in Dak Lak, therefore,
does not necessarily reduce the vulnerability of the households, as their off-farm
incomes may partly be subject to similar shocks as their farming activity. In all
three provinces most of the mixture households generate higher incomes from their
farming activities as compared to their off-farm activities.
Table 2.6: Income differences by sector.
Sector Income per month
($)
N
Agriculture 62 794
Service 77 397
Industry 82 328
Construction/mining 68 324
Public sector 74 286
Others 65 1
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
Table 2.6 indicates differences in wages as well as number of people employed
across the different sectors of off-farm employment in the research locations. Most
jobs are again in the agricultural sector but are paid less than all other options.
The highest wage can be earned in industry. The service sector offers the most
jobs outside the agricultural sector. We therefore need to take a closer look at the
income composition of the households along the income groups. Table 2.7 gives the
detailed composition of the households along six income groups based on fractions
of the national poverty line.
The group that lives with less than a fourth of the poverty line income has
0.6 fewer income sources than the rest of the groups, which have a rather similar
number of sources.
When it comes to wage employment, most of the poor households earn a sub-
stantial share of their income on other farms. This share increases up to the group
that earns incomes up to twice the poverty line and then quickly declines with
further increases in household income. The other most important area of wage
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Table 2.7: Income compositiona of households along income classes (N=2137).
Income groups (fractions of national poverty line)
Indicator Unit < 0.25 0.25− 0.5 0.5− 1 1− 2 2− 5 5 <
Income sourcesb # 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.3
Farmingc % −55 20 27 30 30 37
Off farm employment in:
industry % 1 2 3 2 3 1
construction % 5 9 13 10 7 2
service % 1 4 3 4 4 2
public sector % 2 4 2 3 6 9
agriculture % 18 29 43 45 34 17
Non-farm business # pc 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.14
Remittances % 4 4 4 6 8 9
Public transfers % 6 5 4 3 3 1
Notes: a: The income shares do not add up to 100% due to the possibility of negative
incomes from some sources. Furthermore, sources like income from house and homestead
that is included in the household income is left our here as it does not involve cash flows.
Notes: b: The maximal number of sources is 6.
Notes: c: Includes cropping, livestock and hunting.
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
employment is the construction sector. Its role is less important in higher income
groups, where the public sector accounts for a greater proportion of income - up to
8% of the total for the highest income group. Therefore, besides relying on their
own agricultural production, poor households diversify into wage employment. As
they mainly work in the agricultural sector, their alternative source of income may
be affected by similar external shocks and prone to similar adverse conditions,
meaning that a diversification strategy that takes place in the same sector is less
likely to be successful in reducing vulnerability. Nevertheless, many of the agricul-
tural shocks will not affect all households to the same extent and therefore leave
several jobs in the sector unaffected.
The households at the upper end of the income distribution do, in contrast to
the poorer households, run some non-farm businesses but also rely to a substantial
extent on farm incomes.
Taking the differences in income from different sectors and the rising inequality
indicated by the Gini coefficient in table 2.1 into account, it is worth investigating
the inequality within the household groups as well as within the provinces.
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(a) Provinces.
(b) Household types.
Figure 2.5: Income distribution of households by household type.
Note: Only households that earn less than $20 PPP per day are included (18 Mix
households, 7 Farm households, 3 Non-farm households; 34 Ha Tinh, 14 TT Hue and
28 Dak Lak households were excluded due to higher incomes) N=2083.
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
Figure 2.5 shows the cumulative income distribution for the four major house-
hold income groups (farm, non-farm and the two mixture types). It shows that
the poverty status of the households is closely linked to the characteristics of their
income portfolios. Within the group of farm households, the income is most un-
equally distributed. Considering the Gini coefficient of 0.37 reported by United
Nations [2005b] for Vietnam, the distribution in the provinces is much less even
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than for Vietnam in general. Therefore, the inequality, as the sample does not
cover urban areas, is not simply based on rural-urban differences, as implied by
table 2.1, but also occurs, seemingly to an even greater extent, within rural areas.
Although it seems to be the income maximizing and inequality minimizing
choice to generate income from off-farm activities at least in addition to farming,
the most frequent occupation of rural households in these regions remains farming
(table 2.5). As the share of farm income rises constantly with the income classes
but also generates negative incomes among the poorest households, it seems to be
a major factor that drives the observed inequality. One explanation for this could
be economies of scale. Generally, a minimum land area is required for profitable
farming. This fact suggests that farming might be a factor that makes poor house-
holds poor and rich households rich. It is also reflected in the high Gini coefficient
in the group of farm households.
Figure 2.6: Consumption asset holdings by income group.
Note: Only households that hold less than $30,000 PPP were included for clearer
display (47 were excluded due to higher asset holdings.) N=2137.
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
Taking into account the consumption asset endowment (figure 2.6) of the house-
holds, one can see that the lowest income group has a higher value of productive
assets, as well as an equal level of consumption assets, compared to the next level.
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This leads to the assumption that a high number of the households that are cur-
rently in the poorest group are in higher groups in other years but had slipped to
the bottom end of the income hierarchy due to adverse conditions in the year of
the survey.
Based on this observation, the asset endowment is used as wealth indicator in
addition to the current income, as it is likely to reflect the medium-term wealth
status of the households. Short-term income fluctuations affect the consumption
asset endowment only marginally, as these assets are not easy to convert into cash
and will thus stay rather constant even in years of financial setbacks.
2.5.2 Determinants of being income poor in the research area
As explained in the previous section, poor households seem to rely to a greater
extent on agricultural income, which itself seems to be affected more often by
adverse conditions leading to financial instability, poverty and inequality. In order
to verify this conclusion from the descriptive data presentation, the determinants
of a households’ income is analyzed and additionally the determinants of their asset
endowments as a medium-term wealth indicator are analyzed.
To serve this purpose, two regressions are utilized (table 2.8), with the inde-
pendent variable being first, the natural logarithm of the households’ income and
second, the natural logarithm of their asset endowment.10 As Figure 2.6 implied
that the value of consumption assets is less affected by shocks and other setbacks
than the current income, it is used as an additional (medium-term) welfare measure.
The following set of explanatory variables will be used, based on the sustainable
livelihood framework (recalling Figure 2.4, page 21), the results from the literature
and the analysis in the previous section.
First of all, the influence of the household income typology is covered using three
dummy variables, namely non-farm HH, mix-farm HH and mix-non-farm HH, with
farm HH being the reference case. These variables indicate the composition of the
cash earnings of each household. As increased non-farm income opportunities are
found to increase household incomes, the income typology is used to indicate the
welfare impact of participation in the non-farm economy.
10The natural logarithm is used as the distribution of both variables is right skewed.
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The second group represents the resources and the financial assets of the house-
hold using the land holdings per household member as well as their credit volume.
Furthermore, the number of insurances is included to cover for possible payments
received for balancing shocks or other insured events. The value of its production
assets was excluded as it is correlated with farming that requires more assets as
compared to the other activities. Additionally, the number of shocks experienced
by a household in 2006, and the number of insurances it holds, are included to
account for external influences that caused an exceptionally low income or compen-
sated for it respectively. These variables are a rough indicator for the vulnerability
context of the households.
Furthermore, some basic household characteristics such as education, depen-
dency structure and the age of the household head are included, plus a dummy
indicating whether the household belongs to one of the multiple ethnic minorities.
The variable nucleus-wider ratio gives the share of a household members that the
household head does still count as household members but who live outside the
household for more than 180 days per year. These are likely to give some in-
sight into the opportunities and constraints of the household in terms of income
generation.
Education (measured as mean years of schooling) is included, as being less
educated reduces the income opportunities of households. More highly paid jobs
in the non-farm economy usually require higher education to meet the demands of
employers and the greater challenges of those jobs.
The dependency structure (measured as the percentage of dependent members,
i.e. defined as household members older than 70 or younger than 16, living in
the household) should increase the likelihood of being poor. The more dependent
members a household has to take care of, the more likely it is to be poor.
To interpret the nucleus-wider ratio, one has to take the characteristics of the
wider members into account. Among the sampled households, the two most fre-
quent reasons for not staying with the household are job opportunity (55%) and
schooling/studying (32%). Therefore, the nucleus-wider ratio can have two effects.
On the one hand, in the case of job migration (temporarily or permanently), the
household is more likely to receive remittances and is therefore less likely to be
poor. On the other hand, in the case of schooling or studying, the household has
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to support these migrants and thus has more people who do not contribute to the
household income, making poverty more likely.
Finally, the different characteristics of the provincial structures are captured
by the three dummies indicating the location of the households. Furthermore, the
travel distance to the nearest town is included to account for market access and
other agglomeration advantages.
The travel distance to the nearest town is included as a proxy for labor and
product market access, which should enhance welfare. People from households
that face less travel costs in reaching the bigger labor and produce markets in the
cities are more likely to generate higher incomes. Furthermore, rural farmers who
are able to contact the traders/customers more easily and with a shorter time lag,
have better chances of finding those who pay better or who purchase produce even
in times of low demand on the market. These households are also able to access
new customers who have special needs such as flexible and/or spontaneous supply
(for example, hotels). This gives the households more options in terms of market
channels and thus enables them to diversify within the agricultural sector, making
them less vulnerable to short term price fluctuations than households that market
all their produce to one trader, for example in their home village.
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The factors that affect both the incomes and the consumption assets holdings
will now be elaborated. First of all, the amount of credits has a significant positive
effect on both incomes and consumption asset holdings. Especially in case of
consumption assets, the credit sum indicates that many households finance their
consumption and consumption assets by taking credits.11 An examination of the
financing of motorbikes enables interpretation of the influence of these credits on
income, as a motorbike enables a household to access markets and find lucrative
jobs in a wider area than is generally accessible via public transport. This tendency
is supported by the slightly negative correlation between credit and travel distance.
The second highly significant and positive variable is land size. Higher land
holdings enable a household to either produce on a bigger area or to rent out parts
of their land and therefore generate higher incomes and finance more consumption
assets. For the land area in particular it might be argued that it is endogenous in an
income regression, as income would enable a household to buy additional land and
again generate more income. In the special case of Vietnam this is less likely as the
land market is still not completely free, and although households can obtain legal
status for their land it is never owned but only leased to a household for a certain
number of years. Furthermore, based on resolution ten in 1998, that introduced
the privatization of land, land rights were given to individuals in a ”remarkably
egalitarian way” [Ravallion and van de Walle, D., 2004]. Nevertheless, authorities
tended to give more land to well connected households [van de Walle and Cratty,
2004]. Therefore, land size is less likely to be endogenous but might serve as a proxy
for government connections. In any case, having more land enables households to
generate more income and to acquire more assets.
The dummies indicating the household income structure all positively and sig-
nificantly affect household income. The effect for non-farm households is greater
than for mix non-farm households, which is itself greater than that of mix-farm
households. This might indicate that, in fact, agriculture is the activity that lowers
the income of the mix households, while non-farm activities lift their income above
the poverty line. This would support the common argument of agriculture being
11This observation is also supported by informal interviews with local expats as well as Viet-
namese working closely with international agencies. Taking the density of motorbikes and their
prices against the average incomes, one can assume that most of them are financed by credits.
The mean income is less than 1% of the price of a motorbike.
34
CHAPTER 2. POVERTY AND THE RURAL NON-FARM ECONOMY
a safety net for rural households. One important purpose of agricultural produc-
tion for mainly non-farm households is to ensure that even in the case of job loss,
the households still have the means to survive from their own production of food.
The effect on consumption assets is only significant and positive for the non-farm
households, and is insignificant for the other two dummies.
The variables for the number of shocks and the number of insurances are espe-
cially important in Vietnam and in the research provinces as flooding and taifuns
are very common in this part of Vietnam. Both variables show the expected sig-
nificant influence in both regressions, with shocks affecting the income and assets
negatively and insurances positively.12 The more shocks a household experienced in
2006, the lower the income it was able to generate. Shocks included here are of var-
ious kinds, including natural disasters, deaths of household members or robberies.
The effects transmit through various channels depending on the type of shock.
Natural disasters mainly affect agricultural income as they are mostly floods or
droughts that destroy the means of agricultural production. Furthermore, shocks
also affect the wage-earning possibilities of the households. In times of production
stops due to flooding, the non-permanent workers do not receive any compensa-
tion for their lost income opportunity as they are employed on a daily basis. But
even the permanent staff usually have to cope with major cuts in their earnings,
as in times of a production stop (based on natural disasters, demand decrease, ...)
they only earn a fraction of their normal income.13 In the case of robbery, the
effect depends on the item that is lost. If it involves purely consumption assets or
saved money, the shock should not have any impact on income but on the asset
endowment. In the case of assets that are crucial for employment or production,
the effect could be dramatic. If a car or motorbike is stolen, the household might
lose the means of marketing their produce or reaching their place of work and thus
have to cope with major income losses due to this shock in addition to the asset
loss itself. As expected the number of insurances works in the opposite direction
as it will cover for just those losses described above. Theoretically, the coefficient
should be zero as insurances generally cover only the amount lost, but here it turns
12From the correlation matrix it can be seen that shocks did happen more often in TT Hue
and Ha Tinh and insurances are more common in TT Hue. Although the correlation coefficients
are slightly above 0.2, the model does not show any significant changes when adding or deleting
one of the variables and therefore the correlation does not play an important role.
13Based on personal communication with company managers and government officials.
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out to be even positive as the value of each asset is discounted and therefore the
asset value will be higher once the household buys a new one.
The education measure (mean years of schooling of all adult household mem-
bers) positively affects asset value as well as income, which indicates that educa-
tion pays off even in rural areas where jobs that require high education are usually
scarce, leading to low returns to education in the absence of migration.
The dependency measure influences incomes and therefore the asset holdings,
agreeing with general perceptions. The higher the proportion of dependent mem-
bers, the poorer a household becomes.
The result shows that income increases with the share of household members
who do not live in the household permanently but have migrated or at least mi-
grate for more than 180 days a year. This indicates that the effect of receiving
money from absent household members is greater than the effect of sending money
to absent members, which is mostly done in the first phase of migration when
the household member who does migrate is still searching for a job or attending
school/university [Stark and Bloom, 1985]. This relationship indicates that job
migration of some household members might be a path out of poverty for rural
households, and that only the less successful members stay behind. Another pos-
sible interpretation is that only the relatively better off households are able to
facilitate the migration of household members. This would mean that the effect
of sending money is great, at least in the first period of migration. Nevertheless,
a successful strategy to reach an income level above the poverty line should not
be based on remittances, but should enable households to earn enough money on
their own. Based on this analysis, it is not possible to decide which effect actually
results from migration14. If the household depends only on the nucleus members
to generate income, it is more likely to be poor. The nucleus-wider ratio shows
a similar effect on the consumption assets holdings as it does on the likelihood
of being poor. Therefore, the reasoning becomes analog. The more people have
the opportunity to migrate successfully (earning more money than it would be
possible by staying) the more likely the household is to increase its welfare level.
This share can furthermore be interpreted as network assets. The more people a
14The effect of migration on the households left behind is the subject of further research. For
details for the case of Thailand, see: Lu¨bben [2009].
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household counts as household members, although they do not actually stay within
the household, the more opportunities the household will have to generate income,
to diversify, to migrate or to borrow money.
The coefficient of belonging to one of the multiple ethnic minorities of Viet-
nam is, in accordance with the findings of other studies, negative in both cases.
Therefore, ethnic minority households are more likely to be income poor as com-
pared to the majority (Kinh - the majority ethnic group in Vietnam) households.
Furthermore, according to general observations in many studies, belonging to an
ethnic minority reduces the (medium term) welfare status of households. In Viet-
nam especially, ethnic minorities face severe problems as they mostly live in remote
areas where income opportunities are limited. But as the third group of variables
accounts for location (remoteness), this is not the only reason for these households
to face more difficulties in generating income than Kinh households. Thus, this
group has further disadvantages, analogue to the findings of van de Walle and
Gunewardena [2001] Gaiha et al. [2007].
The measure indicating the distance to town (as minutes to reach) is only signif-
icant in the asset regression. Most likely it is not significant in the income regression
as these towns are very small and therefore the labor and product market is too
small to significantly affect the income opportunities of the households. Therefore,
the variable is more likely to indicate the availability of several consumption assets
and an economic structure that is based on retail rather than production.
The three measures accounting for the provinces in which the households live
result in Dak Lak having a statistically significant influence on consumption asset
holdings and the income of households, with Hue significant only in the income
regression. The result that households in the Ha Tinh and Hue provinces are
more likely to be poor is also supported by Minot et al. [2003]. The strong coffee
industry in Dak Lak enables households to generate higher incomes than those in
other provinces. Even if households are not directly linked to coffee production,
processing or trading, many more households profit from this industry due to
spillover effects. The effect is particularly large due to the recent explosion of
coffee prices on the world market.15
15For further details, see section 2.3, page 18 and Appendix A.1, page 136.
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2.6 Summary
Based on analysis of the income structure of the sampled households, the reliance
on off- and non-farm income sources is different for different income classes and
locations. On the one hand, households with higher total incomes also derive
higher shares of income from farming activities but also have more non-farm self-
employment that most of the time generate even more income than their farming.
On the other hand, especially for the middle income classes, the share of income
generated from wage employments increases by more than 50%.
The differences in the income distributions across the four main household
income types is obviously in favor of higher shares of off-farm incomes. The house-
holds that do not participate in self-employed farming are generally better off as
compared to the other types. The higher the farm share becomes (from mix non-
farm to mix farm to farm) the lower the incomes tend to be. Similar results emerge
for the inequality within the groups. The Gini coefficient is also highest for the
farm households and lowest for the non-farm households.
These trends of higher welfare for non-farm households also emerge from the
analysis of the determinants of household incomes. With farm households as the
reference case, all other types earn significantly higher incomes. Furthermore, the
provincial differences are also supported, with Ha Tinh being the poorest province
with the lowest household incomes and asset holdings. The seemingly most pros-
perous province was TT Hue, based on its diverse industry and service sector,
while Dak Lak’s economy is dominated by agriculture and therefore seemingly less
developed. However, the coffee industry that is Dak Lak’s dominant sector was
able to provide households with higher incomes compared to TT Hue households.
Nevertheless, this is dependent of the high (and volatile) coffee price. Once the
coffee price drops again, the picture will most likely change dramatically.
All in all, households rely on wage-employment as an additional source of in-
come to a large extent, even in remote areas where jobs are mainly in the agricul-
tural sector with comparably low salaries. Furthermore, after controlling for the
commonly found determinants of income, the income portfolio still plays a major
role. Even Dak Lak is able to overcome its seemingly adverse starting condition of
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high shares of ethnic minorities, based on more off-farm opportunities due to the
large coffee industry.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The concepts of measuring pro-poor growth
The idea of pro-poor growth has been introduced as a concept to measure the
achievements in poverty reduction efforts outlined by the millennium development
goals, and attribute changes in poverty to a country’s overall growth. The defi-
nitions vary slightly but generally include the common criterion of a ”dispropor-
tionate growth of the incomes of the poor” [Klasen, 2004, p.64] or less restrictive
”changes in the distribution [of income] were poverty reducing” [Ravallion and
Chen, 2003, p.94]. The differences lie in the details of the definitions and es-
pecially the application, depending on the goals that are pursued. Generally, two
different methods of analysis can be differentiated. On the one hand, those authors
who are just interested in answering the question if there was any pro-poor growth
and on the other hand those who want to quantify the rate of pro-poor growth.
Furthermore, some definitions are narrower in their recognition of pro-poor growth
while other use wider measures. The widest definition considered here requires
the growth rates of the poor to be above zero (def I). A less restrictive definition
demands that the growth in incomes of the poor is greater than the mean growth
(def II). The narrowest and therefore most restrictive definition requires that the
absolute increase in incomes of the poor exceeds the absolute increase in average
incomes (def III) [Grosse et al., 2008].
Based on these differences, several measures of pro-poor growth have been sug-
gested. McCulloch and Baulch [1999], as well as Kakwani and Pernia [2000], focus
on the question of whether pro-poor growth was achieved, but do not include a mea-
sure of the extent. Their measure just compares the income/wealth distribution
in the past, today and the distribution that would result from distribution neu-
tral growth.1 If the distribution-neutral scenario would result in higher inequality
measures, the growth realized is defined as ”pro-poor”.
The definition suggested by White and Anderson [2001] is based on three steps.
First, the share of growth realized by the poor must be greater than their current
share of income. Second, their share of growth must be greater than their share of
1Distribution neutral growth would be the case in which the whole population would realize
equal growth (the average growth).
41
CHAPTER 3. RURAL-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN PRO-POOR GROWTH
the population. And third, their share of the current growth needs to be greater
than ”some international norm”. The White and Anderson [2001] type of measure
essentially requires a closing of the absolute income gap. The condition for this
kind of pro-poor growth is:
Y Pt
NP
− Yt
N
>
Y Pt−1
NP
− Yt−1
N
.
With P referring to the group of poor households, N giving the population size,
Y indicating the cumulative income and t being the second observation period.
As this definition only holds in very few cases [Grosse et al., 2008] it will not be
considered here.
The pro-poor growth measure proposed by Klasen [1994] builds on the income
distribution over the income percentiles. It weights the growth rate of each income
group by a declining function of its rank in the income distribution, e.g. its share
of population, and thus composes an aggregated growth rate that accounts for
inequality. Although it is a good indicator, the shortcoming of this measure is
determination of the difficult and subjective decision of the right declining function
with which these growth rates are weighted [Cord et al., 2003].
Kraay [2006] combines these two approaches and ”decomposes the average
growth rate of incomes of the poor into growth in average incomes and the av-
erage growth rate of the poor relative to growth in average incomes”[Kraay, 2006,
p.205]. This leads to a measure of pro-poor growth that indicates how much more
the incomes of the poor rose as compared to the non-poor. This is mainly impor-
tant for cross-country studies if the countries realize very different mean growth
rates and are thus difficult to compare in terms of their pro-poor growth successes.
As this chapter only investigates one country, and the mean growth rate is the same
for all households, this does not help the analysis and is therefore not implemented.
The pro-poor growth measures applied in this study are the growth incidence
curve based percentile growth rate of the poor [Ravallion and Chen, 2003] and its
adjustment based on considerations of Grosse et al. [2008]. The poverty measures
used by Ravallion and Chen [2003] are distribution-sensitive measures like the
Watts index, headcount index or squared poverty gap. The rate of pro-poor growth
is then defined as the weighted (depending on the poverty measure used) mean
growth rate realized by the people below the given poverty line. This measure has
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the disadvantage that every growth that is realized will result in positive pro-poor
growth unless the incomes of the poor decline [Cord et al., 2003]. This means that
even countries in which the incomes of the rich increase at higher rates than the
poor will have a positive pro-poor growth rate. Thus I deduct the mean growth
rates of the whole population from that of the poor (the Ravallion and Chen [2003]
pro-poor growth rate) leading to a narrower type of pro-poor growth.
Here a combination of measures as in Grosse et al. [2008] is utilized as each
individual measure has disadvantages that could be outweighed by a simultaneous
consideration of several. Therefore, the measure developed by Ravallion and Chen
[2003] is used here to investigate pro-poor growth in its widest definition (def I).
Furthermore, the Ravallion and Chen [2003] measure will be adjusted by deducting
the growth rate of the rich from the pro-poor growth rate in order to generate a
measure that includes the reduction of the inequality and thus gives the rate of
”catching up” (def II).
3.1.2 Previous empirical work on pro-poor growth
Several studies assessing the pro-poor growth performance of different nations have
been conducted in the past [among others: AFD et al., 2005; Bonschab and Klump,
2007; Byerlee et al., 2005; Cord et al., 2003; Grosse et al., 2008; Hanmer and
Booth, 2001; Klasen, 2004, 2007; Klump, 2005, 2007; Klump and Bonschab, 2004;
Kraay, 2006; White and Anderson, 2001]. Most of these studies focused on both
the question of whether pro-poor growth was realized, and what determines the
success in pro-poor growth.
Some papers aim at a conceptual improvement of pro-poor growth in general
while supplementing their work with empirical applications [Cord et al., 2003;
Hanmer and Booth, 2001]. Cord et al. [2003] emphasizes the importance of a
decomposition of pro-poor growth, as not every growth process involves poverty
reduction. A combination of growth and inequality as separate aims would be
his policy of choice. Hanmer and Booth [2001] argume for policy that explicitly
targets regions and sectors in which the poor are found. Thus a focus on rural
areas and their industry, as well as the agricultural sector in general, shows the
highest elasticity of poverty and should therefore be adopted.
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The rest of the papers listed above apply existing measures to different numbers
of countries and focus on the determinants of pro-poor growth. Klasen [2007] builds
on his past work on several countries and briefly introduces the areas that should
be central policy topics in poverty reduction and pro-poor growth. These are: pro-
ductivity of the food crop sector, reduction of regional inequalities, improved asset
base for the poor, reduce gender inequality, integration of disadvantaged groups
and political commitment. Kraay [2006] and AFD et al. [2005] build on cross coun-
try studies. While Kraay [2006] suggests the use of country-level studies as these
will best serve policy based on his partly inconclusive cross country analysis, AFD
et al. [2005] found common factors that should be applicable to all poor countries.
They focus on the key role of agriculture in targeting poverty but also point out
that access to infrastructure for sectoral shift in rural areas should be the future
focus of pro-poor policy. Byerlee et al. [2005] have a more narrow focus on rural
areas and conclude that in the case of Asia priority should be given to diversifica-
tion. This includes the promotion of high value agricultural production but also
non-farm activities. Policy focus should be on less favored areas rather than growth
centers. The work in the area of pro-poor growth by Bonschab and Klump [2007]
and Klump [2005, 2007] focuses on the impressive poverty reduction of Vietnam
and quantifies and decomposes the realized pro-poor growth at a regional level.
They suggest a shift away from the growth centers, i.e. Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi
and Da Nang, towards rural areas in order to reach higher pro-poor growth rates.
Nevertheless, they also emphasize that this strategy will come at the cost of overall
growth, as investments will be less cost efficient in these regions. The core of such a
strategy would be decentralization, which has to be accompanied by local capacity
building.
Finally, the contribution by Grosse et al. [2008] suggests the use of the growth
incidence curve also for non-income indicators like education or vaccinations, as
the Millennium Development Goals also focus on these dimension and they should
not be underrepresented. In the case of Bolivia they found that despite pro-poor
growth rates in income being positive, the growth rates for some non-income in-
dicators were actually negative and therefore, the whole picture should be taken
into account rather than only looking at income.
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All these studies focus on the achievements of pro-poor growth and to some
extent on the determinants of pro-poor growth, but only a few [e.g. Bonschab
and Klump, 2007; Klump, 2007] include a regional dimension in their analysis
although that is recommended by several studies [AFD et al., 2005; Byerlee et al.,
2005]. The regional factor is found to be of huge importance for Vietnam due to
the focused growth spots in its economy while the rest of the country is lacking
behind. Furthermore, most of these studies implicitly state that pro-poor policies
should target the agricultural sector in rural areas [e.g. Klasen, 2007]. As efficient
as it may seem now, in the long run agricultural intensification will not be able
to take place to a sufficient extent in the densely populated countries of Asia and
especially in Vietnam [Bonschab and Klump, 2007; Davis et al., 2007; Otsuka and
Yamano, 2006; van de Walle and Cratty, 2004]. Therefore, the approach favored by
Collier [2007] might better suit the special circumstances in Vietnam. He argues
for the creation of jobs for the rural population. Though these jobs will be ”[...] far
from wonderful, but they are an improvement on the drudgery and boredom of a
small farm [...]” [Collier, 2007, p.83]. Similar arguments can be found in AFD et al.
[2005] where the key role of agriculture is focused, but it is also stressed that in the
longer run a sectoral shift is necessary, especially in rural areas. Based on these
findings, one can assume that households that have already (at least partially)
turned from agricultural production to more beneficial non-farm jobs should be
better off in terms of income and lower poverty rates. Furthermore, based on
the findings in the previous chapter, the income composition is also an important
feature that differs even within rural areas and should be included in this analysis.
Therefore, the broadening of the non-farm opportunities and the strengthening of
rural industries will be crucial for poverty reduction in the long run.
Analogous to points made in the previous chapter, the definition of non-farm is
wider, as wage employment, even in agriculture, will reduce risks for the household
as agricultural shocks like crop pests will not affect all households and thus the
income source will still be available. Therefore, in the following the term rural
non-farm employment/rural non-farm economy includes all activities that are not
self-employed farming/livestock keeping/aquaculture.
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3.2 Objectives and data used
Building on the findings in Bonschab and Klump [2007] as well as Klump [2007]
related to medium- and long-term pro-poor growth in Vietnam, the short term fluc-
tuations will be analyzed. Especially in the context of the recent debate around
vulnerability to poverty, the short term setbacks are a major factor that contributes
to transitory poverty. Besides this, I will focus on rural areas, as these are the re-
gions in which most of the world’s poor live. The objective here is to investigate
the differences in the pro-poor growth performance not only across provinces (as
focused on by Bonschab and Klump), but extend this analysis by taking the in-
come portfolio of households into account as a further possible grouping parameter.
Thereby, I will enrich and supplement the extensive work of Bonschab and Klump
[2007]; Klump [2007], and the short term fluctuations of pro-poor growth will be
analyzed with a narrower focus on the households and their income portfolio. I will
shed light on the difference in the pro-poorness of farming, off-farm employment
and a mixture of these two. This will generate insights into the determinants of
these differences on a household level and lead to better policy targeting of poverty
reduction programs.
The data used in the analysis are the Vietnam household living standard survey
(VHLSS) 2002 and 2004 compiled by the GSO. Based on a sample of about 30,000
households in 2002 and 9,200 households in 2004, the rotating sample design leads
to an available panel of 3,991 households in total and 3,132 in rural areas covering
61 of the 63 Vietnamese provinces.2 Analogously to McCaig [2009] the panel
construction was adjusted to account for several matching errors occurring when
using the original household identifier.3
3.3 Pro-poor growth in Vietnam 1993–2002
The following overview will be based on the work of [Klump, 2007] and [Bonschab
and Klump, 2007] as the most comprehensive analysis of pro-poor growth in Viet-
nam. Vietnam’s early growth has been mainly based on agricultural intensification
2Details on the sample design and data processing can be obtained from Tung and Phong
[n.a.].
3I want to thank Brian McCaig, School of Economics and Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, for sharing the information required for correcting these errors.
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and expansion. Besides leading to environmental problems like pollution and ero-
sion, this path can not serve as growth strategy in the long run as fertile land
becomes more and more scarce, especially in the densely populated growth poles
around Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Beginning in 1997 with the introduction of
three ’focal economic areas’ the government focused on economic modernization.
Besides the obvious candidates of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the greater Da
Nang area was the third focal area addressed in an effort to establish a growth
pole in central Vietnam. Export-oriented industries and services were promoted
and basic infrastructure was installed to generate an international competitive en-
vironment for companies. This policy obviously led to an increase in the already
existing regional disparities [Bonschab and Klump, 2007]. Nevertheless, the pol-
icy of focused economic (growth) stimulation has been very successful in terms
of restructuring and expanding the Vietnamese economy4 [Revilla Diez, 1995]. In
the aftermath of this implementation, the contribution of labor to overall growth
started to grow, indicating increasing importance of the skilled workforce. Even
in the Asian economic crisis in the early 1990s, while the total factor productivity
dropped sharply, the growth contribution of labor still exceeded capital. For the
1998–2002 period the contribution of labor was as high as 80% while capital con-
tributed only 20% to overall growth [Klump, 2007]. This is partly based on the
very low capital mobility across province borders that still existed [Bonschab and
Klump, 2007].
Besides the actual growth rate, it is important to know how the growth is
distributed within the population, especially in a society like Vietnam in which
poverty was at very high levels in the early 1990s. The core components used to
calculate the rate of pro-poor growth are: (i) the growth incidence curve (GIC),
which gives the growth rates by income percentile, (ii) the mean of growth rates,
which is the mean over the percentile growth rates as well as (iii) the growth rate
in mean which is total sample mean in growth rates. The rate of pro-poor growth5
between 1993 and 2002 was 4.1%. As this is below the average growth rate of
5.5%, poverty was indeed lowered but at the same time inequality rose as the
incomes of the poor grew at lesser rates than those of the non-poor. The GIC
4Further details on the development of the Vietnamese economy from the doi moi until today
will be elaborated in detail in the following chapter.
5Calculations according to Ravallion and Chen [2003].
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Figure 3.1: Vietnam’s Growth Incidence Curve, 1993–2002.
Source: [Bonschab and Klump, 2004].
(figure 3.1) shows an upwards slope, indicating that def II pro-poor growth was
not realized as higher income percentiles grew at higher rates than lower income
percentiles. A slowdown in the pro-poorness of the realized growth can also be
seen from the rates in the two sub-periods of 1993–1998 and 1998–2002. Between
1993 and 1998 the rate was 5.7% and for 1998–2002 the rate dropped to 2.2%
[Bonschab and Klump, 2007]. While much of the realized pro-poor growth in the
first sub-period was based on employment of unskilled workers in the agricultural
sector, the reduction in the rate was mainly due to the shortage of arable land and
therefore rural industrialization had to start in order to maintain the pro-poorness
of growth [Bonschab and Klump, 2007].
The huge successes in overall pro-poor growth were spatially biased (table 3.1)
analogously to the poverty reduction successes (table 2.1, page 14). While for the
1993-1998 period the rate of pro-poor growth was higher in urban areas (8.9%
vs. 5.3%) the rate fell even more than in rural areas for the period from 1998 to
2002 (1.6% vs. 2.2%). However, the inequality rose more for rural areas in the
second period, indicating an even higher growth rate for the non-poor population
[Bonschab and Klump, 2007]. The very low rate of pro-poor growth in urban areas
for the second period does not necessarily mean that pro-poor policies are better in
rural areas but that the very low levels in urban areas are more difficult to reduce
than the high rates in rural areas [Bonschab and Klump, 2007] giving one of the
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Table 3.1: Rates of pro-poor growth 1993–2002 by subregions.
Region 1993–1998 1998–2002 1993–2002
National 5.7 2.2 4.1
Urban 8.9 1.6 5.9
Rural 5.3 2.2 3.9
Northwest 4.5 −1.64 n.a.
Northeast 4.5 4.42 n.a.
Red River Delta 8.1 1.39 n.a.
North Central Coast 6.2 0.47 n.a.
South Central Coast 4.9 4.6 n.a.
Central Highlands 4.6 5.0 n.a.
Mekong River Delta 4.4 2.6 n.a.
Note: n.a.= not available
Source: Bonschab and Klump [2004]
most important reasons for focusing on rural areas here. The expenditure-based
Gini coefficients for rural and urban areas have been rather stable for many years,
suggesting that the rising inequality is mainly based on rural urban differences in
overall growth rather than within these areas. This is intensified by a migration
pattern in which the economically more active population migrates proportionately
more from rural to urban areas [Klump, 2007]. The pro-poor growth rates in the
central highlands grew for the second period, unlike for the rest of Vietnam, and was
mainly based on the successful introduction of coffee production in 1995 [Klump,
2007].
The important aspect of improved property rights in the Vietnamese policy
during this period contributed strongly to the pro-poorness of growth. This policy
improved predictability of businesses and boosted longer-term investments, e.g. in
multi-year industrial and fruit crops, and therefore enabled income diversification
[Bonschab and Klump, 2007]. Based on the generation of new income opportunities
and therefore the reduction of rural urban migration, the private sector has a great
potential for contributing to the catching up process within the country [Klump,
2007]. Due to the already huge differences in the economic structure, policies that
promote less developed regions will be increasingly difficult to justify as investments
in these regions will be less efficient. Nevertheless, policies that channel investments
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to these areas will have a much larger pro-poor effect as these are the regions in
which most of the poor life [Bonschab and Klump, 2007].
The group that is still suffering from the highest poverty rates is the multi-
ple ethnic minorities. Although special funds have been allocated in support of
these groups, these funds are often not well targeted, as minority groups work on
fundamentally different income generation models compared to the Kinh majority.
Thus, the funds often reach Kinh families that live in the same areas where these
groups are found [Klump, 2007].
The achievements in pro-poor growth are mainly based on high aggregate
growth rates (although spatially biased) and favorable initial conditions with a
widespread primary education and mostly equal distribution of farmland. But
these conditions can not be taken for granted in order to achieve further growth as
the regional inequalities also in these factors also grow. The slow progress in the
privatization of state owned enterprises, and the associated delay in the lay-offs of
surplus workers may cause social problems in the future. Additionally, a slowdown
of the spectacular growth in the agricultural sector can be expected as most arable
(available) land is already under production. Further growth can only be based on
intensification, which has already caused several environmental problems and will
thus not be feasible for future growth [Bonschab and Klump, 2007].
All in all, pro-poor growth did, in the less restrictive definition of poverty-
reducing growth, take place in Vietnam during the 1993–2002 period. In the early
1990s Vietnam took advantage of its natural resources and flexible workforce and
achieved impressive (pro-poor) growth. Nevertheless, ethnic minorities and the
rural population in general, have not yet been included in this and therefore in-
equality is still rising, especially in rural/urban comparison. Thus, even though the
growth process was pro-poor in the sense that poverty was declining and incomes
of the poor were growing, the incomes of the rich grew even more. Furthermore,
the realized pro-poor growth rates were declining, which was mainly due to the
low poverty rates in urban areas where it becomes increasingly difficult to reduce
these [Bonschab and Klump, 2007; Klump, 2007].
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3.4 Pro-poor growth in rural Vietnam 2002–2004
3.4.1 Short term poverty dynamics and household income portfolio
To shed more light into the dynamics and the determinants of successful pro-poor
strategies found in the regional analysis, the following section will decompose the
pro-poor growth into the following five household income6 types. First, a ’farm’
household thus does not participate in any of the latter activities. Second, a ’non-
farm’ household refers to a household that does not have any crop, livestock or
aquaculture production. Third and fourth, two types of mixed income households
refer to those that derive income from both farm and off-/non-farm activities.
These two mixed groups are divided into one group including households with farm
income exceeding the non-farm income (’mix farm households’) and vice versa for
the ’mix non-farm households’. Fifth, the households referred to as ’others’ are
those that have none of those income sources and rely on transfer payments or
renting activities. Furthermore, the sample is reduced specifically to rural areas
as Klump [2005] already found that the poverty in urban areas is on very low
levels and therefore pro-poor growth requires quite different measures and will be
very different from rural areas where people are much more in need for poverty
reduction.
Based on the results that poverty and pro-poor growth are spatially biased
in Vietnam, the poverty incidence and the distribution of the households types
across the 61 covered Vietnamese provinces are given in Figure 3.2. The poverty
headcount ratios by province subdivided by the four major household types are
depicted in figure 3.2e–3.2h. Furthermore, the share of the household types across
the provinces is indicated in figure 3.2a–3.2d.
As indicated by the total shares of the household types in the sample, the
non-farm households have very low shares of mostly below 15% in all provinces
with some exceptions in the Mekong delta. Furthermore, the farm households are
extremely dominant in the North-Western mountain region which is the poorest
region in Vietnam.
6All incomes converted to PPP Dollar (based on ICP [2008]) in 2000 prices. Furthermore all
incomes are adjusted according to regional income comparison factors given in GSO [2002; 2004].
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An interesting distribution of the two mix types is prevalent in the central
provinces where the mix non-farm households are the major group for the coastal
provinces while the mix-farm households are especially dominant in the mountain-
ous provinces along the Cambodian boarder in the South and Laotian boarder in
the North Central region.
Concerning poverty rates, most provinces poverty is most widespread in the
group of farm households while it is lowest for the non-farm household group. The
non-farm household group is the smallest with only 263 households being in this
group, which leads to some provinces in the North-Western and Central highlands
having no households at all in this group. Among the two mix types, those that rely
more on farm income are more often poor. On the one hand, poverty headcount
ratios with increasing importance of non-farm income for the households. On
the other hand, a majority (:62%) of households still rely on farm income (farm
households and mix farm households) as their most important income source.
Based on the wide differences in poverty rates across the household types, the
question is whether households in the groups that are faced with higher poverty
will change their income portfolio towards a more promising combination, even
in the short run. This will allow a first assessment of the households’ decision-
making, as well as further insight into the dynamics to which a households’ income
is subject. Assessing the types over the two survey years, it is clear that many
households do substantially or gradually change their income portfolios, leading to
different categorizations during the two years. These ’switchtypes’ as well as the
non switching types and their shares are given in figure 3.3. The left hand numbers
give the share of the respective group that did change their portfolio to the extent
that they are re-categorized to another group, while the right hand numbers give
the shares of the group in 2004 that has been in the same group in 2002.
While overall the shares of the groups remained rather stable across the years
(with only small gains for the mix farm households and losses for the non-farm
households) it is obvious that between 2002 and 2004 there were major shifts with
up to 58% (Others) of the households within one group changing to other groups.
Among the major four types, the group of farm households is subject to the highest
fluctuations with 46% of the households shifting from pure farming to other income
structures. The most stable group on the other hand is the non-farm households
53
CHAPTER 3. RURAL-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN PRO-POOR GROWTH
Farm HH 
(21%)
Non-farm HH 
(19%)
Mix farm HH 
(31%)
Mix non-farm HH 
(27%)
Other HH 
(2%)
2002 2004
Farm HH 
(22%)
Non-farm HH
(11%) 
Mix farm HH 
(38%)
Mix non-farm HH
(27%) 
Other HH
(2%) 
32%b
60%b
58%b
74%b
62%b
46%a
18%a
40%a
45%a
58%a
Farm to non farm
Farm to mix farm
Farm to mix non farm
Farm to others
non farm to farm
non farm to mix farm
non farm to mix non farm
non farm to others
mix farm to farm
mix farm to non farm
mix farm to mix non farm
mix farm to others
Mix non farm to farm
Mix non farm
Mix non farm to mix farm
Mix non farm to others
others to farm
others to non farm
others to mix farm
others to mix non farm
Figure 3.3: Income composition changes.
Notes: a: Share of group in 2002; b: Share of 2004 group.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
with only 18% changing to other income sources and 74% of the 2004 group were
in the same group in 2002. This might be based on the fact that one needs farm
land in order to pursue any farm activity, but only 73 (2%) out of 3,132 (11%
within the non-farm households group) households have no land available at all.
Therefore, almost all households would have the option to do at least some farming
and therefore, to account for these major shifts among the groups, the following
analysis will be based on the nine major (N>2% of sample = 62 households)7
switchtypes rather than the original household categories. Due to the partly very
small group sizes some groups had to be excluded as results will not be reliable or
meaningful.
Assuming rational behavior of the households, the switchtypes should perform
better in terms of growth and poverty reduction as otherwise they would have
been better off if they remained in their current portfolio. The opposite outcome
would occur in cases where the switching takes place due to outside influences that
force households to change. These could be shocks like job loss that makes some
7Appendix A.4, page 139 gives group sizes as well as the poverty headcount ratios for the
two periods.
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income sources unavailable or at least reduces them. In the case of agricultural
households, those circumstances could also emerge from changes in the market that
force households out of production. Those could be e.g. production or product
standards8 that are introduced and that some farmers might not be able to comply
with. Based on the effects of the changes one can gain at least some evidence on
which scenario is more likely.
Furthermore, two basic directions of change are imaginable. First, households
could diversify their income into different sectors (here farm and non-farm sources)
or, if they already have multiple income sources, they could specialize in one of
these. Both scenarios might lead to increased income with the first scenario being
associated with outside pressure due to e.g. shocks while the second would be more
likely driven by household decisions. Unfortunately, there is only one relevant (in
terms of its size) group for the diversification case, i.e. the farm to mix farm
households. Therefore, this line of argument can not be followed here.
Table 3.2 gives some poverty/inequality indicators decomposed into the intro-
duced nine household types. Remarkably, there is no group that faced an increase
in poverty during this period due to the very high overall poverty reduction. Al-
though the distribution became slightly more unequal, indicated by the increase of
0.01 points in the Gini coefficient, this increase does not constitute a major change
in income distribution. Generally, the poverty headcount ratio was significantly
higher for the group of households that did switch groups between 2002 and 2004,
both in the initial year 2002 as well as for the second period of 2004.9 This indi-
cates a rational decision on changing income portfolio based on insufficient income
from the current sources.
The highest poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap is found in the group
of 2002 farm households that switched to mix farm households by 2004. This
group also realized the highest reduction in these indicators with the headcount
ratio dropping from 57% to about 28% and the poverty gap reduced from 17%
to 7%. The smallest reduction in poverty took place in the group of non-farm
households that did not change their income portfolios, but this group had a very
low poverty level and poverty gap before, making large reductions unlikely as the
8One example is the emerging 4C standard in coffee production.
9T-test results for poverty headcount ratios switched vs. non switched households in Ap-
pendix A.5, page 140.
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Table 3.2: Poverty by household types.
Change household types Head-
count
ratio
2002
Change
in
head-
count
ratioa
Normalized
poverty
gapb
Gini
coef-
fi-
cient
2002
Change
in
Ginia
N
2002 2004
Total 35% -17% 10% 4% 0.36 0.01 3132
Switched 38% -23% 11% 4% 0.36 0.02 1317
Non-switched 33% -19% 9% 3% 0.36 0.02 1815
Farm HH 44% -18% 14% 8% 0.39 0.00 426
Mix farm 39% -22% 11% 5% 0.31 0.03 685
Mix non-farm 22% -14% 5% 2% 0.36 -0.04 499
Non-farm 12% -4% 2% 1% 0.34 0.06 182
Farm to mix farm 57% -29% 17% 7% 0.34 0.03 270
Mix non-farm to mix farm 29% -16% 8% 4% 0.31 0.06 222
Mix farm to farm 46% -19% 13% 7% 0.39 0.00 183
Mix farm to mix non-farm 37% -27% 10% 3% 0.33 -0.02 227
Mix non-farm to non-farm 30% -15% 8% 3% 0.35 0.05 128
Note: a: Changes between years 2002 and 2004.
Note: b: Poverty gap given as share of national poverty line.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
poorest households are mostly those that are most difficult to lift out of poverty.
Generally, the difference between switched types and non-switched types was larger
in 2002 in all indicators but became significantly smaller for 2004. This indicates
some catching up effect for the switched types. Nevertheless, the Gini coefficients
remain similar in both periods.
The group that performs best of all groups, in terms of reduction of poverty and
inequality, is the group of mix non-farm households that already had the second
lowest poverty headcount ratio in the first period and which came down to be the
lowest for the second period. Furthermore, the poverty gap went down by 3%
and the Gini coefficient by 0.04 points, which was the highest reduction. Almost
similar movements took place in the group of mix farm households that extended
their non-farm engagement and are now considered mix non-farm households. The
poverty headcount went down from the above average rate of 37% to only 10%,
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which is exactly the average for the second period. The poverty gap that was 10%
dropped to 3% and the Gini went down, which happened for only two groups.
The switched households encountered higher poverty incidence in both peri-
ods, but also realized higher poverty reductions in the poverty headcount ratio as
well as poverty gap. Therefore, based on these indicators, the switching income
composition seems to pay off for the households and the new combination does
better reflect their potential to generate income. Now, the question is whether the
observed poverty changes are based on the shift of population from one group to
another or the poverty reduction occurred within the groups.
Table 3.3 provides a decomposition of the poverty changes along the household
income types and deducting the population shift effects emerging from household
changing their income portfolio. The decomposition proposed by Ravallion and
Datt [1996] decomposes the national growth by the contributions of the primary,
secondary and tertiary sector contributions to GDP. Here the income of the house-
hold groups is used instead, which might imply some distortions as the sectors
are not completely separated due to the two mix household types. Due to the
Table 3.3: Household type (2002) Poverty Decompositiona.
Household type Absolute
change
Percentage
change
Change in poverty (HC) −17.77 100.00
Total Intra-sectoral effect −17.62 99.14
Population-shift effect −0.54 3.01
Interaction effect 0.38 −2.16
Intra-sectoral effects:
Farm HH −5.22 29.39
Non-farm HH −0.30 1.68
Mix farm HH −7.45 41.90
Mix non-farm HH −4.51 25.37
Other HH −0.14 0.80
Note: a: Decomposition according to Ravallion and Huppi [1991].
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
mix types this decomposition cannot be interpreted with respect to any sectoral
growth impact as the sectors are not completely separated due to the mix types.
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Nevertheless, this approach offers more insight into the differences of the four in-
come compositions as compared to assigning the most important sector to each
household.
The high share attributed to the ”intra-sectoral” effects shows that most of
the poverty reduction observed in the data is attributed to increases in incomes
within the household groups and not by population shifts across these groups.10
The highest contribution (41.9%) to overall poverty reduction is attributed to the
poverty reduction within the mix-farm household group. This is not only based on
the very high poverty reduction itself but also on the group size. The group of mix
farm households accounts for almost 40% of the households in both periods and
therefore has a major impact in this decomposition. The same holds for the other
groups that were all able to reduce poverty to different extents. The groups of non-
farm and other households had only small reductions and are also small in number
and therefore have a combined impact of less than 3% although constituting 10%
and 13% of all households in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Thus these groups have
been reducing poverty disproportionately less while in the group of farm households
and mix farm households the poverty reduction has been disproportionately large.
Based on the differences in poverty changes, the switching households perform
better than the non-switching households. But the poverty measures were higher
in 2002 and are still higher in 2004 although some catching up does take place.
3.4.2 Short term pro-poor growth performance across household
types
Based on the poverty decomposition across the household types we now turn to
the analysis of income growth from 2002 to 2004, generating further insight into
the short-term intertemporal dynamics within the groups. First of all, the growth-
redistribution decompositions allow insight into distinguishing between the growth
component of poverty reduction and the effect of mere redistribution. Besides
the question of whether the poverty reduction can be attributed to population
shifts between the groups, another possible explanation for the reduction would
be redistributions within the groups. Especially in the context of pro-poor growth
10Major shifts across the groups have been shown above but these have been almost equal for
all groups leaving the group sizes almost constant.
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this question is important, as if growth is not the most important driver of poverty
reduction it would not matter how much growth one can achieve because it would
not directly benefit the poor but only via redistribution policies. Table 3.4 gives
Table 3.4: Growth redistribution decomposition by household type.a
Household type Change in
poverty
rate
Growth
compo-
nent
Redistri-
bution
compo-
nent
N
Total −17.92 −10.95 −6.97 3132
Switched −22.60 −16.54 −6.07 1317
Non-switched −19.42 −12.89 −6.53 1815
Farm HH −15.77 −8.24 −7.53 426
Mix farm −21.59 −15.65 −5.94 685
Mix non-farm −14.51 −4.32 −10.19 499
Non-farm −5.80 −4.96 −0.84 182
Mix farm to farm −18.98 −10.86 −8.13 183
Farm to mix farm −28.10 −20.33 −7.78 270
Mix farm to mix non-farm −28.99 −16.66 −12.33 227
Mix non-farm to non-farm −15.73 −13.62 −2.11 128
Mix non-farm to mix farm −14.48 −13.62 −0.86 222
Note: a: Decomposition according to Datt and Ravallion [1992].
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004] using
ADePT 4.0 Poverty [2009].
the results for the decomposition of growth and redistribution components of the
realized poverty reduction. For all households the growth component does exceed
the redistribution component. Roughly 11% of the total poverty reduction of about
18% can be attributed to growth in mean incomes. The additional 7% of poverty
reduction can be ascribed to redistribution of incomes from households above the
poverty line to households below the poverty line, enabling them to increase their
income to a level above the poverty line. Subdividing the effect to the switched
and non-switched households, the same picture holds as for the other indicators,
with the switched types realizing higher poverty reduction than the non-switched
types.
Again, splitting the whole sample into subsamples of the major change house-
hold types enables further examination of the differences across the household types
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with respect to growth and redistribution components of the different poverty re-
duction performances. Within the group of households that did not change their
income portfolios, all groups except the mix non-farm household’s poverty reduc-
tion is mainly attributed to growth rather than redistribution. Within the group
of mix non-farm households the poverty reduction of 15% is mainly attributed
to redistribution rather than mean income growth. This is consistent with the
observed reduction in the Gini coefficient, which already suggested a reduction in
inequality but from which a growth effect can not be concluded in the way it can be
from this decomposition. The opposite trend in terms of growth vs. redistribution
components holds true for the mix non-farm to mix farm as well as non-farm house-
holds, the Gini coefficient rose in these groups and the observed poverty reduction
is almost entirely attributed to growth rather than redistribution. Recalling the
findings of [Klump and Bonschab, 2004], who found the redistribution component
to be positive for Vietnam, here the same effects take place, with redistribution
and growth component working in the same direction. Additionally, the growth
component still dominates the redistribution effect, leading to poverty reduction
over all groups.
Three groups, i.e. farm, mix farm to farm and mix farm to mix non-farm
households, have rather similar growth and redistribution components. The Gini
coefficients for these groups have been stable (except thatfor the mix farm to mix
non-farm households within this group the Gini coefficient did decline slightly).
For the rest of the groups, the growth component is considerably higher than the
redistribution component but a significant share of redistribution in favor of the
poor did happen within these groups although the Gini coefficient rose. Again,
the switched households performed much better, which gives additional support to
the assumption that households do switch due to rational assessment of increased
income opportunities.
A sizable share of households (42%) changed their income portfolio, which might
well be connected to their insufficient income as the poverty rate among those
households is significantly more often considered as poor. But the poverty reduc-
tion among the households that did switch was higher (23%) as compared to those
who did not change (17%). Finally, the mean growth components/redistribution
component ratio is 2.8 times higher for the switch type households than the non-
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switching households, which suggests a successful strategy by the switching house-
holds. Furthermore, the switch of the income portfolio also led to considerably
higher growth within the group of switch households (11.5% vs 8.7%).11 All in all,
the growth component is the most important across all groups except the mix non-
farm households. This indicates that a growth-based poverty reduction strategy
would be more efficient than a redistribution policy. Therefore, a more detailed
analysis of the growth that did happen is useful in facilitating adequate policy
targeting poverty reduction and in investigating whether the realized growth was
pro-poor or if the poverty reduction is based on mere growth in mean incomes over
the whole population.
Turning to the pro-poor growth realized across the groups, the growth inci-
dence curve, the mean percentile growth rate of the poor and growth rate in mean
[Ravallion and Chen, 2003] is utilized in figure 3.4. The GIC for rural Vietnam in
total, as well as three selected household types, are illustrated in figure 3.512.
Figure 3.4: Growth incidence curve for rural Vietnam.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
11Figures given are based on own calculation from GSO [2002; 2004].
12All other curves are given in figure A.6 page 141.
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As elaborated earlier, there are several definitions for pro-poor growth that
are more or less strict. The wide definition requires only the growth rates of the
poor to be above zero (def I). A less restrictive definitions demands the growth in
incomes of the poor be greater than the mean growth (def II). Finally, the most
narrow definition requires the absolute increase in incomes of the poor to exceed
the absolute increase in average incomes (def III) [Grosse et al., 2008].
Taking first the GIC for all rural households in the sample, visual inspection
leads to some basic insight into the implications of the different definitions. First
of all, although there are some fluctuations, a general upward trend is visible from
the graph, which implies that the growth rate of the bottom income percentiles
was lower than that of the top income percentiles. Furthermore, the curve runs
below the growth rate in mean curve up to approximately the 40th percentile but
is above zero throughout all percentiles. This again suggests that the poorest 40
percentiles realized a growth rate below average. With respect to the definitions
above, these two observations lead to only the widest definition of pro-poor growth
being fulfilled. The second definition suggests that pro-poor growth has not been
realized. It is obvious that the rates of pro-poor growth vary by more than 10%
across the household types, with the non-farm households group performing worst
(0.53%) and the mix farm to farm households group performing best (11.63%).
Differentiating the GIC by the household types, the several differences emerge.
For figure 3.5a, the trend of the bottom 30 to 40 percentiles having a growth rate
below the mean growth rate still holds, but in contrast to the whole population,
almost all of the upper 10 percentiles also realize a lower growth. Nevertheless,
the rate of pro-poor growth is exactly the same for this group. For the other three
subgroups there are no clear trends and it is not easy to judge based on the graphs.
A downward slope is, if in any, detectable in figure 3.5c for the mix non-farm to non-
farm households. These households used to generate some additional income from
agriculture but dropped this income source by 2004 and now focus on non-farm
income as their only income source. This group seems to have realized narrower
pro-poor growth even in terms of the second definition of the poor, achieving
above average growth rates. A final assessment is not possible as only the lowest
15 percentiles realized above average growth while from 15th to 60th percentile the
growth rates are below average.
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(a) Mix farm to mix non-farm households ru-
ral Vietnam (N=227).
(b) Mix farm to farm households rural Viet-
nam (N=183).
(c) Mix non-farm to non-farm households ru-
ral Vietnam (N=128).
(d) Non-farm households rural Vietnam
(N=182).
Figure 3.5: Growth incidence curves.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
Note: For the other groups, see Appendix A.6, page 141.
What can be accurately compared are the rates of pro-poor growth that dif-
fer across the groups, with the non-farm households realizing the lowest rate of
all groups (0.53%), while the mix farm to farm and mix non-farm to non-farm
households realize almost similar above average rates of more than 10%. For easier
comparison, table 3.5 gives several pro-poor growth related measures. These are
the mean of growth rates, the rate of pro-poor growth according to Ravallion and
Chen [2003] and finally the Ravallion and Chen [2003] rate of Pro-poor growth
adjusted according to definition II by deducting the mean of growth rates from the
pro-poor growth rate.
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Table 3.5: Household typology changes and pro-poor growth rates.
Change household types Mean of
growth rates
Rate of
PPGa
Rate of PPG
- mean of
growth rates
Total 9.4% 8.0% −1.4%
Switched 10.3% 9.5% −0.9%
Non-switched 8.7% 6.9% −1.9%
Farm HH 8.3% 6.6% −1.7%
Mix farm 9.7% 7.6% −2.2%
Mix non-farm 9.0% 7.4% −1.6%
Non-farm 6.2% 0.5% −5.7%
Farm to mix farm 11.8% 9.6% −2.3%
Mix non-farm to mix farm 9.0% 5.9% −3.1%
Mix farm to farm 12.4% 11.6% −0.8%
Mix farm to mix non-farm 9.4% 8.0% −1.4%
Mix non-farm to non-farm 7.5% 10.8% 3.3%
Notes: a: Rate of PPG according to Ravallion and Chen [2003].
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
First of all, as a basis for one of the measures of pro-poor growth, the mean
growth rates do differ across the household types, from 6.2% to the highest growth
rate of 12.4%. The households that changed their income portfolio realized slightly
higher growth rate than the households that remained in the same group. Although
poverty reduction was greater, poverty headcount was and remains higher (recalling
table 3.2: 39 vs 33% for 2002 and 19 vs. 17% for 2004). The group realizing the
lowest mean percentile growth rate is the group of non-farm households, while the
mix farm to farm households realized the highest growth of 12.4%. Almost all
subgroups among the switched household types realized higher growth rates than
all other subgroups in the category of non-switched types. This indicates that the
income composition switches have been very successful for households and do pay
off in terms of higher income gains.
Now turning to the direct measures of pro-poor growth, the Ravallion and Chen
[2003] type measure used for def (I) is positive for all household types and thus pro-
poor growth has been realized across all types although to very different extents.
It ranges from as low as 0.5% mean growth of the poor for the group of non-farm
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households to 11.8% mean growth of the poor for mix farm to farm households.
Similarly to the mean of growth rates, the switched households did realize higher
pro-poor growth rates than the non-switched households. Except for the group
of mix non-farm to mix farm households, all groups that changed their income
portfolios realized higher pro-poor growth rates than all non-switched types.
Based on the def (I) type pro-poor growth measure and the mean of growth
rates, the def (II) type pro-poor growth measure is calculated by deducting the
mean of growth rates from the rate of pro-poor growth. This results in an overall
negative pro-poor growth measure for all types except the mix non-farm to non-
farm households that realized a 3.3% higher pro-poor growth rate as compared to
the mean of growth rates. Therefore, according to this definition pro-poor growth
can only be found in that group. Overall, the switched households again performed
better than non-switched households in terms of def (II) pro-poor growth although
both groups had negative rates. Due to the very low def (I) pro-poor growth, the
non-farm households perform worst in def (II) pro-poor growth with an 5.7% lower
pro-poor growth rate compared to the mean of growth rates. Nevertheless, one has
to take into account that this group especially already has very low poverty levels
and comparably high income levels.
Besides the differences that exist among the groups, the regional differences
found by [Klump, 2007] and [Bonschab and Klump, 2007] still persist. Figure 3.6
gives the pro-poor growth rates across the Vietnamese provinces based on the two
different definitions.
Clearly, the highest pro-poor growth rates can be found around the growth
poles, especially in the Mekong delta around Ho Chi Minh City but also around the
Red River delta in the Hanoi region. Nevertheless, some places in less prosperous
regions of Vietnam do also perform above average in terms of pro-poor growth,
such as Da Nang province in Middle Vietnam and Bac Kan province in the North
Eastern region.
What can also be seen from figure 3.6b is that most regions face a negative
pro-poor growth rate according to def II, meaning that growth was actually anti-
poor and the gap between the poor and the non-poor was widening from 2002 to
2004. Even some places close to Ho Chi Minh City realized pro-poor growth rates
ranging from -10% to -15%.
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(a) Def I: Annual rates of pro-poor
growth by province (N=3132).
(b) Def II: Difference annual pro-
poor growth rate and mean of an-
nual growth rate (N=3132).
Figure 3.6: PPG (2002–2004) for definitions I and II across provinces.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004]; Map generated using ADePT
Maps 2.0 [2009].
3.5 Summary
Besides the differences in poverty rates across provinces, the income composition
of households has a major impact on poverty prevalence. Furthermore, the income
portfolio is less static than one would usually expect, even in a developing country
like Vietnam. Even seemingly specialized households that only derive income from
either farming or non-farm activities do (to a major extend) integrate other sources
based either on opportunities or of necessity and therefore switch to different sec-
tors. The steadiest group was the non-farm group with more than 80% remaining
in that group. The most volatile group (apart from the other households) was
found to be the farm households. Assuming these households are also more often
hit by shocks, especially flooding or droughts, this suggests some degree of neces-
sity was involved in the decision to change. For the group of non-farm households,
shocks such as job loss might also be involved but these are (even though casual
labor is still very common) less common than flooding. Vietnam was hit by several
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typhoons in the last few years and farmers frequently lost their harvests from these
occurrences.
Besides showing mixed results in term of poverty and poverty reduction, the
switched household types generally perform better than the non-switched types
but also had higher poverty rates in 2002. All above average poor groups realized
higher poverty reduction than those with lower poverty levels. This supports the
argument by [Klump, 2005] that especially with low poverty rates, it becomes more
and more difficult to lift these least favored groups out of poverty.
Furthermore, recalling the findings of [Klump and Bonschab, 2004], who found
the redistribution component to be positive for Vietnam, here the same effects
take place, with the redistribution and growth components working in the same
direction. Additionally, the growth component still dominates the redistribution
effect, leading to poverty reduction over all groups.
Similar results are shown in growth and pro-poor growth. Besides the mixed
results across the groups, most of the switched households did perform better. The
seemingly very poor performance of the non-farm households is mainly based on
the very low level of poverty before, and the remaining households seem to face
especially adverse conditions. Nonetheless, one should not take those groups out of
focus, for although the poverty incidences are low, it seems that those affected are
trapped in a low income low growth scenario out of which they might not be able
to escape by themselves. Although mostly showing a similar pattern, the growth
incidence curves differ across the household types. Lower growth rates in lower
income percentiles persist across almost all types, with only for the mix non-farm
to non-farm households showing some kind of downward slope or at least an equally
fluctuating pattern over all percentiles.
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4.1 Introduction
In the traditional view, development was associated with pure growth of the Gross
National Product (GNP) and people’s incomes, but the more recent view also
includes social aspects like personal freedom in efforts to enhance development [Sen,
1999]. Freedom is not only important for the happiness of people but also supports
the development of companies. These freedoms are one aspect of institutional
economics theory. Institutions play a central role in understanding the differences
in the economic performance of countries and therefore for the performance of the
companies that operate in a country [North, 1990]. Institutional economics has
its origin in North [1990], who defined institutions as: ”Institutions are the rules
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints
that shape human interactions. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the
way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical
change.” [North, 1990, p.3] ”(...); they are the underlying determinant of the long-
run performance of economies.” [North, 1990, p.110]
Considering institutions as a key factor explaining economic success across econ-
omies became commonly accepted [Gagliardi, 2008] and thus the Millennium Dec-
laration of the United Nations General Assembly states that institutional reforms
promoting good governance are one central condition for the goal of poverty erad-
ication [United Nations, 2000]. In rural areas particularly, governance is a central
problem with poor people having no voice in politics as the rich tend to dominate
rural institutions. This gives them the possibility of conserving their traditional
power. As a result law enforcement is problematic; the trust of the poor in the
governmental and legal institutions is lacking [United Nations, 2007]. Among other
measures, pro-poor policies should strengthen rural informational systems and de-
velop rural institutional capacities. Both of these aims focus on the improvement
of institutional settings. This is based on the two basic effects of institutional
quality. First of all, a good institutional environment induces investments and
increases income growth. Furthermore, high quality institutions distribute income
more equally by restricting the ability of the rich to engage in successful rent seek-
ing [Gradstein, 2007].
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Following the definition of Acemoglu et al. [2004], good institutions are charac-
terized by a cluster of conditions. A key part is the enforcement of property rights
in order to provide incentive to individuals to take part in economic activities.
Furthermore, a certain degree of equality of opportunity is necessary to facilitate
an efficient allocation of investments and investors.
4.2 Vietnam’s economy
Vietnam witnessed a strong and steady economic growth of around 8% per year
over the last decade. For the first nine months of 2007 Vietnam was able to
continue with this positive trend despite only a 3% growth rate in agriculture.
This fact emphasises that the major driving force in the Vietnamese success in
recent years can be attributed to the performance of the industry, manufacturing
and service sector, which again accomplished growth rates of 10.2%, 12.5% and
8.5% respectively [World Bank, 2007a].
Vietnam’s business environment in general has undergone tremendous changes
in the past two decades. Starting from the doi moi1 reform in 1986 the socialist
party began opening up to a more market-oriented economy. The doi moi reform
process that emerged from the 6th convention of the communist party of Vietnam
(1986) aimed at improving the productivity of state-owned enterprises (SOE), loos-
ening the discrimination against private enterprises and opening up the economy to
foreign trade [Revilla Diez, 1995]. Furthermore, a democratization of the country
and an political opening towards the rest of the world was agreed upon [Nam Xuan
et al., 2001]. In 1992 the constitution first recognized individual ownership and the
private sector as legal parts of the economy [Wescott, 2003]. In the decade after
doi moi Vietnam witnessed the highest economic growth rate out of the 40 poorest
countries in the world. Between 1992 and 1998 real income rose by 39%. Fur-
thermore, the decision of the United States to lift the embargo in 1993 fostered
the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow [Fforde, 2001]. In additon, the private
sector gained importance in recent years and today it accounts for a relative large
share of the GDP [Rand and Tarp, 2007].
1Doi moi is Vietnamese for regeneration.
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The opening of the Vietnamese economy can also be seen in the composition of
the GDP. Figure 4.1a shows that, starting in 1988, the share of the GDP generated
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(b) Employment by ownership.
Figure 4.1: GDP and employment structure by ownership.
Source: Own presentation based on GSO [2008c] data.
from FDI enterprises (FDIE) rose as it was then possible to invest directly in
Vietnam. This trend was accompanied by an almost equal decline in the investment
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from private domestic enterprises (PDE). Meanwhile, the share of the state sector
remained approximately constant over the past decades.
The same trend can be seen in the employment structure (figure 4.1b). As FDI
companies grew in terms of their share of the GDP these companies also started to
employ a considerable share of the Vietnamese workforce and thus became more
important, not only for the Vietnamese economy, but also in the political decision
making.
Alongside the change towards an open and world market integrated economy,
the share of the agricultural output as a proportion of the total output declined
from 43% in 1980 to 24.6% in 2002 while the share of the service sector rose from
33.7% to 39.5% and the industry sector rose from 23.3% to 35.9% in the same period
[United Nations, 2007]. The Vietnamese economy thus faced several structural
changes in the decades since the opening process. Besides integration with the
world market it also faced a structural change within its domestic production,
which shifted from domination by agriculture to a modern industry- and service-
oriented economy.
Figure 4.1 and figure 4.2 show that the turning point for the Vietnamese econ-
omy can be pinpointed to the period between 1988 and 1990, when the share of
the agricultural sector to the total GDP declined, while the share of the service
sector rose and foreign direct investments started to flow into the economy. Thus,
a structural change in the Vietnamese economy happened shortly after the doi moi
process was introduced, which therefore can be denoted a successful implementa-
tion of the political decision.
This process provided the ground for the strengthening of the RNFE that plays
a central role in poverty reduction. Thus, its development has to be considered in
policy plans targeting the improvement of the living conditions for the rural poor.
In 2004 the RNFE accounted for over 30% of rural employment [ADB, 2005]. The
constraints that these firms face are different from the ones located in the country’s
centers like Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi or Da Nang. Obvious constraints that rural
enterprises face are mainly the lack of various infrastructures like electricity, trans-
portation and telecommunication, but they also include institutional constraints
such as political/regulatory uncertainty, corruption or access to secure land rights
that hinder their performance [ADB, 2005]. The fact that land prices in urban ar-
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Figure 4.2: Structure of GDP as share of total.
Source: Own presentation based on GSO [2008c] data.
eas are about 500 times higher than in rural areas [ADB, 2005] might increase the
incentives for companies to invest in rural areas. The challenge that came along
with the opening up was to adjust the business conditions to the new circumstances
in order to provide fruitful ground for the newly established businesses and to be
able to maintain the positive trend. Besides the competition for the Vietnamese
companies from world markets, there is also a strong international competition for
FDI. In order to be able to benefit in the long run, Vietnam needs to provide a legal
system that enables investors to accurately predict the terms of doing business and
that ensures them that they will benefit from investing in Vietnam.
4.3 Institutional economics and transition economies
4.3.1 Political economy approach
An attempt to formalize the concept of institutional economics and the multiple
and complex linkages between political and economic institutions on the one hand
and the economic performance and distribution of resources of a country/region it
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includes on the other hand is given in Acemoglu et al. [2004]. Figure 4.3 provides
an overview concerning these linkages.
Figure 4.3: A framework of institutions.
Source: According to Acemoglu et al. [2004, p.6].
The prevailing (period t) political institutions and the current distribution of
resources determine the de jure and respectively the de facto political power in
the same period t. These two sources of political power determine the economic
institutions in t as well as the next period’s (t+1) political institutions as the groups
with de facto political power try to gain de jure political power and thus broaden
their influence on the economic institutions that finally determine the economic
performance of a country in t and more importantly the distribution of resources
in t+1 which directly affect the de facto political power in t+1. Therefore, the
economic performance and the distribution of resources is directly and essentially
affected by economic institutions, which are themselves determined by political
institutions and the distribution of resources [Acemoglu et al., 2004].
According to Acemoglu et al. [2004], political and economic institutions are
assumed to influence the economic performance of countries according to six basic
arguments. First, as institutions influence the investments and the organization of
production in a country, they are the major source of cross-country differences in
economic growth and prosperity. Second, they are endogenous as they emerge from
a collective choice of the society. Third, there are conflicting interests over the dis-
tribution of resources and therefore indirectly over the set of economic institutions.
Fourth, political power, which is endogenous in a society, can be distinguished into
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two components: de jure and de facto political power. While de jure political
power is based on the political institutions in the society, de facto political power
of a certain group depends on their ability to cooperate, and their economic re-
sources, which enable them to use/misuse political institutions and to use force
against other groups. Therefore the two state variables are defined as: political
institutions and the distributions of resources.
4.3.2 Transaction cost based considerations
The most applied approach in the analysis of institutions is transaction cost eco-
nomics that originate in Coase [1937]. In the original transaction cost economics
framework, firms have been viewed as governing structures with their main pur-
pose being to organize the production and exchange process. Coase set a focus on
the role of exchange costs in the related interface. ”Firm-level decisions, especially
those regarding internal production and contracting out (...), business decisions in
terms of choice of activities under vertical and horizontal integration of business
activities (...) have been assessed in terms of incidence of their relative transaction
costs in addition to traditional direct costs.”[Rao, 2003, p.7]
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the different types of transaction costs and their
origin within the economic system. In the context of provincial differences in the
performance and the development possibilities of rural non-farm companies, all
three categories of transaction costs, i.e. market-based, administrative/managerial
and political transaction costs, are important as they all determine the actions
of the entrepreneurs. As transaction costs are difficult to measure directly, they
have to be included using different proxies like the number of contracting partners,
which will lower the transaction cost at a lower the number, or connection to the
internet and telephone network as this will lower the time spent to get in contact
with current and future contracting partners. Furthermore, the length of the re-
lationship with one market partner reduces the transaction costs, as generally the
longer two partners work with each other the higher is the level of trust, resulting
in a lowering of the monitoring effort and therefore the transaction costs. The same
argument holds for reputation, which can be signaled by holding certificates. If a
company holds a specific certificate it signals that this company operates accord-
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Table 4.1: Transaction costs classification.
Categorya Costs items a Possible indicators
Market-based - Information - Connection to the internet
and Telephone network
- Bargaining/negotiation
over transactions
- Number of contact part-
ners and length of the rela-
tionship
- Contracting - Ways to find new business
partners
- Monitoring and enforce-
ment of agreements
- Number of contact de-
faults
Administrative
and/or man-
agerial
- Setting up or establish-
ment of organizational fea-
tures
- Business attitude of the lo-
cal authorities
- Operating an organiza-
tional entity
- Local business environ-
ment and infrastructure
- Information gathering and
processing
- Staff replacement rates
- Alternative modes of re-
source development
Political - Specified due to system
characteristics
- Ease of doing business
- Set of costs of broader
institutional configurations
within which other institu-
tions and organizations ex-
ist
- Bribe level and tax proce-
dures
Source: a: according to Rao [2003].
ing to the rules specified by the issuing authority and therefore any new market
partner can rely on this signal and does not need to assess it himself.
Furthermore, internal administrative processes influence transaction costs. These
costs occur due to decision-making and hierarchical structures. The longer the hi-
erarchy, the higher the transaction costs. If workers are more integrated in the
processes, transaction costs might be lower compared to a more patriarchal struc-
tured company. A proxy for this kind of transaction cost is the share of professional
staff as their main task is to monitor operations and organize the production and
exchange processes.
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For the political factors the general ease of doing business can be measured by
the reliability of regulations, as it is time consuming to adjust to new circumstances;
the business attitude of the authorities is important, as it is easier and faster to
deal with officials who try to help.
Besides lowering the transaction costs of a company, some of these factors also
involve risks. For example, the low transaction costs of only producing for one
single market partner also involves the risk of losing this partner and have no
market left.
4.3.3 The special case of institutions in a transition economy
Taking a look at the special case of transition economies, it becomes clear that insti-
tutions play an even more vital role in a successful transition process. A communist
regime provides a framework with zero probability of being held up. Mostly one
large state-owned company per sector manages the whole sectoral system. After
privatization the system was split into many small enterprises that make decisions
autonomously. Thus, the transition, if not accompanied by an adequate change in
the institutional setting, might be trapped in several hold-ups [Cungo et al., 2008].
Any transition process inherits constraints. First of all, there is the uncertainty
of outcome. In some parts, the goal of a transition is controversial as there is
no general understanding of many parts of a market-economy. For example, the
role of the government, which is possibly the most debated within the theory of
market-economies, leads directly to a debate on the transition and its goal. And
even if there is a clear goal for transition, no theory yet exists on how to get there.
Furthermore, the transition process is usually directed by some few individuals
who will decide, due to the enormous uncertainty they face, quite differently even
if they were theoretically in the same situation. Despite this general uncertainty,
a transition process is a very complex path and it includes multiple steps and
complementary reforms that are supposed to lead to the goal. This also leads
to the last and possibly most important constraint of a transition process. As
every transition involves winners and losers, the political constraint is crucial.
The politicians who start the process and are now in power will try to remain
empowered even after transition. Thus they will mostly act out of self-interest
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and not necessarily choose the best option from a society’s point of view [Roland,
2000].
New institutions should not aim to outrival existing institutions but provide
alternatives and thus the necessary flexibility. The goal should not be a rigid
system of enforcement of all contracts but leave open the option of risk sharing
and excusable default [Fafchamps, 2004]. Policies that facilitate trade are not
exclusively contract law and court improvements. Another strand of institutions
are of private/personal nature. Private screening and monitoring facilities like
trade unions and business associations serve as a complement to the legal system
and thus broaden the opportunities of the companies involved [Fafchamps, 2004].
Nevertheless, a certain degree of enforcement is necessary. Cungo et al. [2008]
proved in the case of Hungary that especially in the transition period, contract en-
forcement problems existed. For example, inadequate institutional settings caused
many problems of delays in payments or deliveries. This is due to the fact that the
legal system that used to provide total security was then highly ineffective and thus
doing business became very insecure. Their survey showed that payment delays
are important or at least fairly important for 60% of Hungarian farm enterprises.
Similar problems have been found in the transition process of countries like the
Czech Republic and Slovenia where Gorton et al. [2000] found that payment delays
were the single most important barrier to growth. Furthermore, Gow and Swinnen
[2001] showed in the case of Slovakia that payment problems were very important
for several agricultural sectors. According to a survey conducted by Dries et al.
[2009], about 35% of the Bulgarian dairy farms experienced payment delays of at
least 60 days.
Another problem emerging from transition are increasing information costs as
the former centrally distributed goods and centrally planned prices are now vari-
able and determined by market conditions that need to be analyzed [Krug, 1991].
The importance of networks for, for example, information- or risk- sharing is gen-
erally agreed upon. Fafchamps [2004] provides a unique framework for analyzing
how networks influence the economic behavior of firms under non-convex trans-
action costs. Non-convex transaction costs refer to a situation in which economic
transactions recur over time between the same individuals or firms. This creates
a situation in which individuals tend to choose partners for their transaction with
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whom they have already traded. Thus trade patterns will persist along the same
network structure over longer time periods. This leads directly to the observation
that especially in former centrally planned economies, where the former elites have
a comparative advantage concerning information gathering, networks are even more
important than in more developed market economies. They used to have most of
the relevant market information and thus have a comparative advantage in infor-
mation gathering after privatization [Krug, 1991]. Therefore, the former elite is
able to conserve their influence on the society even after the privatization process.
Thus Leipold [1991] proposed an extensive disempowerment of the former elite to
overcome this obstacle to a successful transformation.
Generally, most of the issues arising from institutional economics literature are
transformed into laws in most of the countries in the world, as they are in Vietnam.
Vietnam has a land law that regulates the access to land, corruption is illegal and
contracts are binding. Nevertheless, the implementation of these regulations and
laws is the crucial part of the process according to institutional literature. If
corruption is illegal but the law is either not monitored at all or people are not
punished for breaking the law, corruption still exists and the law has no impact on
the actual situation. The same holds for Vietnam where an anti-corruption law is in
place but corruption levels are still high. According to Transparency International
[2008], Vietnam still ranks 121st out of 180 countries surveyed for the perception
of corruption. Thus, having an anti-corruption law does not lead to low levels of
corruption unless it is enforced. The same holds for access to land rights. Even
with land being officially obtainable, private companies still face major problems
in getting access to land as most of the available land is allocated to state-owned
enterprises [ADB, 2005].
As shown above, all factors introduced in the transaction cost theory are even
more important in the transition process, as in the first years after a political
change transaction costs are likely to increase and need to be lowered in order to
supplement growth. Therefore, the transaction cost based definition of institutions
is the main focus of the analysis.
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4.3.4 Empirical applications of the institutional economics concepts
As the livelihoods of rural poor depend crucially on labor incomes, functioning of
the rural labor markets is a key concern of rural poverty reduction efforts [Otsuka
and Yamano, 2006]. As shown above, one crucial precondition for the functioning
of the economy, especially in rural areas, is an adequate institutional setting within
which the companies act. One prominent example of empirical and theoretical re-
search in the field of institutional economics is Acemoglu et al. [2004]. Institutions
are one important reason for the different economic performances across countries.
According to their findings, this is based on institutions that were, in the case of
developing countries, mostly formed during the colonial era. As institutions tend
to persist over long periods and are hard to change due to different political and
social circumstances, these colonial institutions still determine the fate of many de-
veloping countries. They conclude that the incentive to invest for people with good
investment opportunities in a country is based on the precondition of enforceable
property rights and equality before law for ”a broad cross-section of the society”.
The problem in policy-oriented empirical work is to measure the variety of
institutions and to generate policy-relevant proxies that are on the one hand able
to measure the institutional differences and on the other hand are detailed enough
to be relevant for policy interventions.
The security of land rights, as one part of the institutional setting in countries,
is crucial in stimulating investment and innovation and is one proxy that can be
directly influenced by policy makers via the design of land laws that are enforceable.
The effect of secure land rights is not only based on the direct investment effect,
but also on indirect factors as land can serve as collateral for credits needed for
investment [Grimm and Klasen, 2007].
The challenge of improving the access of the rural poor to welfare enhancing
non-farm activities is not only reached via the improvement of physical infras-
tructure that lowers the relative distance to centers of economic activities, but
should also include the improvement of institutional settings to lower the entry
costs for those groups. These entry costs can be knowledge barriers that could
be reduced by improvements in the education system but may also include diffi-
culties in migration or setting up a business [Barrett et al., 2001]. Furthermore,
does the access to institutional capacity (including information, markets, commu-
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nications and transport) lower the costs of acquiring information such as on where
wage work is available or on the demand for goods/services, physical infrastructure
lower transport and transaction costs? [van de Walle and Cratty, 2004]. Another
proxy for institutional quality is the corruption prevalence that hinders people or
companies from investing in a certain region or to grow in that region. Corrup-
tion generally causes higher uncertainty in the business and makes it more difficult
to operate in an environment in which decision are not only based on laws and
regulations but also on additional and unpredictable payments for governmental
services. Stalker [2008] has shown that control of corruption and high scores for
the human development index are closely correlated. This leads to the conclusion
that better control of corruption leads to improvements in the human development
index and via higher education levels to pro-poor growth. Another indicator of the
broad set of institutional proxies is the freedom of capital movement. In case of
Vietnam, the mobility of capital is still extremely low, which makes it even more
difficult for regions that lack behind in their economic development to catch up
with the booming centers [Bonschab and Klump, 2007].
Another interesting example is the topic of decentralization aiming at increased
participation of the local population and improved accountability of local authori-
ties. Wescott [2003] analyzed this issue in the case of Vietnam and found that the
newly introduced decentralization policy is unfortunately moving only slowly due
to the remaining political networks that hinder effective implementation of the law.
Therefore, the party elites still dominate the businesses, and private investments
are not growing at the expected pace [Wescott, 2003]. This example shows as well
as the appropriate laws, it is important that the correct institutional settings exist
to enable their implementation, and how this has strong implications for economic
growth and entrepreneurship within the country or location.
Especially when operating in imperfect markets, transaction costs are a major
factor to be considered by companies. Some examples that illustrate the dimension
that transaction costs can reach are given in Benham and Benham [2001]. In the
first example the ”real” costs of getting a landline telephone in Egypt (1996) are
approximated by the difference in apartment rents for similar apartments with
and without an installed telephone. With the official price given at $295 and the
”urgent response” price at $885, the actual difference in rents ranged between
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$1,180 and $1,770. This approximates the additional costs by the willingness to
pay for the already installed service. Another example is the difference in waiting
time to get a ship cleared that is already in the port. Comparing Singapore with
only 15 minutes to Tanzania where it takes between 7 and 14 days, the transaction
costs vary tremendously. This implies that transaction costs ought to be included
in the analysis of the Vietnamese non-farm economy as they might be a major
factor that drives the differences between provinces and the success of resident
industries.
One prominent attempt to compare institutional settings across different coun-
tries of the world is the ”Doing Business Index” of the World Bank. It combines
several indicators on the business environment for 181 countries in 2008, which are
aggregated to the Index. Table 4.2 gives details about the performance of Vietnam
between 2005 and 2007 as compared to other South Asian countries.
Table 4.2: Ease of doing business ranks of selected South Asian economies.
Ease of doing business world ranks
Economy 2005 2006 2007
Singapore 2 1 1
Hong Kong, China 6 5 4
Thailand 19 18 15
Malaysia 25 25 24
Taiwan, China 43 47 50
Mongolia 41 45 52
China 108 93 83
Vietnam 98 104 91
Indonesia 131 135 123
Philippines 121 126 133
Cambodia 142 143 145
Lao PDR 164 159 164
Timor-Leste 174 174 168
Source: Own presentation based on World Bank [2008a].
Although Vietnam improved its position in the Doing Business Index [World
Bank, 2008b] from 104th rank in 2007 to the 91st in the 2008 Version of the same
index it remains a difficult country to do business in. This poor performance is
mainly based on institutional weaknesses like the low enforcement levels of con-
tracts, the time consuming procedure of tax payments, the weak protection of
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investors and problems in worker employment. This is also stressed in the anal-
ysis of Vietnam’s strengths and weaknesses, where Vietnam’s major weaknesses
are found in the institutional area, with transparency accountability and social
protection below the South Asian average [ADB, 2005].
Although institutional economics mainly focuses on cross-country differences,
recent research showed that, even in mainly centrally planned economies like Viet-
nam, institutions also differ within countries [Malesky and Ray, 2007].
The Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) assessed the differences in the pri-
vate sector performance among the 64 provinces of Vietnam. The PCI consists
of ten sub-indices that value the entry costs, land access and security of tenure,
transparency and access to information, time costs of regulatory compliance, infor-
mal charges, state-sector bias, pro-activity of provincial leadership, private sector
development services, labor training and legal institutions. The scores are based
on the best practices found in the survey and is set as 100 for the best performer
while all other provinces are ranked accordingly [Malesky, 2007a].2 For the PCI,
the worst performing areas are concentrated in the northern uplands on the border
with China and Laos, the South-central Highlands around the province of Dak
Lak and on the border with Cambodia. The best performance is found mainly in
the Mekong River Delta around Ho Chi Minh City. Some others in the northern
uplands, as well as around TT Hue provinces, also show above average scores.
The PCI is not used in this work due to different reasons. Many of the indicators
used, e.g. entry costs and access to land, are mainly relevant for establishing new
businesses and less important to large companies already operating in a province.
Furthermore, the design of the mail out survey has some weaknesses, especially
when faced with response rates of less than 15%. This rate is generally high
considering the design, but nevertheless might produce a severe bias of the results.
The different measures included in the sub-indices also pose some problem. These
indicators are aggregated using weights of the different factors, which may lead
to very different results when changing the weights. Finally, the PCI gained huge
public attention, which is presumably just what the authors intended, as the aim
was to guide the improvement of governmental quality in Vietnam. Nevertheless,
this attention also comes with the problem that all provincial governments have to
2Appendix A.11, page 154 shows the PCI performance of all provinces in Vietnam.
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improve their position in a rather short time and cannot change a lot in single year
that is between the survey waves. This may well lead to some attempts to influence
the result of the PCI without actually having changed anything. Particularly
against the background of the differences in the performance of some regions from
2005 to 2007, this might have been the case. Some provinces, e.g. in the area
around Hanoi, had scores at the bottom end out of all provinces included and by
now they have improved their scores remarkably and are rated among the best in
Vietnam after only two years.
4.4 Objectives and data used
4.4.1 Objectives of this chapter
Arguably, much of the institutional settings in terms of regulations and laws are
set on a national level and thus are similar to all companies within a country, but
nevertheless, a crucial part of this setting is determined by the local authorities in
each province and district. The officials who finally apply and enforce the regula-
tions are often the ones who make a difference, as they are who interpret the laws
and apply them either stringently or more loosely. Another advantage of analyzing
the institutional setting or the governmental quality within a country, and not on
a cross country basis, is that a micro level study will cover institutions better as
parameter heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity do not need to
be controlled for, which can cause problems in a cross-country comparison [Grimm
and Klasen, 2007].
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the differences in the institutional
settings, i.e. infrastructure, governmental quality and transaction costs, of three re-
mote provinces in Vietnam. Furthermore, the possible differences will be analyzed
in terms of their effects on economic performance and employment generation of
the companies operating in these provinces. Additionally, it is investigated whether
a rather rough six point Likert scale measuring the perception (of company owners
and managers) of the institutional setting are able to explain the difference in the
performance of companies in different locations.
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4.4.2 Survey design and data
In addition to the DFG FOR 756 [2008] household survey, a company survey was
conducted in the same provinces3. Figure 4.4 gives an overview of the research
location for the company survey. The survey aimed at generating a sample of
companies that have a considerable effect on the employment opportunities of
the rural population in the research provinces and that constitute (or have the
potential to be) the major driving forces of provincial development. The sample
frame was therefore set to non-farm companies that employ more than 50 workers
and that operate as legal entities in the research province. This led to a sample
Figure 4.4: Research area - company survey.
Source: Own presentation based on Hardeweg et al. [2007].
of 128 companies of which 36 are located in Ha Tinh, 46 in TT Hue and 46 in
Dak Lak. Based on the nature of the questionnaire4 that includes a number of
questions requiring assessments of the business environment and insight into the
3Presented in section 2.3, page 16.
4The questionnaire used is included as Appendix A.7, page 142.
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basis of business decision making, the interview partners were managers or owners
of the companies5.
Medium- and especially large-scale companies require well developed infrastruc-
ture and mostly depend on agglomerations [Scha¨tzl, 2003]. Therefore, most of the
companies that were sampled are operating from the provincial capitals. These
companies employ a large share of the total population working in the non-farm
sector of the provinces and they not only employ people from the capitals but also
attract workers from rural areas. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the share of the
provincial workforce that is covered by the company survey, the household survey
and the combination of both of these.6 Depending on the source used, the share
Table 4.3: Representativeness of the sampled companies.
Province
Number of Share of
employees
in
non-farm
enterprisesa
employees
in enter-
prises
b
employees
in
sampled
compa-
nies
(N=128)
employees
in
household
survey
(N=2195)
employees
covered
Ha Tinh 54,413 22,215 8,553 730 17 - 42%
TT Hue 67,533 40,188 16,712 899 26 - 44%
Dak Lak 47,428 56,553 8,889 1,000 17 - 21%
Sources: a: Based on GSO [2008a]; b: Based on GSO [2008b].
covered by the two surveys combined is at least 17% of the total workforce for
the cases of Ha Tinh and Dak Lak and 26% for the case of TT Hue. Even more
impressive is the share if the data on employees in enterprises is used, which leads
to a share of 21% in Dak Lak and 42 and 44% for Ha Tinh and TT Hue. As these
secondary data sources do not provide their sample frame or a definition of the
enterprises they interviewed it is not possible to judge which source would be more
accurate to compare this sample with. So this rather rough estimate of the covered
552% of the interview partners were the owner of the company, 42% were leading and top
managers of the company and the rest were head of several management fields like marketing,
trade or personnel departments.
6The share of workers in non-farm companies that the household survey covered was rather
low and furthermore this survey does not provide information about the company they work in.
Therefore, these are not considered in the analysis later on.
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population of workers is the best estimate available. But the covered shares (even
when taking the conservative figures of 17 and 26%) are high enough to be able to
generate valid results that do represent the sector and types of company focused
on.
4.5 The effect of the institutional factors on the performance
of the rural non-farm economy
4.5.1 Description of the surveyed companies
The companies covered here are mainly located in the provincial capitals and sev-
eral nearby industrial zones. As elaborated above, this is not based on the sample
design but on the fact that large companies rely on agglomeration advantages as
well as the infrastructure that is provided in and around the capitals, but not at all
or at least not to the same extent, in more remote locations in rural areas. factors
Several differences exist in the sectoral distribution of the companies across the
Table 4.4: Sectoral distribution of companies by province (N=128).
Sector Ha Tinh TT Hue Dak Lak
Food Processing 14% 13% 17%
Garment/Textiles 0% 15% 2%
Construction 6% 0% 20%
Hotel 6% 11% 2%
Wood Processing 17% 4% 11%
Electronics 0% 4% 2%
Constitution material pro-
duction
8% 20% 0%
Trade 14% 7% 7%
Service 11% 7% 15%
Multiple 14% 7% 15%
Others 10% 12% 9%
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
provinces (table 4.4). First of all, TT Hue has a more ”developed” structure with
more hotels based on tourism, a feature that is not found to the same extent in
the other two provinces, and a textile sector that is virtually absent in the other
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provinces. Furthermore, more suppliers for construction companies are located in
TT Hue, is partly based on the tourism industry but also on other businesses that
require good infrastructure for their operation, e.g. the garment/textile sector that
mostly produces for export. The trade and service sector is relatively more im-
portant in Ha Tinh with only few companies involved in production. Besides this
sector there is also a high share of wood processing that is based on the availability
of forest wood extraction in this province. Finally, Dak Lak has a heavy depen-
dence on the construction and food processing sectors. The construction sector is
mainly dependent on public finance, as most of this construction is in infrastruc-
ture building that is financed purely by the provincial government. The production
and processing of coffee is the major economic factor in Dak Lak province, using
almost 40% of the total agricultural land for coffee production [GSO, 2008c].
The same diverse picture also holds for the internal structure and characteris-
tics of the companies in the three provinces. Table 4.5 shows that the profits of
companies in Ha Tinh are just 15-20% of the profits realized in Dak Lak and TT
Hue. However, the turnover/cost ratio is only slightly higher for Hue companies
than those in Ha Tinh. Nevertheless, companies in Ha Tinh employ - due to their
Table 4.5: Surveyed companies description by province (N=128).
Variable Unit Ha Tinh TT Hue Dak Lak Total
Profit 06 ’000 $ 113 776 552 506
Turnover/Cost Ratio 1.12 1.17 1.72 1.35
Employees ’06 # 277 410 237 310
Employment growth
’04-’06
% 45 21 18 27
Share professionals % 7 7 11 9
Share engineers % 10 13 11 11
Share workers % 63 67 44 58
Share Casuals % 20 13 34 22
Employees income $per month 77 87 79 81
Large (>200 employ-
ees)
% 36 52 48 46
Party member % 14 16 59 32
Industrial zone % 14 27 9 17
Note: All values given are means; N=128.
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
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lower productivity - a larger workforce than those in Dak Lak, which is also the
reason for the bigger difference in profits compared to sales.
The workforce is not only different in size but also in its structure. In Dak Lak
the use of casual labor is more common, with every third worker being employed
on a day-to-day basis. The companies in Dak Lak also employ a higher share
of professionals and engineers, which indicates a more sophisticated production
and marketing system compared to the other two provinces. The incomes earned
in the companies reflect the same trends as the poverty figures, with Ha Tinh’s
workers earning the lowest salaries and companies in TT Hue paying the highest
wages. A distinct difference is the share of company owners who are members of
the communist party of Vietnam. In Dak Lak more than half of the companies are
owned by members, while in Ha Tinh, which is generally considered a stronghold
of the Vietnamese communist party7, only 14% of the companies have this link to
the political system. This fact is likely to be based on the resettlement policy that
started after the reunification and continued up to the 1990s. During this time the
communist party tried to reverse the rural-urban migration, which was considered
to be a problem for the fast growing centers of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
New economic zones were established and people received financial assistance if
they decided to migrate to these areas. This policy aimed at not only at lowering
the population pressure in the boom regions mainly in the Red River delta but
also at ”colonizing” the central highlands with its high share of ethnic minorities
[Wescott, 2003]. Furthermore, after reunification the settlement of farmers in the
strategically important areas along the Chinese and Cambodian borders was based
on security reasons [Revilla Diez, 1995]. This system likely favored party members
to receive the assistance and to reach the goal of colonizing and securing these
areas and thus constitute the major group of migrants. Between 1994 and 1999 a
net population growth from migration was as high as 7.2% from migration only,
while Ha Tinh and TT Hue faced a net population loss of 4.1% and 1.8% from
migration respectively [Anh et al., 2003]. Similar migration trends and reasoning
could be observed after the reunification in 1976.
7According to personal communication with various experts in Vietnam.
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4.5.2 The provincial business environments
To gain insight into the business environment of the three provinces, the compa-
nies were asked to give their perceptions of the importance and rating of the local
conditions considering three major groups of factors, i.e. general business environ-
ment, local infrastructure and governmental quality. The assessment was based
on a scale ranging from one to six, with six being the best score. This scale was
later on normalized to a scale from zero to one with one being the highest score.
Furthermore, companies were asked to indicate up to three of the factors that con-
stitute barriers to expanding their operations. Based on the scores it is possible
to assess which constraints these companies face and in which areas political in-
tervention might help to overcome the bottlenecks and improve the performance
of the companies that operate in these areas. Furthermore, it may also point out
the factors that need to be considered in order to attract more companies to these
rural provinces.
Firstly, the general business factors are indicated in table 4.6. These factors
include indicators that are well established as major influences on companies’ be-
havior. The table is sorted according to the mean stated importance of each factor,
which leads to skilled labor being the top priority of these companies in this group
of factors. However, that factor also turns out to be a major expansion barrier
with almost 50% of the companies stating the lack of availability of skilled labor as
one of their barriers for expanding their businesses. Nevertheless, the rating of the
Table 4.6: Rating and importance of general business factors (N=128).
Importancea Ratinga Barrierb
Skilled labor 0.91 0.58 62
Available credit 0.86 0.72 13
Affordable inputs 0.85 0.35 16
Proximity to supply 0.81 0.47 22
Affordable land 0.74 0.50 8
Proximity to customers 0.72 0.72 17
Affordable labor 0.66 0.56 1
Notes: a: All values are means (∈ [0, 1] with 1 being the best score).
Notes: b: Number of companies stating factor as major expansion barrier.
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
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conditions is better than some others. The availability of affordable inputs, which
is the third most important factor for these companies, shows the lowest score for
the rating of local conditions. The availability of credit, which is the second most
important factor, has the highest rating. In contrast to skilled labor, these factor
are not perceived as an expansion barrier to the same extent. The availability of
affordable labor, which is generally reckoned as a major comparative advantage of
operating in Vietnam as compared to other South-East Asian countries [German
Industry and Commerce Vietnam, 2007], is not stated as very important, as it
is available all over Vietnam. For the availability of credit the picture is rather
different. Although the importance was stated as very high, and the rating of the
conditions was fairly good, more than 10% of the interviewed companies considered
this factor as one of their barriers to expansion.
Secondly, the perception of the infrastructure endowment of the provinces is
summarized in table 4.7. The most important is, unsurprisingly, the quality of
roads, which is crucial for any flow of inputs and products and thus for almost all
business transactions. Again, this factor is also rated rather low, and stated as
Table 4.7: Rating and importance of infrastructure factors (N=128).
Importancea Ratinga Barrierb
Good roads 0.89 0.48 24
Training quality 0.88 0.38 11
Mobile network 0.87 0.76 1
Internet 0.83 0.65 1
Industrial zones 0.79 0.37 10
School quality 0.75 0.62 1
Proximity to airport 0.63 0.60 1
Recruitment agencies 0.58 0.35 1
Notes: a: All values are means (∈ [0, 1] with 1 being the best score).
Notes: b: Number of companies stating factor as major expansion barrier.
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
the most important barrier to expansion within this group, indicating poor road
quality in most of the locations. The following two factors, i.e. training quality
and mobile network, are rated almost equally with road quality on importance.
Despite the equal importance, the ratings are considerably different. While the
mobile network is generally perceived as good and only in one case as a barrier
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to expansion, training quality was rated very low and was stated as an expansion
barrier by almost 10% of the interviewed companies. For the rest of the factors,
the existence of industrial zones and the availability of recruitment agencies show
some interesting results. The factor of industrial zones shows a similar pattern
as that of training quality, with a rather high importance and a low rating. It is
nominated as an expansion barrier by several companies, while the availability of
recruitment agencies is not considered to be very important. This is also reflected
in the fact there was only one nomination as an expansion barrier even though
having a low rating.
Finally, several governmental quality indicators are considered. Table 4.8 shows
a summary of the indicators included. The most important factors in this category
turned out to be the pro-private business attitude of local government officials and
the reliability of local regulations. While the pro-private business attitude, which is
Table 4.8: Rating and importance of governmental quality indicators (N=128).
Importancea Ratinga Barrierb
Pro-private business attitude 0.90 0.70 10
Reliability of regulations 0.90 0.57 35
Secure land rights 0.87 0.54 8
Financial gov. support 0.86 0.55 13
Voice 0.83 0.74 0
Non-financial gov. support 0.82 0.52 8
Bribe level 0.64 3
Notes: a: All values are means (∈ [0, 1] with 1 being the best score).
Notes: b: Number of companies stating factor as major expansion barrier.
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
crucial for a transition economy like Vietnam, is rated rather highly, the reliability
of the regulations is rated low and is also the second most often stated barrier to
expansion for local enterprises within all three groups of indicators. One surprising
result is that, in contrast to the other two groups, there are no indicators that are
considered as not very important. Furthermore, the lowest ratings are still better
than those found in, e.g. the general business factors. Nevertheless, 45% of the
interviewed companies stated at least one of the indicators in this group as one
of their three most important expansion barriers. Additionally, the two factors of
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pro-private business attitude and reliability of governmental regulations scored the
highest importance values over all factors included.
Decomposing the expansion barriers by the provinces in which the companies
operate in, it turns out that companies face very different problems depending on
their location. Figure 4.5 gives the number of companies in each province that
stated one of the factors within the groups introduced in table 4.6–4.8 as one of
their three major expansion barriers. In each province the group of factors that is
most often stated are, unsurprisingly, the general business factors. These are the
factors that need to be fulfilled to a sufficient extent for companies to be able to
operate in an at least satisfactory manner.
The other two groups are more diverse. First, the infrastructure endowment
that is also important for operating a business is not a big problem in Dak Lak and
TT Hue, but is stated as a problem in almost 50% of the cases in Ha Tinh. However,
in all provinces the infrastructure factors are the least often stated indicators.
Figure 4.5: Major expansion barriers of companies by province.
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
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Second, the governmental quality was least often mentioned as a problem by
TT Hue companies, where it is only slightly more than the infrastructure but both
are at a low level. In Ha Tinh it is also very similar to the share of companies
stating infrastructure problems but on much higher level of almost 50%. Finally,
in Dak Lak the infrastructure was no problem but governmental quality poses a
barrier to almost 60% of the companies.
Turning to the individual factors, over all provinces the most frequently stated
barrier is skilled labor. Nevertheless, this factor is not analyzed in detail here as
the main focus is on governmental quality and its interaction with the performance
of companies.8 For Ha Tinh it is obvious that the expansion barriers are similar
in all companies. Only skilled labor, road quality and the reliability of regulations
are major problems faced by the companies,which suggests that the problems are
mainly based on location and less on other factors. In Dak Lak and TT Hue the
barriers are more diverse, although there are also common barriers like skilled labor
and reliability of regulations for both provinces and proximity of supplies for TT
Hue. In Dak Lak a number of factors, i.e. affordable inputs, customer proximity,
credit availability, pro-private business attitude and financial support were men-
tioned by several companies. In TT Hue the further factors are customer proximity
and the road quality for some of the companies. This leads to the assumption that
companies in TT Hue and Dak Lak face different problems, depending not only
on the location like in Ha Tinh but most likely also on other factors such as the
sector they operate in.
4.5.3 The perception of the business environment and the perfor-
mance of the companies
Based on the details given in table 4.6–table 4.8, three indices were generated based
on equation (4.1).
The indices were developed in order to get a more aggregated picture of the
constraints faced by the companies. They aggregate the factor groups introduced
before into three indices, i.e. the general business environment index, the infras-
tructure index and the governmental quality index. Each index combines the stated
8For details on the educational system and its shortcomings see Dang [forthecoming].
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Xi =
P∑
p=1
[∑N
n=1Rn ∗ In
N
]
∗
[ 1
P
]
(4.1)
Variables:
Xi Index value for the three Indices (i)
Rn Rating of each factor (n) included
In Importance of each factor (n) included
N Number of factors (n) included in Index
P Number of interviewed companies in
province
importance of the factors included with the provincial mean rating of the same fac-
tor. As the importance and the ratings are normalized to [0, 1], all parts of the
sum also range between zero and one, with one being the best score for both the
importance and the rating and therefore also for the combination of both. In order
to normalize the total indices to a range between zero and one and make them
comparable to each other, the sum is divided by the number of factors included.
The whole index therefore also ranges from zero (the worst possible score) to one
(the best possible score). Of course, it is necessary to take into account that for
a score of one, both the importance perceptions and the ratings of all factors in-
cluded need to be one. This situation is rather unlikely but nevertheless the index
facilitates a comparison of the three provinces. The index weights the rating of
each factor by the stated importance of each factor in order to generate an index
value that is able to value the impact of the indices on the operations of the com-
panies. If not weighted by the importance, the index might lead to high values
although the good conditions are in areas that do not matter for the operations
of the companies. The way it is generated now gives more weight to factors that
are of great importance to the companies and thus leads to values that reflect the
real perception of the people who do business in the province. Finally, the mean
of the index is taken over the province in which the company is located to be able
to evaluate the provincial settings.
Similarly to the expansion barrier perception, there are some differences appar-
ent in the index scores. Table 4.9 shows the differences in the index scores across
the three provinces. First, the general business environment is rated best in Dak
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Table 4.9: Provincial differences in the Index scores.
Ha Tinh TT Hue Dak Lak
Business environment
Ha Tinh − −0.02 −0.04 *
TT Hue 0.02 − −0.06 ***
Dak Lak 0.04 * 0.06 *** −
Infrastructure
Ha Tinh − −0.17 *** −0.15 ***
TT Hue 0.17 *** − 0.02 *
Dak Lak 0.15 *** −0.02 * −
Governmental quality
Ha Tinh − −0.10 *** 0.01
TT Hue 0.10 *** − 0.11 ***
Dak Lak −0.01 −0.11 *** −
Notes: T-test mean comparison significance levels at the
Notes: 99% level =***, 95% level =** and 90% level =*.
Source: Own survey data collected within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
Lak province. The score for TT Hue is, although not significantly, higher than
Ha Tinh province. Generally, the differences are lower than is the case with the
other indices. The biggest differences are found in the infrastructure index with
the highest value being 0.17 points higher than the lowest value. In this index all
provinces perform significantly differently from each other, with TT Hue reach-
ing the highest value and Ha Tinh the lowest. Finally, the governmental quality
index is perceived as significantly better in TT Hue as compared to both of the
other provinces, which do not differ significantly from each other. Nevertheless,
the mean score for Dak Lak province is the lowest of all provinces, but due to the
lower standard deviation for Ha Tinh, the difference is not significant.
4.5.4 Effects of the business environment perceptions
Using the generated indices, the effects of these perceptions of the ease of doing
business are analyzed utilizing two regressions. First, the effect on the profits of
the companies in 2006 (table 4.10) and second, the relation to the size of their
workforce in 2006 (table 4.11) is investigated. The regression analysis is performed
in four steps including different sets of variables in order to check the robustness of
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the influences of the explanatory variables. The first set of variables accounts for
some basic influences on the profit of a company and is included in all regressions.
These variables are two dummy variables indicating if the company is large in terms
of its workforce and if the company exports its produce. Furthermore, losses due
to natural disasters and the severity of these losses is accounted for by the shock
profit ratio, and the share of replaced permanent workers is included to control
for stability and therefore predictability of the business and the reliability of the
workforce. Finally, three dummies are included indicating the sector in which
the company operates, namely the industry sector, service sector and the food
sector. The food sector was separated from the industry sector as it constitutes
a large share (30–53%) of the whole industry sector. This sector received special
assistance based on the industrial policy goals in the early 1990s [Communist Party
of Vietnam, 1991] which might have some implications for today’s operations and
especially today’s size. Furthermore, food production is of special importance to
policy makers as the availability and price of food is crucial, especially in developing
countries.
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The share of state capital might have been an influential factor in a transition
economy like Vietnam, and might have helped as several companies have recently
been privatized. As some companies were not willing to share this information and
others could not calculate the actual share, this variable could not be included.
Therefore, a dummy variable is included indicating if the company was ”recently”
privatized. Here, recently is defined as less than four years ago, based on the mean
number of years the former state owned companies have been private.
Looking at these variables, the dummy for large companies turns out to always
have a significant positive effect and the shock/profit ratio always has a significant
negative effect on the profits generated. These effects are not surprising as most
of the time bigger companies generate higher profits and the shock losses directly
reduce the profits. The other variables are not significant, but as for the export
and food sector dummies, the signs of the coefficients do not change between the
settings andthe direction of the influence can be assumed to be positive in the case
of exporting companies and for companies producing food. The coefficients for
the replacement rate, the dummy variable for recently privatized companies and
the other two sector dummies are not significant and nor do they show a clear
direction. Thus there are no clear implications for the profits generated by the
companies.
The second set of variables accounts for several indicators in the institutional
setting, i.e. transaction cost relevant variables, within which the companies act.
The indicators used are three dummy variables indicating whether the company
is a member of a business association, a member of the communist party and if
it has a long-term relationship with its major customer. Furthermore, the rating
of the local bribe level is included to account for corruption. These factors have a
direct impact on the transaction costs a company faces. The long term relationship
accounts for trust and the necessary time for negations, and the ease of finding new
business partners is approximated by the membership dummies. Furthermore, the
membership variables also account for influence on political decisions and on other
actors within a company’s sector of operations. Finally, the number of customers
who make up 80% of the total sales and the number of contract defaults, either by
buyers or customers of the company, are included. The number of customers has
two implications. On the one hand, the more customers a company has the higher
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the transaction costs of dealing with multiple customers. On the other hand, the
risk involved in having only a few customers is higher as the loss of one customer
has a far bigger impact on the sales than it would have in case of many customers.
Within this set, the number of customer has a significant positive effect on the
profits in both regressions. Therefore, the reliability and predictability of a broad
customer basis seems to outweigh the higher transaction costs imposed by dealing
with more customers. Insignificant but positive effects emerge from belonging to
an association, the long term relations with the major customer and from a higher
bribe level. For the first two variables the sign shows the expected result, while
for the bribe level the sign is the opposite of the expected negative effect. Thus
in this setting, higher bribe levels lead to greater profits. The explanation for this
seemingly contradictory influence might be the anti-corruption policy. On the one
hand, the companies that follow the law and do not pay bribes are performing
less well and state a low bribe level as in their perspective it is low. On the other
hand, the companies that do pay bribes know of the real prevalence of corruption
and they benefit from not following the anti-corruption laws and are able to influ-
ence the local authorities. Insignificant but negative influences are the number of
contract defaults and belonging to the communist party. While the first variable
interpretation is rather straightforward and shows the expected sign, party mem-
bership shows the opposite sign to that expected. Generally, one would assume
that belonging to the ruling party leads to better access to governmental contracts
and influence on legislation, which should enable companies to generate higher
profits. For this case of Vietnamese companies, the effect is negative which is, in
the Vietnamese setting, less surprising as the company owners who do belong to
the party are less market-oriented and rely on their connection to the government
and their contracts, which are reliable but less beneficial in terms of profits.
Finally, the three generated indices are included first alone with the first set of
general characteristics and finally with all other variables. Out of the three indices
included in the last two regressions, none shows a significant influence. The Index
on the general business environment was dropped in both regressions as the means
are very similar across the provinces and using the three indices creates some
colinearity. The governmental quality and the infrastructure evaluation, although
being not significant, show positive coefficients in both regressions and are therefore
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likely to affect the profits positively, although the influence cannot be accurately
quantified as both of them are not significant and thus the likelihood of error is
too high.
The second set of regressions (table 4.11) evaluates the impact of the same
variables, except the dummy for large companies, on the size of the companies’
workforces. The reasoning is that in more secured and reliable conditions, with
high governmental quality and low transaction costs, the companies will perform
better not only in terms of their profits but will also employ more workers as the
insecurity involved in doing business is lower.
The general factors included in all regressions show two almost universal sig-
nificant variables. First, exporting companies employ more workers than non-
exporting companies as they have a broader customer base and are able to sell to
other countries in cases of low demand in some markets. Companies with higher
fluctuation rates have a smaller workforce as their operations are less reliable and
their focus can not lie entirely on their operations but they have to deal with the
problem of finding new skilled reliable workers. Furthermore, the recent private
dummy has a positive coefficient throughout, and the food sector dummy has a
negative coefficient in all four regressions. The first effect is most likely based on
the fact that former state owned companies still have a high share of long term
contracted9 workers who cannot be laid off even if the company does not need as
many workers, and therefore have larger workforces compared to similar private
companies. The second factor suggests that food production involves less labor
as compared to the rest of the companies. This sector, which includes companies
like large-scale breweries and coffee processors, operates more mechanization and
is therefore less labor-demanding. However, after controlling for the other factors
the effect of all three sector dummies becomes insignificant. The other variables
included are not significant in most of the regressions and nor do they show a
constant sign.
9According to some interview partners, high numbers of the workers that used to be employed
in state-owned companies have life-time contracts that need to be fulfilled even after privatization.
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The second group of variables includes the same institutional indicators as
before. In this context, the coefficient for the bribe level is significantly negative,
influencing the size of the workforce. Larger companies report lower bribe levels,
which might be based on their size as they have a greater influence and are more
important for the provincial economy. This might replace bribe payments as their
pure size could sufficiently influence the decision makers.
Even though not showing significant coefficients, all other variables in this group
have a consistent sign in all four regressions. Positive influences emerge from be-
longing to an association and from long-term relations with the major customer.
These effects fit in with the transaction cost argument, as belonging to an associ-
ation makes it easier to access new market partners and increases the influence of
its members on the political decision-making. Long-term relations with the major
customer increase the reliability and predictability of the business and enables the
company to plan long-term and therefore employ a larger permanent workforce.
Negative effects are associated with party membership, more customers that make
up 80% of the total sales and a high incidence of contract defaults. Again, these
effects are generally explained in the transaction cost theory. The more customers
a company has the higher will be the fluctuation of these customers, as it is more
likely that the relations will not be on a regular basis and are therefore less reliable.
The same argument of lower predictability also holds for contract defaults. If a
company is faced more often with defaults by buyers or by suppliers, the business is
more unstable and therefore short-term adjustments need to be made and a lower
permanent workforce is employed.
The next step is the inclusion of the index scores for the provinces.10 The
infrastructure index shows a significant positive effect in one of the regression and
an insignificant positive effect in the other one. Large companies seem to choose
locations with a better infrastructure endowment after controlling for the other
relevant factors. Governmental quality shows neither a significant nor a clear
direct association with the company workforce.
10Again, the index for the general business environment is dropped due to colinearity problems.
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4.6 Summary
Generally, the proxies used to cover the institutional setting of the provinces do
have some explanatory power. Higher numbers of customers have a positive influ-
ence on the profits of a company, and smaller companies perceive a higher bribe
level than larger companies. The indices generated are only partly able to explain
the differences in companies’ performances. Nevertheless, this is most likely due to
the rather small number of companies and provinces included, and might therefore
be improved by including a larger sample of provinces and/or companies as even in
these rather similar regions some explanatory power was established. This chapter
was able to show that the self reported perception of the companies is able to cover
the real situation, even though it was only operationalized by using a rather rough
but consistent six point Likert scale for all indicators. Even after accounting for
several ”hard” factors on the transaction costs the companies face, the index of
their perceptions shows some differences across the provinces. In contrast to the
PCI, face-to-face interviews were utilized, ruling out the problem of a possible self-
selection bias in the sample. Furthermore, information on who really answered the
questions is available, ensuring that all respondents had the same understanding
of the issues questioned. This approach made it possible to ensure comparable
answers from the companies. The approach might not be applicable for country-
wide studies as it requires, although using a simple scale, more manpower for the
interviews, but it might be more reliable as unobserved factors are less likely to
bias the resulting index.
The provincial differences emerging from the analysis can be partly attributed
to historical factors that can not be reversed in the short run, e.g. the brain drain
that Ha Tinh faces especially It also shows that, like the PCI, there are several
important factors concerning governmental quality and the institutional setting
that might assist even these unfavored provinces to generate growth and attract
more companies. Although it was not possible to quantify the impact of possible
improvements of the perception, a generally positive impact was established and
the major constraints of availability of skilled labor and the reliability of regulations
were shown. In particular, reliability is one factor that can be improved in a rather
short period and generally improved information on regulations would most likely
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assist in improving the managers’ perceptions. The availability of skilled labor
seems, on the first sight, to be a factor that needs to be addressed by improved
schools and universities, but other factors that influence the availability were also
obvious. In Ha Tinh especially, reduction of the brain drain is an important aim
in making high skilled workers available to local companies. By creating a fruitful
climate for investments and for doing business in general, this problem might be
resolved simply by creating attractive jobs locally, instead of centrally in Hanoi
and Ho Chi Minh City.
Furthermore, the differences between private companies and recently privatised
companies that used to be state-owned emerged not only during the interviews but
also came up in the analysis. Companies that were recently privatized appear to
face quite different problems than those of other private companies. Besides having
to deal with situations that lie in their history, e.g. long term contracts of workers
that might not be needed any more, these companies are often run by their former
managers and thus changes in operations take more time than would be the case
of managers who are experienced in running private companies.
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5.1 Summary and conclusions
The overall objective of this study was to investigate poverty, growth and inequal-
ity in some of the least developed regions in Vietnam, and the influence of non-
and off-farm employment participation of the rural population on those measures.
Furthermore, the possibilities of growth for the rural companies that offer such
wage employments has been explored.
The detailed objectives presented in chapter one have been pursued using data
from (i) a household survey from three remote provinces in Vietnam covering ru-
ral households specifically, (ii) the VHLSS survey 2002 and 2004 for analysis of
intertemporal dynamics within rural areas and (iii) a company survey in three
remote provinces. The combination of these data allowed the addressing of the
various objectives of the study.
Based on the literature review presented in chapter two, participation in the
non-farm economy can be expected to have a positive influence. Nevertheless, the
special case of rural areas has rarely been accounted for in previous studies, which
is the reason for the detailed analysis of a sample specifically targeting rural areas
in remote provinces of Vietnam.
First results from the descriptive analysis suggested that Dak Lak, although
being the least favorable based on the high share of ethnic minorities and a higher
share of mountainous areas, performs best of the three provinces in terms of poverty
rates. The coffee industry obviously has a big impact on the provincial economy
and benefits not only foreign companies or the rich locals but also the rural poor
by providing wage employment opportunities. This again stresses the importance
of a wage income source. The currently strong economy is able to overcome the
two strong negative effects that are mentioned in the literature (proportion of
ethnic minorities and mountainous areas). Nevertheless, Dak Lak is still a mono
structured region relying almost purely on coffee production and related businesses.
This makes it especially vulnerable to changes in coffee prices.
The subsequent grouping of households based on their income portfolio allowed
for the exploration of the impact of the implications that emerge from the different
portfolios with respect to poverty and inequality. Taking the income distribution
curves as a first indicator of inequality, farm household incomes are much more un-
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equally distributed than those of non-farm or mix household incomes. One possible
explanation is that non-farm incomes are able to buffer the mainly environmen-
tal shocks that occurred in the survey regions (as they do regularly in Vietnam),
because they are less affected by shocks such as flooding and droughts.
Combining short term poverty (income) analysis and the longer term poverty
(consumption assets) analysis allowed the drawing of conclusions on the factors that
derive short and long term household welfare (see Table 5.1). Adding dummies to
the grouping of households led to a rating of the impact of portfolio on income and
asset holdings.
Table 5.1: Drivers of household welfare.
Income Consumption Assets
Credit + +
Land + +
Education + +
Wider HH members + +
Non-farm HH + +
Dak Lak + +
Mix farm HH +
Mix non-farm HH +
Shocks 2006 - -
Dependent members - -
Ethnic Minorities - -
Distance to next town -
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
Most of the factors commonly found have also been documented in poverty-
related research. Education, larger land holdings and living in a favorable (rich)
region have a positive impact on income as well as on consumption assets. The
same holds for the negative impact of belonging to an ethnic minority group, hav-
ing dependent household members and experiencing shocks. An additional and
obviously important feature influencing both measures is the number of wider
household members. Having more wider household members leads to better out-
comes in both income and consumption assets. Taking this variable as measure for
friends and family networks stresses the importance of network access for product
and labor market access and thus income generation. In the case where the wider
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members are migrants to other provinces or to urban areas, these network accesses
also lower the entry barriers for successful migration. These factors are very likely
to have a big impact in both the long term and short term poverty status of a
household.
The effects of education, dependency, location, land, shocks and ethnicity are
generally agreed upon as influential variables on a household’s income/welfare.
Based on the provincial differences in the descriptive analysis it was also not sur-
prising that Dak Lak households were shown to be better off than the others.
Taking wider members and the distance to the next town as a measure for market
access in terms of produce and labor markets the effect is also generally agreed
upon.
The only variable that has a significant impact on asset holdings, but not
on the income, is the distance to the provincial capital. The further away the
household is located the lower are the consumption asset holdings, but the there
is no significant influence on the income level. This could well be based on the
availability of consumption assets in very remote areas, where many assets like
cars might not be available or even useless due to bad road conditions.
Finally, the household types were included, and especially in the income anal-
ysis, the expected positive effect of off- and non-farm incomes has been supported.
This suggests that higher engagement levels in activities apart from farming ac-
tually leads to higher incomes, even in remote regions where the main wage em-
ployment occupation is found on other farms and is generally considered low paid.
Non-farm businesses are mainly small retail shops or restaurants and again are
not considered as leading to high returns or major growth. But the positive effect
transmits not only through the direct channel of a higher share of off-farm incomes
but also through indirect channels such as wider household members or educa-
tion that lead to a higher possibilities of diversification. The generally influential
variables are: education, location, dependency, ethnicity, land, credit, shocks and
having wider household members.
Based on the results of analysis of the poverty determinants, several policy op-
tions emerge that are likely to be successful in terms of poverty reduction. First of
all, the generally recommended enhancement of higher education via the reduction
of education costs is likely to improve the welfare of rural households. Rural house-
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holds often rely on family labor and therefore face additional costs of education
apart from just the school fees. One option could be to design a flexible school
fee system that is based on the income of the parents and leaves poor households
with lower fees. Expanded secondary and tertiary education would allow people to
find higher paid wage employments and would most likely also lead to more non-
farm businesses as people would have the knowledge that is required to successfully
establish them. Furthermore, infrastructure investments like the extension of the
mobile phone network are generally believed to enable remote regions to participate
in positive trends and provide more options for the rural population to generate
income.
In case of Vietnam it is especially important to address the special needs of
ethnic minorities who are systematically disadvantaged. The existing programs
targeting ethnic areas should be redesigned in order to effectively reach the tar-
get population. As indicated by previous studies [Klump, 2007; van de Walle and
Gunewardena, 2001], the programs should not target ”ethnic minority areas” but
”ethnic minorities”. Therefore, rules that assure that funds are allocated accord-
ingly have to embedded.
The trends of higher welfare for non-farm households also emerge from the
analysis of the determinants of household incomes. With farm households as the
reference case, all other types earn significantly higher incomes. Furthermore, the
provincial differences are also supported, with Ha Tinh being the poorest province
with the lowest household incomes. The seemingly most prosperous province was
TT Hue, based on its diverse industry and service sector, while Dak Lak’s econ-
omy is dominated by agriculture and is therefore seemingly less developed. But
the coffee industry that is the dominant sector in Dak Lak was able to provide
households with higher incomes than those of TT Hue households. Nevertheless,
as the whole province depends on a high (and volatile) coffe price, the picture will
probably change dramatically once the coffee price drops.
Building on the findings of chapter two, chapter three extends the analysis
by using the VHLSS 2002–2004 panel dataset. The concept of pro-poor growth
enables the analysis of the intertemporal dynamics involved in household incomes
and thereby generate a deeper insight into the impact of income portfolios on
household welfare. Adding to the existing analysis of the regional differences in
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poverty reduction and pro-poor growth across Vietnam, the introduced household
types were used to further support poverty reduction policies in rural areas and
add shortterm dynamics to the concept of pro-poor growth.
The enormous short-term dynamics involved in the income composition of
households were pointed out. Even households that have seemingly specialized
in either farming or off-farm activities may add other sources of income or com-
pletely reverse their portfolios. A total of 42% of the 3,132 households added or
extend other incomes sources from 2002 to 2004. Despite these huge movements
among the groups, the total sizes of the groups remained roughly constant over the
two periods, and all groups had an inflow about equalling the outflow. Of the main
groups, the steadiest was the non-farm household group, and the most volatile was
the farm household group.
Building on these results and using the different switch-type household groups
rather than the original five groups, pro-poor growth performance was assessed.
The results in terms of pro-poor growth were mixed, though showing some similar
patterns of mostly lower growth rates for lower income percentiles as compared
to the top end of the income distribution. Mostly, the switched household types
performed better in the intertemporal indicators of growth, poverty reduction and
inequality reduction, but faced higher poverty rates in 2002 both and 2004 (see
table 5.2). Generally, groups faced with higher poverty rates in 2002 realized
above-average poverty reduction, supporting the argument by [Klump, 2005] that
already low poverty rates are harder to reduce than those that are very high.
Furthermore, the finding that most of the poverty reduction in Vietnam was
based on growth rather than redistribution for the 1992–2002 period was also con-
firmed for the 2002–2004 period. Nevertheless, redistribution from the poor to the
non-poor also happened, but was mostly much lower than the growth component
of poverty reduction.
In terms of pro-poor growth, the worst performing group was the non-farm
households, which seems unlikely as they not only generated higher incomes but
were also faced with lower poverty rates in 2002. This is most likely also the reason
for their low pro-poor growth rate as the poverty rates have been very, low and
therefore the remaining poor are the least favored who struggle the most to climb
out of poverty.
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Table 5.2: Poverty and pro-poorness - summary.
PPG-Definitionsa
I II
Household types Poverty
rate
below
aver-
age in
2002
Poverty
reduc-
tion
above
aver-
age
growth
of the
poor>0
growth
of poor
>
mean
growth
Rate of
PPG
above
averageb
Total + -
Switched - + + - +
Non-switched + - + - -
Farm HH - + + - -
Mix farm - + + - -
Mix non farm + - + - -
Non farm + - + - -
Farm to mix farm - + + - +
Mix non farm to mix farm + - + - -
Mix farm to farm - + + - +
Mix farm to mix non farm - + + - 0
Mix non farm to non farm + - + + +
Note: a: Categories based on Grosse et al. [2008].
Note: b: Here the Ravallion and Chen [2003] rate of PPG is referred to.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004] using.
The growth incidence curves, that are the basis for the Ravallion and Chen
[2003] type pro-poor growth rate, show similar upward slope patterns for most of
the household types. The main difference is the scale of pro-poor growth in general,
ranging from 0.53% to 11.63% of pro-poor growth.
Based on the above average pro-poor growth (and poverty reduction) rate of
switched households and the below average pro-poor growth (and poverty reduc-
tion) rate of the non-switched households, a catching up effect can be concluded.
This would, if lasting, reduce inequalities between these groups and will assist the
group that suffers higher poverty incidence. Therefore, flexibility of rural house-
holds should be encouraged and enabled through the promotion of the non-farm
economy so that the households are able to choose their income sources based on
profitability rather than availability. Additionally, supporting households in finding
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’their’ portfolio and encouraging change where necessary might be beneficial. This
support could include assistance in calculation of current income flows, from which
they might realize that their farming/aquaculture/livestock/self-employment setup
(for example) is not profitable in its current state. In this context, information for
rural households concerning opportunities and possibilities of markets, either for
employment or for self-employment, might aalso optimize their current portfolios.
This will reduce entry barriers to new opportunities and will also improve current
setups.
Neither specialization nor diversification seems to have clear poverty or pro-
poor growth impacts. Although the effect of diversification is based only on one
group that used to do farming only and took up a non-farm income source for the
second period, the effects are not clear even for this group as similar poverty and
growth patterns are found for the opposite group of mix farm to farm households.
Therefore, a judgment on these effects is not possible from the data at hand.
All in all, due to the positive performance of the switching households in terms
of poverty reduction and pro-poor growth, the recommendation of generating non-
farm jobs in order to promote development and to serve the needs of the poor
[Collier, 2007] also holds for rural Vietnam. However, even within the seemingly
favored group of non-farm households that apparently have managed the transition
from farming to ”modern” economic activities, some groups did remain poor; a
certain extent of occupational choice will enable many households to improve their
income portfolios and climb out of poverty.
Based on off- and non-farm incomes as one way out of poverty, the question of
how to improve the performance of the RNFE and how to channel investments not
only into boom regions but also into rural areas remains the central. Improvement
of the business environment, especially in rural areas, will be the key component
of reducing inequality within the country and further reducing income and food
poverty. Therefore, chapter three first explored the recent performance of the
Vietnamese economy from the decision of the doi moi reform process until recently.
The process of opening to the world market led to an increased inflow of foreign
direct investments that boosted economic growth in Vietnam. But this happened
mainly in the economic centers of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, leaving rural and
remote regions behind. Additionally, the government began privatizing most of the
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state owned companies and started to recognize private enterprises, which led to an
increase of the share of workforce employed in these private enterprises. Besides
legal changes, the sectoral structure shifted along with the ownership structure
away from an agriculture-dominated GDP towards a modern economy with higher
shares of industry and service sectors. Nevertheless, these achievements were less
successful in rural areas that are still dominated by agricultural production, and
privatization has not yet happened to the same extent.
Therefore, the question was pursued of how the rural economy can be best
promoted in order to provide the rural population with the possibilities of choosing
occupations according to their characteristics and capabilities. The performance
of medium- and large-scale companies in the DFG FOR 756 research provinces
was investigated as these companies have, based on their size, the potential to
lead the growth and transition of these provinces. Special attention was paid to
institutional factors that are of core importance in a transition economy. The
proxies used to cover the institutional setting did show some explanatory power.
Furthermore, the indices generated on infrastructure endowment and governmental
quality showed some influence on the companies’ performance in terms of profit
and employment. In contrast to the earlier attempt at covering the Vietnamese
business environment on a provincial level (PCI) by Malesky [2006, 2007b, 2008],
the approach taken by this study did not inherit the problems of selection bias or
the incentive to influence the result by the local administration.
The differences found in the analysis of the provincial differences are partly
based on historical circumstances and developments. One example is the brain
drain that is especially severe in Ha Tinh and that leads to companies facing a
severe shortage of skilled labor that hinders them from expanding and profession-
alizing their businesses. Company performance was then analyzed using three
indices of the provincial business environment (table 5.3). Further factors such
as the proximity to supply can mostly not be changed as these are more often
natural materials like forest wood or raw material for concrete production that
can not be provided. Nevertheless, several factors did emerge that are more or
less easily changeable by the local government. Some factors included in the gov-
ernmental quality index that pose expansion barriers to the companies could be
tackled without major efforts, e.g. the reliability of regulations. Providing easy ac-
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Table 5.3: Company performance - summary.
Company profit Company Employees
Large + (not included)
Exporting (+) +
Shock/profit -
Perm. empl. repl. (-)
Recent priv. (+)
Food (+) (-)
Industry
Service
Association member (+) (+)
Party member (-) (-)
Long term selling (+) (+)
Customer 80% + (-)
Contract defaults (-) (-)
Bribe level (+) -
Governmental quality (+)
Infrastructure (+) (+)
Note: Signs in brackets show constant signs but are not always signifi-
cant. Signs with no brackets are significant in all settings.
Source: Calculations based on own survey conducted within DFG FOR
756 [2008].
cessible and binding information on regulations and processes concerning business
registration and regulations would most likely change the perception and provide
businessmen with trust in the regulations and maybe encourage them to expand
their operations. Likewise, by creating a fruitful climate for investments and for
doing business in general, the problem of brain drain might be resolved just by
providing attractive jobs locally instead of centrally in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh
City. For Ha Tinh especially, a reduction in brain drain is an important issue in
making highly skilled workers available to local companies.
Another major constraint that emerged mainly for the case of Dak Lak was
the lack of pro-private business attitude. This might be based on the special
circumstances in Dak Lak and the social environment due to the high share of
ethnic minorities, as well as its location along the Cambodian border. Additionally,
recently privatized companies were found to have several difficulties in managing
to make the transition from state ownership. Besides having to deal with the
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problems that lie in their history, e.g. long term contracts of workers who might
now be not needed, these companies are often run by their former managers, who
often did not acquire their positions based on their skills but on their connection
to the government. Thus, changes in operations take more time than would be the
case of managers who are experienced in running private companies. It might be
worthwhile to support privatized companies in the changes that need to be made
in order to be able to compete in an open market economy and to be able to
successfully manage the transition from state ownership.
In order to be able to attract more large companies to operate in these rather
remote provinces of Middle Vietnam, the provincial authorities should not focus
only on large green field infrastructure investments. Although these show some
success in some regions, many deserted areas declared industrial zones can be
seen, especially along the coastline in TT Hue. Tackling the administrative and
law enforcement problems that exist and that are at least perceived differently in
different locations is more important. Reduction of the bribe level, as targeted by
anti-corruption laws, is one step towards improvements of the business environ-
ment. However, other areas such as law enforcement are not yet focused on, which
makes anti-corruption efforts partly inefficient. The number of contract defaults,
as one example of law enforcement problems, shows a negative influence on the
profits of companies and forces them to employ less workers as they need to op-
erate as flexibly as possible to be able to buffer those incidences. When asked for
their reactions to those contract breaches (which ”defaults” essentially are) most
of the companies tried to solve the problem by direct contact. Even if this does not
work and the financial damage is serious, almost no one would take legal action as
courts are perceived as inefficient, slow and not a solution to the problem.
Besides these soft factors involved in doing business, core components for en-
abling business also need to be kept in sight. The inadequate infrastructure (es-
pecially roads) in Ha Tinh urgently needs to be upgraded in order lower the costs
of getting raw materials to the companies and products to the customers. Using
the current roads almost rules out international trade for remote companies as it
simply takes too long and is too costly. The problem of road quality is less urgent
for the other two provinces as these have access to airports that provide the re-
quired connection to markets. Improving road quality can be expected to serve all
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sorts of rural businesses in the farm and non-farm sectors. Even tourism, which is
a big factor in Vietnam, could be fostered in the not yet connected but attractive
region around Ha Tinh, with its beautiful beaches that are left out of the main
tourist routes due to non-existing infrastructure. With no other sector yet having
the opportunity to arise, this might be a way to tackle both poverty and brain
drain by providing more opportunities for local households and could provide the
incentives for further entrepreneurship in the sector.
As the RNFE can be expected to foster rural growth, their needs for reliable
business environment, infrastructure (mainly roads), skilled labor, and for some
areas better recognition of the private sector, should be targeted. Therefore, pro-
viding market access in rural areas is the key component in the development of a
vibrant RNFE in remote areas, so tackling poverty and supporting the agricultural
sector will remain important in rural areas. Furthermore, a ”one strategy fits all”
on how to achieve increased investments and growth in remote provinces can not
be given due to the different needs and conditions. Strategies need to account for
regional differences in order to meet the needs of the companies.
5.2 Further research
Some fields have been identified that have not yet been covered in the literature
and went beyond the scope of this study. In particular, a panel of the rich DFG
FOR 756 [2008] data set will enable deep insights into issues of rural development
and household strategies that have not yet been explored.
Such a panel would enable an assessment of household income dynamics, an-
swering the question of diversification, specialization or constant adjustment to
external conditions like environmental or price shocks. To gain further insight,
several period to period inspections are required to detect patterns of specializa-
tion and diversification, e.g. from farm to mix farm to mix non farm to non-farm
as a possible development path. Furthermore, the year-to-year panel, including
detailed information about droughts, flooding and other shocks would enable a
judgment on the necessity-driven switching of income sources based on external
influences like shocks.
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Adding risk perception and migration patterns to the more easily observable
income changes would allow for an understanding of households’ decision making
that is usually only covered by sociological qualitative interviews, and thereby
extend the economic understanding of households. The case of Dak Lak especially,
with its good poverty reduction performance but its dependency on volatile coffee
prices, would be an obvious example. A closer investigation of the relevance of
migrants in accessing non-local labor and product markets could be explored and
add further dimensions to poverty and vulnerability analysis.
More importantly, a panel would allow for the consideration of vulnerability
measures and extend the poverty-based approach taken in this study, which would
lead to a better assessment of the contributions of the RNFE; not only to poverty
reduction but also to the provision of sustainable livelihoods for the rural popula-
tion. To link the several vulnerability measures available to the household types
(i.e. non-farm, farm and mix households) as well as their reactions to shocks,
would provide a more detailed assessment of regional differences and the extent
of resilience against risks. A direct link from the households in the sample to the
companies sampled would allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the risks
involved in the different income generating activities.
Aiming at a broader understanding of developments in the rural economy, an
extension of the company survey would be necessary. This should include a second
visit to the sampled companies in order to investigate the impact of the world eco-
nomic crisis on their businesses and their reaction to it. Additionally, extending the
sample to other types of companies would enable construction of a comprehensive
picture of the rural economy. On the one hand, large-scale agricultural producers
should be included as they may play an important role in more remote areas out-
side the provincial capitals. On the other hand, data from small-scale businesses
would enable an assessment of the growth potential already available and measures
that could assist them in growing. Furthermore, the suggested sample would allow
for an assessment of the role of large companies as potential leaders in rural devel-
opment, the different impacts of the world economic crisis and different reactions
to the changes. Additionally, a detailed consideration of recently privatized com-
panies and their needs in the transition process would allow for policy guidance
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in order to provide special assistance to those companies in order to successfully
complete a transformation even in less favorable areas.
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A. APPENDICES
A.1 World market coffee price monthly averages.
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A.2 Regression variable description
Variable Unit Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Income regression; N=1717
ln(income) 4.13 1.14 −1.52 7.72
Credits $pc 148 270 0 4040
Travel distance min 82 57 1 320
Household head age years 47 13 17 91
Land ha pc 0.20 0.39 0.00 7.57
Insurances # 1.13 1.74 0.00 10.00
Shocks 2006 # 0.59 0.70 0.00 5.00
Mean schooling years 8.05 3.65 0.00 36.00
Dependency
Nucleus/ wider size
Ethnic Minority dummy 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Non-farm HH dummy 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Mix non farm HH dummy 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Mix farm HH dummy 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
Hue dummy 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dak Lak dummy 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
Ha Tinh dummy 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Consumption assets regression; N=1838
ln(consumption assets) 5.91 1.22 0.68 9.70
Credits $pc 150 267 0 4040
Travel distance min 83 57 1 320
Household head age years 47 13 17 91
Land ha pc 0.20 0.38 0.00 7.57
Insurances # 1.12 1.73 0.00 10.00
Shocks 2006 # 0.60 0.70 0.00 5.00
Mean schooling years 8.07 3.59 0.00 36.00
Dependency
Nucleus/ wider size
Ethnic Minority dummy 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Non-farm HH dummy 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Mix non farm HH dummy 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Mix farm HH dummy 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Ha Tinh dummy 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Hue dummy 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Dak Lak dummy 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00
Source: Own calculations based on DFG FOR 756 [2008].
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A. APPENDICES
A.4 Household typology changes and poverty rates.
Poverty rate Change N
Change household types 2002 2004 2002-2004
Farm 44% 29% −15% 426
Farm to non-farm 18% 27% 9% 11
Farm to mix farm 57% 29% −27% 270
Farm to mix non farm 58% 19% −39% 57
Farm to other 43% 33% −10% 21
Non farm to farm 75% 25% −50% 4
Non farm 12% 5% −7% 182
Non farm to mix farm 20% 10% −10% 10
Non farm to mix non farm 14% 5% −9% 56
Non farm to other 9% 0% −9% 11
Mix farm to farm 46% 27% −19% 183
Mix farm to non farm 29% 17% −13% 24
Mix farm 39% 19% −19% 685
Mix farm to mix non farm 37% 11% −26% 227
Mix farm to other 11% 11% 0% 9
Mix non farm to farm 20% 19% −2% 59
Mix non farm to non farm 30% 14% −16% 128
Mix non farm to mix farm 29% 15% −14% 222
Mix non farm 22% 8% −15% 499
Mix non farm to other 10% 20% 10% 10
Others to farm 22% 22% 0% 9
Others to non farm 50% 0% −50% 2
Others to mix farm 0% 0% 0% 1
Others to mix non farm 33% 0% −33% 3
Others 26% 22% −4% 23
Total 35% 18% −17% 3,132
Note: N=3132.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
139
A. APPENDICES
A.5 T-test poverty differences by switchtypes.
switched non-switched
2002 Freq. 2002 Freq.
non-poor 809 non-poor 1,225
poor 508 poor 590
Total 1,317 Total 1,815
2002 2004
switched 0.39 0.19
non-switched 0.33 0.17
Differencea in poverty rateb -0.06*** -0.02**
Notes: a: Difference ’non-switched’ - ’switched’
Notes: b: Significantly smaller than zero at the
Notes: 99% level =***, 95% level =** and 90% level =*.
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
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A.6 Further growth incidence curves.
(a) Mix non farm households rural Vietnam
(N=499).
(b) Mix farm to mix non farm households
rural Vietnam (N=227).
(c) Mix farm households rural Vietnam
(N=685).
(d) Farm households rural Vietnam
(N=426).
(e) Farm to mix farm households rural Viet-
nam (N=270).
(f) Mix non farm to mix farm households
rural Vietnam (N=222).
Source: Own calculations based on GSO [2002; 2004].
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A.7 The questionnaire used for the company survey
Please fill the first page  before the interview starts without asking the questions.
Date of interview (dd/mm/yy)
Name of Company/Establishment
Province
District
City/Commune
Address
Is the location any special zone? please tick 1
3
4
2
Distance to next city Name:___________ km hrs
Distance to Province town km hrs
Ethnic majority in your location
religious majority
Name of interviewer
Name of Supervisor
Time interview started
Time interview ended
Name of Data entry personnel
(Please collect the business cards of the respondent and hand them to the German researchers) 
none
Based on structural transformation and economic development, Vietnam accomplished impressive successes in poverty 
alleviation in the past decade. Crucial for these results are non-farm employment opportunities for the rural population. 
Therefore, CIEM implements this enterprise survey in the 3 provinces Ha Tinh, TT-Hue and DakLak to study the 
prospects and limitations that companies face in Central Vietnam concerning their labour force and the quality of the 
local labour market, their supplier and buyer linkages as well as overall political and economic environment in order to 
assess their current role and future potential for sustainable non-agricultural job creation.
Company Survey 2007 Vietnam
Data is used ONLY for research purpose and will be kept strictly confidential
Export processing zone
industrial zone 
High-Tech zone
1
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I General characteristics of business
First of all we would like to know some general characteristics of your company.
1 5 %
2
6 How do you perform your production?
3 How is your company registered? (@ interviewer: read out the categories)
(tick one)
1 sole proprietorship non mechanised (hand tools)
2 Private Limited Company
3 Public Limited Company
4 Limited Partnership
5 Government- / State enterprise
99 others:________________________
4
7 1=yes  2=no
(@interviewer: read out the code)
1 Single unit      if yes: Please name the most important 2.
2 Head office with domestic branches
3 Head office with international branches
4 Branch of domestic company 8
5 Branch of foreign company
99 others:______________________ (@ interviewer: go point by point and fill in the code below)
process innovation
capacity to generate capital
marketing / distribution
technological know-how
management know-how
product innovation 
others:__________________
4 1 excellent 3 moderate
b 1=yes  2=no 2 good 4 poor
9 no answer
II Employment
9 (9 continued…)
1998 1995
Total (number)
Permanently (%) % %
2006 2004 2001 Seasonal/casual (%) % %
Total (number) Family (number)
Permanently (%) % % %
Seasonal/casual (%) % % %
Family (number)
How many employees did you have in the following 
categories and years (end of year)? Important for us 
are possible impacts of shocks (e.g. Asian crisis, bird 
flu,  … )
if above is 2 or 3: What is the city or country 
of major branch?
if above is 4 or 5: What is the city or country 
of head office.
Would you give us an estimated number of 
employees fo 2008?
Which share of your company is 
domestically owned?
Now we want to know some details about your employees.
Please asses your companies capacity 
concerning the following factors.
(@ interviewer: if 100% domestic owned skip 
the question below)
What is the nationality of the 
major foreign owner?
mechanised (human controlled machinery 
used)
________________
In which economic organisation 
is your company embedded?
Is the owner of the company member party member?
Are you certified for any 
international standards?
automated (electronic controlled 
machinery)
Please describe in short form 
your establishment (e.g. rice mill, 
canning factory, hotel, shoe 
factory…)
________________
In which year was this company/branch of 
the Company established?
2
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10 14
Days
2006 2004 2001 1998 1995
11
pleas tick the month(s) 15
J / F / M / A / M / J / J / A / S / O / N / D 
%
12
16
pleas tick the month(s)
J / F / M / A / M / J / J / A / S / O / N / D 
13
child care accommodation food
% transport others:_____________
17 Now we want to know some general characteristics of your workforce at the end of 2006.
(@ interviewer: ask line by line. Ask in an open way and assign the answers to the code)
Code A Code B Code C
1 university/college degree 1 same province 1 Kinh
2 Vocational degree 2 neighbouring province 2 Chinese
3 Upper secondary 3 non neighbouring province 3 Khmer
4 Lower secondary 4 bordering country of province 99 others:_____________
5 Primary 5 Hanoi
6 incomplete primary 6 Saigon
7 none 7 countries 
99 others 8 EU, USA, Canada, Japan,
 Australia and New Zealand
99 others
Professional
s 
(Managers, 
accountants,
…)
per  Month
per  MonthEngineers/ technician
Production/ 
Service 
worker
What is the average salary 
for these employees 
(Dong)
per  Month
per Day
seasonal/ 
casual 
workers
(fluctuation rate)
Typical 
Regional 
origin 
(Code B)
How many days in 2006 was an 
individual seasonal/casual 
worker engaged on average?
health insurance
Number of replaced 
employees in 2006
NumberOccupatio
nal group
In which month(s) do you need 
seasonal/casual workers?
Typical 
Education
al level 
(Code A)
Which non-monetary benefits do 
your employees get? (please 
tick)
Please estimate the share of 
labour costs as share of the total 
costs in 2006.
(@ interviewer: read out all categories 
BEFORE answering, multiple answers are 
possible)Estimate the share of female employees as 
% of total employees in your company in 
2006.
In which month(s) is the availability of labour 
a problem?
pe
rm
an
en
t  
   
 s
ta
ff
Please give the total wage payment (Mio. 
Dong) for these years.
Typical 
Ethnic 
group 
(Code C)
3
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19
(@ interviewer: ask line by line. Ask in an open way and assign the answers to the code)
1=yes  2=no (Code B) (Code C) (Code B) (Code D)
Code A Code B Code C
1 Job experience 1 excellent 1 Head-hunter
2 gender 2 adequate 2 Job agent
3 age 3 inadequate  3 Newspaper
4 family or friends reference 4 highly inadequate 4 governmental agencies 
5 level formal education 9 no answer 5 other employees' reference
6 technical/computer skills 6 family/friends reference
7 foreign language skills Code D 7 choose from applications
8 vocational training 1 very high 8 direct recruitment in villages
9 party membership 2 high 99 others:________________________
10 ethnic/religious membership 3 moderate 
99 others:_______________ 4 low
9 no answer
20 22 What type of training was prüvided?
Did any training take place in 2006 or 2005 ? 1
2
if no go to question 24 3
4
5
6
21 99
23 Who provide the most important training?
(tick one)
1
2
3
4
5
99
Management/Marketing
Most 
important 
(tick one)
Technical
seasonal/ 
casual 
workers
(tick all 
that apply)
others:____________________
trainers from customer
private agency 
own staff members
No. of 
participant
s
pe
rm
an
en
t  
   
 s
ta
ff
Engineers/ 
technician
Please give us some details about training  (e.g. 
technical, computer, language training) that took place 
in your company in 2005 and 2006.
Professional
s 
(Managers, 
accountants,
…)
most 
important
public vocational training
trainers from Head-office
industrial practice
others:___________
Production/ 
Service 
worker
Does a 
formal 
labour 
contract 
exist.
What are the most important criteria 
for the selection of new employees?
Code A
How do you 
assess the 
difficulties in 
firing? 
others
Now we would like to know more details about the requirements and skill level of new employees.
How do you 
assess the 
availability 
of new 
employees 
occupa- 
tional 
group
others
1=yes  2=no
Since when (year) do you train 
your employees?
Language
Computer
Hygiene
How do you 
assess the 
skill level of 
new 
employees?
How do 
you recruit 
them? 
4
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III Business environment / location factors
24 26
1
1st 2nd
3 Foreign firms
if 1-3 go to question 26
25
5
(@ interviewer: read out all categories and tick yes or no.) 27 Is your firm member of any business association?
1=yes  2=no
yes no
1 reduce production
2 lay-off seasonal casual workers
3 lay-off  permanent workers
4 find new customer Dong/VD
5 develop new products
6 nothing
99 others _________
yes no
1 reduce production
2 lay-off seasonal casual workers
3 lay-off  permanent workers
4 find new customer (please tick the most important one )
5 develop new products 1 there is no relevant in that line of business
6 nothing 2 there are no benefits from existing ones
99 others ________ 3 fees are too high
4 company was excluded
5 have enough own contacts
99 others:____________________________
long-term (>1 year)
if yes:  To how many does your 
company belong?
Give the total amount of 
membership fees
2
3
4 Stochastic changes (irregular demand 
changes)
Seasonal changes (regular changes within
one year)
Cyclical changes (regular changes over
several years)
Which of the following patterns is most suitable to 
characterise the dynamics in the market of your 
company's most important product?
Continuous growth/decline
1
2
4
If your market is charactzerised by stochastic changes, 
what is your strategic response to those changes?
please rank the most 
important 2
Firms in a different sector in 
Vietnam
If you encounter any problems (e.g. you got disputes 
with the authorities and you need help to solve the 
issues or you would like to upgrade your production 
and need consultation) whom would you ask?
(@ interviewer: read out all categories 
BEFORE answering)
Governmental agencies
if your company does not  belong to any 
association, why not?
Banks and other financial 
institutions
Firms in the same sector in 
Vietnam
In your opinion, which one is the most 
important/best?
short-term (1 year)
5
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28
6
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 Level of bribe payments
19
20
21
22 Voice in local politics
99 Others:______________
29 30
Mio Dong 1=yes 2=no
1 to 6
Do you plan to relocate your company or 
parts of it in the next 5 years?
(@interviewer: for the first 2 rows ask line by line.      -       
After finishing this, ask the respondent the third question without reading out the categories again.)
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
How important do you consider the following factors for your business and how do you asses 
them at your location?
1 to 6
1 to 6
Security of land rights
Proximity to 
trader/customer
Proximity to 
supplier/raw materials
Existence of cheap 
land
Availability of cheap 
inputs
1 to 6
Which of the 
previous factors do 
you consider as the 
3 major expansion 
barriers?
Rating of local conditions
on a scale from                      1 
very good  to                
6 very poor
Availability of cheap 
labour
Availability of skilled 
labour
 (tick the most important 
3)
4 1 to 6
5
7
in
- a
nd
 o
ut
pu
t
1
2
3
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 61 to 6
1 to 6
What were costs related to natural disasters 
(e.g. flood, storm,…) 
Pro-private business 
attitude of local 
administration
on a scale from            
1 very important  to         
6 not very important
Availability of credit
Existence of good roads
Existence of mobile 
phone network
in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e
Quality of school 
1 to 6
1 to 6
Available internet 
connection
Proximity to airport
Quality of 
vocational/technical 
existence recruitment 
agencies
Existence of industrial 
zones/ business 
concentration
Non-financial business 
support by gov. 
institutions
1 to 6
1 to 6
in
st
itu
tio
ns Financial governmental support (incl. Tax reduction)
Reliability of local 
regulatory environment
Importance for 
business
1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 61 to 6
(99 don't know)
1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6 1 to 6
1 to 6
1 to 6
6
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IV Input/Finance
Now we want to know some details about your inputs and finances.
31 35 How did you solve these problems?
1st 2nd (Code B)
No delivery of supply
Late delivery of supply
Poor quality of supply
32 Price too high
Code A Code B
1 1
2 2
your province and neighbouring provinces %
Laos / Cambodia % 3 3
4 call the court 4
5 nothing
33 99 other:______________ 5 nothing
99 others:______________
36
(tick the most important 2)
34
(@ interviewer: ask line by line)
Number
37
(@ interviewer: read out all categories and tick yes or no)
No delivery of supply yes no
Late delivery of supply
Poor quality of supply
Price too high
mediation through 
friends/relatives
others:____________________
Required quantity not 
available
customer
imitation of competitors
cooperation
others:___________________
local research facilities
(@ interviewer: only ask the types of problems 
that were mentioned above;          ask line by 
line and read out all categories BEFORE 
(Code A)
governmental bank
start using formal 
contracts
Short-term Solution
Required quantity 
not available
long-term 
Strategic 
parent company pays
private bank
supplier loan
family members
friends
customer loanothers:__________
new skilled employees
 (tick the most important 2)
parent company loan
price
terms of payment
How do you learn about new products and 
production technologies?
firm savings
no choice
secure supply
(@ interviewer: please read out all categories 
BEFORE answering)
personal connection
proximity
Which are the most important criteria for 
supplier selection?
Please estimate the share of your inputs 
(raw material + intermediate goods) that is 
purchased in your province/neighbouring 
provinces as well as from Laos/Cambodia?
(please tick)
Type of supplier
 (if 0, go 
to next 
line)
First-time 
supplier
long-term 
supplier
Value in Mio. Dong
What is the value of the following types of 
input costs in 2006?
type of input/cost
Raw materials/ Intermediate 
goods
negotiation and 
compromise directly
stop dealing with 
business partner
mediation through local 
authorities
start screening business 
partner
join business cooperation
Which are the 2 main sources for financing 
major investments?
(@ interviewer: ask open and assign the 
answer to the categories)
quality 
How often did you encounter the following problems in 
2006 and how did you solve these problems?
other costs 
(e.g.: electricity, 
rental costs, 
transport, insurance, 
maintenance)
7
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V Sales
Now we want to know some details about your customers and sales.
38 44
2006 2004 2001 1998 1995
45 For how long do you sell to your 2 major customers?
39 Do you produce for the export market? 1st years
1=yes  2=no 2nd years
if no, go to question 42
40 Since when (year) do you export? 46
41
(Please tick)
yes no
1 personal contact
2 e-mail
42 3 reference
4 trade fairs
5 own homepage
6 business associations
(please tick the most important 2) 7 governmental business boards
not part of strategy 99 others:____________________
lack of potential market
lack of knowledge
high costs (e.g. licences, transport,…)
high product standards required
high risk involved
lack of business partner Number
tariff barriers of destination country
others:____________________________
43 47
1 _______________ % %
2 _______________ % % (please tick the most important 2)
 (see list)
….. % % %  = 100%
….. % % % = 100%
proximity to customer
Through which channel do you supply the 
export market?
if no export production: 
others:____________________
What are the major (customer) decision 
determinants for buying your products?
Where do you sell your 2 main products (% 
of sales in 2006)?
(@interviewer: do not ask the 3 following 
columns if there is no export production)
advertisement
price
quality
What are the 2 major reasons?
(@ interviewer: ask open and assign the 
answers to the categories))
How much was the value of your total 
sales for the following years? (in Mio Dong)
Through which channel do you get in 
contact with new business partners?
How many customers made up 
80% of your sales in 2006?
Which of the above named channels is the 
most important one?
(@ interviewer: read out all categories and tick 
yes or no)
Bordering 
country of 
province
High 
income 
countries
Rest of 
the world
High income countries:  EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, 
USA, Korea, New Zealand
Other 
domestic 
provinces
(@ interviewer: read out all categories 
BEFORE answering)
personal relation
reputation of company
Name of 2 major      
products
Same and 
neigh- 
bouring 
province
indirect
direct
being a subcontractor
selling to trading companies
8
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48 49 How did you solve these problems?
(@ interviewer: ask line by line)
(Code A)
1st 2nd (Code B)
Internal disputes of staff
Code A Code B
1 1
2 2
3 3 join business cooperation
4
4 call the court
1=yes  2=no 5 nothing 5 nothing
99 others:_____________ 99 others:______________
VI Personal characteristics of respondent 
50 Name of respondent 55
51 gender of respondent 1 university/college degree 5 Primary
(@ interviewer: don't ask just fill in!) 2 Vocational degree 6
1= male  2 = female 3 Upper secondary
4 Lower secondary 7 none
52 When did you join the company in this location? 99 others
56
53 What is your current work position in your company?
57
1 = owner  2= manager  99= others
1=yes 2=no
if 2 or 99 go to question 99 (code A)
Code A
54 Indicate your nationality. 1 Hanoi 3 Da Nang
1 = Vietnamese  2 = foreign Asian  99= others 2 Ho Chi Minh City 99 others
99  @ interviewer: Comments by interviewer that he feels might be relevant at the end of questionnaire
No payment of customer
Disputes with local 
authorities 
Customer complains 
about quality
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
Short-term Solution
mediation through local 
authorities
mediation through 
friends/relatives
___________________________________________________________________________
Did you encounter severe financial/liquidity problems 
due to any of these problems?
Thank you very much for your kind cooperation
incomplete 
primary
How often did you encounter the following 
problems in 2006 and how did you solve 
these problems?
Internal disputes of 
staff
Late payment of 
customer
Number
(please tick) (if 0, go 
to next 
line)
First-time 
customer
long-term 
customer
How many years in total did you work in a 
management position. (years)
Did you ever work as a manager outside of 
the current province?    
Please give us information about your 
highest educational level.
negotiation and 
compromise directly
Disputes with local 
authorities 
Type of supplier
      if yes, in which location?
(@ interviewer: ask line by line and read out all 
categories BEFORE answering)
stop dealing with 
business partner
start screening business 
partner
start making formal 
contracts
long-term 
Strategic 
response
Late payment of 
customer
Customer complains about 
quality
No payment of 
customer
9
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A.8 Variables used in the regressions.
Variable Type Description
Largea dummy =1 if the company has more than the mean number
of employees (320)
Exporting dummy =1 if the company exports its produce
Shock/profit ratio Financial loss due to shock event in 2006 divided by
the profit of that particular year
Perm. empl. replaced % Share of permanent employees replaced in 2006
Recent private dummy =1 if company got recently (less than 4 years since
privatization) privatized
Food sector dummy =1 if company operates in food sector
Industry sector dummy =1 if company operates in industry sector but not
food sector
Service sector dummy =1 if company operates in service sector
Age years Number of years the company operated in 2006 since
its establishment
Association member dummy =1 if the company or its owner is member of any
kind of business association
Party member dummy =1 if the company owner is member of the commu-
nist party of Vietnam
Long term selling dummy =1 if the company sales more than 5 years to its
major customer
Customer 80% # Number of customers that constitute 80% of the to-
tal sales
Contract defaults # Number of defaults either by buyers of the produce
or by suppliers of materials
Bribe level [0,1] Rating of the local bribe level by interviewed com-
panies
Governmental quality [0,1] Provincial mean of the generated index
Infrastructure [0,1] Provincial mean of the generated index
Business environment [0,1] Provincial mean of the generated index
Note: a: only included in one of the regressions.
Source: Calculations based on own survey conducted within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
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A.9 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the regres-
sions.
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Employees 06 # 127 312 474 50 3200
Profit ’000$ 128 524 1344 −523 9107
Largea dummy 128 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Exporting dummy 119 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Shock/profit ratio 128 0.42 3.03 −0.20 33.90
Perm. empl. repl. % 120 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.64
Recent private dummy 128 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Food dummy 128 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Industry dummy 128 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Service dummy 128 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Association member dummy 128 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
Party member dummy 108 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00
Long term selling dummy 128 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Customer 80% # 128 55 61 1 500
Contract defaults # 122 44 61 0 300
Bribe level [0,1] 123 0.36 0.22 0.00 1.00
Governmental quality [0,1] 128 0.52 0.05 0.48 0.59
Infrastructure [0,1] 128 0.41 0.07 0.29 0.47
Note: a: only included in one of the regressions.
Source: Calculations based on own survey conducted within DFG FOR 756 [2008].
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A. APPENDICES
A.11 PCI scores of Vietnam’s provinces.
Source: Based on Malesky 2008, p.29.
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